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ABSTRACT 
This thesis presents the findings of exploratory research in the area of social enterprise 
governance. Specifically focussed on Social Firms, there were a number of major 
outcomes. Firstly, a significant association between accountability and legitimacy in 
perceptions of governance was determined. In addition, the constructs of 
transparency, accountability, sustainability and legitimacy were developed, providing 
a basis for further research. 
The exploratory study exposed significant differences regarding perceptions of Social 
Firm governance. These pertained to variables such as organisation size, turnover, 
Board size, decision-making authority and the presence of a social audit. The 
implications being that older, smaller organisations with larger Boards may have a 
stronger social, rather than business orientation. Conversely, Social Firms with 
smaller Boards and higher turnover may have a keener enterprise focus than the 
former type. This provides some support for the emergent theories relating to 
stewardship models of governance in social enterprises. The general lack of a social 
audit amongst the sample signifies that holistic approaches to measuring governance 
performance are not commonplace. 
The findings prompted the development of a conceptual model of Social Firm 
governance, which proposes a division of Board structure to improve accountability, 
thus enhancing legitimacy to primary beneficiaries. This division comprises a smaller, 
instrumental Board of directors, and a representative, inclusive stakeholder 
committee, charged with oversight and contributing to suitable strategy development. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
The issue and academic field of corporate governance is something of a zeitgeist. 
With a backdrop of high-profile corporate governance failures, a changing 
regulatory environment and a burgeoning academic literature, activity and 
interests in it continues unabated. A majority of public attention is drawn to high- 
profile cases of maligned corporate governance: arguably the most notorious of 
recent times include Enron and the long-running Parmalat debacle. However, 
corporate governance issues transcend sectors and pervade the public and 
nonprofit sectors also. There is also a small and emergent sector, the social 
enterprise sector, which remains relatively untouched by academic enquiry into 
its organisations. This study aims to go some way towards rectifying this, 
through exploratory research of its themes and issues. 
Social enterprises form an important and growing element of the economy in the 
United Kingdom. They are defined as "A business with primarily social 
objectives whose surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose in the 
business or in the community... " (DTI, 2002, p. 7). A recent report by the UK 
Government's Office of the Third Sector (Sector, 2006) valued their cumulative 
economic contribution in the region of approximately £27 billion, from 55,000 
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recognised social enterprises. They provide a range of services to customers and 
communities in need of them, and play a part in regeneration of deprived 
communities in towns and cities (Pearce, 2003). They also have a primary role 
for delivering social benefit to a defined community or group (Borzaga and 
Defourny, 2001, Spear, 2001). They use enterprise to increase the level of social 
benefit they deliver to these groups (Pearce, 2003; Westall, 2001). 
The UK government has been pro-active in supporting and championing social 
enterprise activity at a national and regional level. It is common that councils and 
local government will pursue some kind of agenda for social enterprise. They are 
seen in as important providers of public services in the future, though evidence 
that they actually can and do this is presently unavailable. However, they do still 
play an important part in regeneration and empowerment within communities, so 
it is notable that study of their governance is relatively sparse: a handful of recent 
academic papers exist that focus on the governance of social enterprises per se 
(Low, 2006). Partly this is complicated by the variety of social enterprises, the 
term is an umbrella that covers cooperatives, housing associations, Social Firms, 
charity trading arms and credit unions, and many more types besides (Pearce, 
2003; Paton 2004). There has been significant research activity in some of these 
types, though there are others with relatively little research development (Low 
2006, Mason, Kirkbride and Bryde, 2007). Therefore, with a gap emerging in the 
corporate governance and social enterprise academic literature, this research 
reviews and explores the salient features of social enterprise governance. 
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1.2 RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
The research question that was developed from the initial literature survey was: 
Do attitudes to governance influence perceptions of performance in Social 
Finns? 
Following this research question, research objectives were determined: 
" To examine the influence of accountability on the legitimacy of social 
enterprise governance. 
" To determine the role of the social mission in facilitating ethical practice 
by managers of Social Firms. 
" To determine and analyse the significance of any relationship(s) between 
transparency, accountability, sustainability and legitimacy 
" To develop a model of governance that represents a holistic view of the 
formal and informal governance arrangements in Social Firms. 
Both the research question and objectives provide a focus to the research that 
was intentionally exploratory. This was useful because it provided a general 
direction for the study, without restricting the parameters of investigation too 
much. A summary of the findings, and their relation to the research question and 
objectives, can be found in Chapter 8 (8.2). 
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1.3 THESIS OUTLINE 
Following on from this Introduction, Chapter 2 begins with an overview of the 
corporate governance literature. A variety of different governance theories are 
discussed, and then applied across different organisation types. Finally, the 
review centres on social enterprises and governance. One of the major themes 
from the review was the relative lack of any substantive social enterprise 
governance research. This directed the review to the need for exploratory 
research to provide some empirical evidence of emergent themes in social 
enterprise governance. Therefore, it highlighted some of the emergent theories 
applicable to social enterprise governance, and a set of propositions were 
developed for further testing. At the forefront of these theories was institutional 
theory, and its use in analysing governance was deemed appropriate and novel 
for study of socially-oriented organisations. 
Chapter 3 considered the methodological implications for the study, and 
discussed the merits of a number of different approaches. Postpositivism was 
advocated for the study for two principal reasons: firstly because exploratory 
research is well suited to a relativist scientific approach, and; secondly, because 
the institutional approach adopted aligns with postpositivist methodology. These 
methodological norms were important for grounding the exploratory research in 
a way that could be justified in light of previous, similar, studies. This Chapter 
also gave an outline of the stages involved in the research, and a research design 
model was developed to show how the two stages fitted together. 
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Chapter 4 provided a rationale for an explanation of Stage 1 of the study. After 
justifying the methods chosen to accomplish and analyse this qualitative stage of 
the research, a summary of the salient findings from the key informant interviews 
closed the Chapter. The most important outcomes were that governance was a 
worthwhile and multi-faceted subject of further study; and Social Firms 
represented the appropriate type of social enterprise to focus Stage 2 of the 
research on. 
Chapter 5 explained the implications for validity and reliability in the 
investigation, together with sampling and piloting issues. As Stage 2 was 
quantitative, the measurement instrument was explained, and each aspect of it 
was justified in relation to prior studies. The Chapter finished with a reflective 
account of the potential limiting factors that may impinge upon the study, and 
remedial action that was in place to minimise their impact. 
Chapter 6 detailed the quantitative findings and analysis of Stage 2. Firstly, 
descriptive analysis showed the trends in the data, and non-parametric tests were 
performed to look for any associations within data categories. In additions, tests 
for internal consistency and normality of distribution established that the data set 
was valid. Next, a rigorous series of parametric tests was conducted on the Likert 
statement data from the questionnaire, and found a number of significant 
findings. Of these significant outcomes, there were some categories that recurred 
more than others, principally the number of Board members, budget 
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responsibility and the locus of decision-making authority. Also, an association 
was found between one of the predictor variables (accountability) and the 
dependent variable (legitimacy). Summary analysis of these findings was 
provided in this Chapter, though the implications of these outcomes were given 
in the following Chapter. 
Chapter 7 grouped discussion of the implications sequentially, by proposition. In 
a thorough interrogation of the implications of the study, this Chapter culminated 
in the conceptualisation of a governance model that would arguably serve Social 
Firms better than the current governance arrangements. This model attempted to 
alleviate the apparent difficulties encountered by Boards of trustees by splitting 
them into to two: an instrumental Board of directors (requiring some recruitment 
of expertise), and a separate but influential stakeholder committee (with similar 
responsibilities to the Board of trustees). The former Board is better placed to 
deliver social benefit to primary beneficiaries: managers and staff. The latter 
committee provides oversight of the Board and is in control of the social audit 
process. This attempts to increase the uptake of the social audit as a means to 
improving accountability, thus enhancing legitimacy of governance. A discussion 
of the various parts of the conceptual model followed, with the emphasis on 
justification of the role of legitimacy and stakeholder claims upon it. The Chapter 
concluded with a discussion of the limitations of the study, difficulties 
encountered and caveats pertaining to the study generally. 
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Chapter 8 provided a set of conclusions about the study. Principally, these were 
the salient factors for significance of perceptions about Social Firm governance. 
In addition, consideration was given to the development of the constructs used in 
the study, and those propositions that have indicated valid components of each 
one. The conceptual model, and a number of areas for further research were 
discussed. Finally, a summary of the directions that each may take, together with 
an indication of how they could contribute to a body of knowledge was provided. 
1.4 CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
The thesis contributes to both the corporate governance and social enterprise 
bodies of knowledge. It contributes to the former because the area of social 
enterprise governance is generally under-researched, and this study provides 
some insight into the structure and practice of governance for a social enterprise 
type. The majority of corporate governance research tends to focus on 
corporations, public organisations or nonprofits. Social enterprises are still a 
relatively recent addition to the corporate governance field, and so this thesis is a 
valuable starting point for further investigation. This is particularly so if some of 
the findings can be, as has been indicated in Chapter 8, applied across sectors. 
Some social enterprises have proven to be successful in niche markets against 
multi-national competitors (for example Day Chocolate Company and their 
Divine chocolate brand). These organisations manage the fusion of two 
(supposedly) opposing orientations, social and business, and there is evidence 
that they can compete against mainstream business. This thesis shows that there 
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are some interesting aspects of Social Firm governance that could be applied to 
corporations, particularly the role of stakeholders at Board level and how they 
might be managed. 
For the latter, the thesis contributes because it develops knowledge of the way 
that a type of social enterprise is managed and the problems faced. The social 
enterprise academic literature is steadily accumulating but is at present quite 
disparate. Hence, the thesis contributes by providing an empirical study of 
governance in a type of social enterprise, and a conceptual model showing how 
governance problems could be minimised. Four constructs, transparency, 
accountability, sustainability and legitimacy were all developed and tested during 
the thesis. The outcome of testing these constructs has shown that they are 
internally consistent, and provide a useful starting point for future research to 
build upon them. In addition, the thesis provides evidence of an association 
between accountability and legitimacy, both of which are important in the 
governance of socially-orientated organisations. This association justifies the 
pursuit of more transparent, accountable governance, and should encourage 
Boards in social enterprise to pursue this agenda more vigorously. It also 
illustrates how important legitimacy is, and that Boards should take steps to 
ensure that their activities and performance can be judged transparently by 
primary stakeholders. Therefore, legitimacy can be acquired through accountable 
governance practices, and this should be the rationale behind all governance- 
related activities. 
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Finally, this study indicates that Social Firms may be adapting (possibly via 
isomorphism) to professionalisation of their organisations. This has been 
indicated in some of the recent literature in this area (Low, 2006; Reid and 
Griffith 2006). In order to create more social benefit, there is pressure on social 
enterprises to become more efficient and effective in meeting service-level 
agreements with their partners, clients and customers. This study showed that 
managers and Board members do have different perceptions of the primacy of 
social needs over business focus. This change in orientation is contrary to the 
normative definition of social enterprise, but does confirm the predictions about 
the direction that the social enterprise sector in the UK will take. 
1.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This Chapter has provided an outline of the thesis that follows. The starting point 
was a background for the entire study that focussed on social enterprises, what 
they are and why the research of them was required. Following this, the research 
question and objectives were stated, and a summary of the entire thesis was 
outlined sequentially by Chapter. Finally, the contributions to knowledge that 
this exploratory study provides were given in the concluding section. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the United Kingdom, the social enterprise sector is worth approximately £27 
billion to the economy, with 55,000 such organisations accounting for not less 
than 1.2% of all enterprises in the country (Office of the Third Sector, Sector, 
2006). Social enterprises are defined as: "A business with primarily social 
objectives whose surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose in the 
business or in the community... " (DTI, 2002). These enterprises are beginning to 
form a significant part of the UK economy. Increasingly, social enterprises are 
involved in the delivery of public services and are viewed in the long-term as 
being able to compete with privately owned organisations operating within new 
or existing markets(Westall, 2001). 
Allied with a new legal form, the Community Interest Company (CIC), 
created by the Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 
(2004), the current and future role of social enterprise will be influenced by their 
success in procurement and delivery of public services. Also, they are expected 
to play an integral role in the regeneration of cities and towns in the United 
Kingdom (Robinson, Dunn and Ballintyne, 1998). 
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Given their growing value in the UK economy, the requirement for effective 
governance of these organisations is of importance (Borzaga and Defourny, 
2001, Borzaga and Solari, 2001, Low, 2006, Mason, Kirkbride and Bryde, 2007). 
The furore caused by high profile mismanagement of large and / or multi- 
national private corporations has brought heightened media attention to corporate 
governance issues. These have included Enron, Parmalat, WorldCom and 
Barings Bank, though these examples are a small representation of the number of 
corporate governance failures. However, they do represent some of the most 
infamous and costly to shareholders and other relevant constituencies. 
The development of the corporate governance concept has occupied many 
decades prior to the collapse of the above organisations. Furthermore, the term 
applies to other types of organisations, such as public and non-profit 
organisations. Social enterprises of all types are prone to governance problems, 
though the profile of such instances receives less coverage in the mainstream 
press (Mordaunt and Otto, 2004). In academic literature non-profit governance 
has been subject to a degree of development (Vinten, 1998). Also, in practice 
voluntary codes have and are being developed, such as the Corporate 
Governance code of Best Practice (CooperativesUK, 2005), to promote good 
governance in this sector. 
It is integral that the governance structures of social enterprises are 
transparent, democratic and promote accountability to its defined stakeholders. 
Common methods employed to this end include social auditing and accounting, 
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which measures the impact of the organisation in defined areas. Contrary to the 
`private' view, that organisations exist to serve the rights of shareholders or 
financiers, social enterprise embraces a broader interpretation of the term, 
stakeholder. This contrasts the `private' social institution conceptions of 
organisations (Parkinson, 2003). Social auditing and accounting measures impact 
on defined stakeholder groups to test organisational performance against 
predetermined (hence benchmarked) social goals. 
The purpose of this literature review is to discuss the appropriate conceptual and 
theoretical basis for governance in social enterprise. The review begins by 
charting the development of corporate governance theory from an Anglo- 
American perspective of corporate governance. Furthermore, it examines the 
appropriateness of the social institution view of the organisation as a basis for 
studying the corporate governance arrangements of social enterprises. 
Consideration is given to the expediency of this approach compared with the 
prevailing `private' conception of organisations (and their governance). Finally, 
it determines whether the social institution conception is a more appropriate lens 
through which to examine social enterprise governance. 
Contemporary governance research is examined to provide a practical 
illustration of the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on organisation 
performance. Finally, it traces the development and current role of `social 
enterprise' in the United Kingdom, and highlights the gaps in research in this 
area. 
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2.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Corporate governance is defined as: "... (A) set of relationships between a 
company's management, its Board, its shareholders and other stakeholders ... also 
(providing) the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, 
and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined. " (OECD, 2004, p. 11). 
Corporate governance maintains a high profile in the public domain, notably this 
is when corporate wrongdoing is exposed. In recent times, the demise of Enron 
and WorldCom in the United States and the recent Parmalat scandal in Europe 
exemplify the high-risk and complex governance issues that organisations can 
encounter. As Grant (2003) asserts, the profits of some corporations exceed the 
Gross Domestic Product of some of the world's nations. Given the scale of 
financial and human capital employed within organisations, the requirement for 
trust in companies on behalf of investors and the general public has become 
increasingly important. To this end, academic research in corporate governance 
has sought to develop methods of control and `checks and balances' within the 
organisation. These controls aim to ensure efficacy of governance structure and 
processes, upholding the fiduciary duty managers and directors have to 
shareholders and / or stakeholders. 
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Formal study in corporate governance "is less than half a century old" (Tricker, 
2000, p. 15), though practice predates theoretical development back to the 
creation of the corporate form. `Corporate governance' is a fairly recent term, 
widely used since the end of the twentieth century. Corporations first surfaced in 
Europe in the seventeenth century, and their original, chartered purpose was to 
serve the public interest (Grant, 2003). Legislative changes in England in the 
nineteenth century, particularly the development of company law, facilitated a 
pro-entrepreneurial environment. For example, corporations were now enabled to 
define their own purpose and limit liability of shareholders (Grant, 2003). This 
expansion in the availability of capital for corporate enterprises fostered the spirit 
of entrepreneurship and the rise of the corporation in the United Kingdom during 
the industrial revolution. This period also saw the establishment of the 
corporation as legal `entity', entitled to "... contract, to sue and be sued, to own 
property and to employ. " (Tricker, 2000, p. 14). As corporations grew in size, 
and economic prosperity rose and fell (for example the US stock market crash of 
1929), research in law, economics and the developing organisational sciences 
sought to understand more about the impact of the rise of corporations. This was, 
in part, founded in the economic and legal environment past and present, and the 
major role that corporations and capital markets had on the direction of national 
prosperity. 
The development of governance literature has provided at least three major 
theoretical approaches to corporate governance: agency theory (Berle and Means, 
1932, Coase, 1937, Fama, 1980, Fama and Jensen, 1983), transaction cost 
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economics (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, Williamson, 1979) and stakeholder 
theory (Dodd, 1932, Donaldson and Preston, 1995, Freeman, 1984, Freeman and 
Reed, 1983). Crucially, the theories can be attributed a shareholder or 
stakeholder perspective, and pertain to the Anglo-American corporate system 
(Weimar and Pape, 1999). International governance typologies, such as the 
Germanic, Japanese, and Latin systems typically diverge from the Anglo- 
American approach by virtue of their Board structure, stakeholder inclusion and 
the more prominent role of regulation. The Anglo-American system is defined by 
the reliance on the market to control, (or "discipline") corporations' inefficient 
management by the threat of merger or takeover by competitors (Weimar and 
Pape, 1999, p. 155). In a modern context, one consequence of high-profile 
corporate governance failures is the increasingly prominent role of governance 
measurement and ratings systems (Strenger, 2004, Tsipouri and Xanthakis, 
2004). They are a means of measuring the effectiveness of, not only corporate 
performance, but director effectiveness and management performance. In turn, 
this information is used to inform shareholder and (the more powerful) 
institutional investors, in making voting decisions and appropriate representation 
at Annual General Meetings. Such developments are illustrative of the drive for 
accountability and transparency, the evidence of which is an indication of good 
governance practice (Gray, 1992, Strenger, 2004). 
Traditional debate has focussed on the appropriateness of governance 
arrangements within the organisation. These arrangements take various forms, 
dependent on the degree of shareholder / stakeholder orientation within the firm. 
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The theories alluded to above generally adopt the premise of the corporation as a 
private entity. However, the role of corporations in society is also of importance, 
and it is here that a distinction is drawn between concepts of the corporation and 
governance theories (Carroll, 1979, Preston, 1975, Shrivastava, 1995). The 
agency theory and transaction-cost economics perspectives take the shareholder 
primacy stance, and vindicate the role of the external market to control, regulate 
and discipline inefficiencies. This contrasts with the social institution view of the 
corporation, which posits the idea of the organisation as a social entity. Rather 
than focusing on profit and `optimal efficiencies', there is a prominent holistic 
view of governance which involves the recognition and inclusion of 
stakeholders. This is not wholly dissimilar from alternative models of corporate 
governance, such as the Japanese model, which are markedly different from the 
Anglo-American model (Blair, 1995). 
The following section analyses the historical and contemporary status of these 
three theories of corporate governance from the Anglo-American perspective. It 
discusses the appropriateness of this research and the implications of it for the 
monitoring of governance performance in corporate, non-profit and more 
relevantly social enterprises. 
34 
2.2.1 AGENCY THEORY 
There are a number of diverse theoretical strands that make use of agency theory. 
These range from economics, to political theory and marketing (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Agency theory "... identifies the agency relationship where one party, the 
principal, delegates work to another party, the agent. " (Mallin, 2004, p. 10). It is 
in this sense that agency theory applies to corporate governance. The `principals' 
are the legal-entitled beneficiaries of corporate activity in their role as 
shareholders. The shareholders delegate power to the agent, the corporation's 
management, for control of the corporation's financial, physical or human 
resource assets. They delegate this power to managers to run the company in the 
interest of the principal and optimise the productivity and profitability of the 
firm. This principal-agent relationship is central to agency theory, as is the 
metaphor of a contract to analyse it (Eisenhardt, 1989, Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). The next section traces the development of the key concepts forming the 
basis of agency theory, which is fundamental to the predominant `principal- 
agent' governance model (Letza, Sun and Kirkbride, 2004). 
2.2.1.1 DIVORCE OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
A seminal work by Berle and Means (1932) provides the theoretical 
underpinning for, what became, agency theory. In this work, they proposed the 
concept of the divorce of ownership and control. The historical context of this 
work is that, around the time of its publication, the United States had just 
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experienced the stock market crash of 1929, following a decade of industrial 
growth (Kristie, 1997). Historically, investors were the key resource for the 
growth of the corporation, via the influx of capital from purchase and trade of 
company shares. Over time the requirement for large inputs of fresh capital from 
investors diminish as the corporation seeks other avenues for raising capital 
(Grant, 2003). 
Their predominant assertion was that as the number of shareholders in a 
corporation increases and this group becomes geographically dispersed, the 
ability for shareholders to exert control over the running of the corporation 
diminishes. In turn, the locus of control shifts towards management, lessening the 
oversight and control shareholders have over corporate performance. This poses 
a problem for the investor, whether it would be in their interests at all to invest 
given the requirement for a preferential return on their investment, managed by 
individuals they have limited control over. This is the primary, delegated, 
responsibility of the Board of directors. 
An implication of this scenario is that directors, whose duty to shareholders is to 
oversee the strategic direction of the corporation, are less likely to be held 
accountable for poor corporate performance (Aguilera, 2005, Huse, 2005, 
Roberts, 2001, Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005). The role of directors is 
integral in what amounts to a governance triumvirate. As Mace (1972, p. 38) 
explains: "Management manages the company, and Board members serve as 
sources of advice and counsel to the management. " The role of director has been 
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subject to controversy, notably for claims of excessive director remuneration, the 
effectiveness of directors and the presence of independent, non-executive 
directors (Baysinger and Butler, 1985, Conyon, Gregg and Machin, 1995, Estes, 
1973, Mace, 1972). Without effective means of controlling the level of residual 
managerial power over corporate resources, shareholders have a reduced 
influence over the control of the corporation. Therefore, examination of the role 
of directors in the governance of organisations focuses on the areas outlined 
above. The directors, and the expectations associated with their role and 
performance by various parties, have a central place in the theory. 
The key aspect of research in this area is the pressure to ensure that principal 
interests in an organisation's performance are protected. This results in seeking 
an optimal and workable solution that enables such protection of interests but 
also ensures that directors are properly remunerated and accountable (McNulty, 
Roberts and Stiles, 2003, Short, Keasey, Hull and Wright, 2005, Spira, 2001, 
Weir and Laing, 2001). In so doing, the process of governance can be seen to 
have integrity and maintain its legitimacy to internal actors and externally to key 
groups in society. The appropriateness of such a solution is the focus of ongoing 
debate on the corporate social responsibilities of corporations (Guay, Doh and 
Sinclair, 2004, Husted, 2003). 
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2.2.1.2 THE AGENCY PROBLEM 
Agency theory is concerned with remedying the `agency problem' and this is 
defined as "... (a) conflict of interest, involving members of the organisation - 
these might be owners, managers, workers or consumers. " (Hart, 1995, p. 678). 
Building on the divorce of ownership and control concept, agency theory deals 
with the management of the principal-agent relationship, as a way of 
marginalising the agency problem. The role of contracts between parties is the 
device for ensuring manager and shareholder interests are aligned leading to the 
conceptualisation of the corporation as a `nexus of contracts'. In doing so, 
agency theory deals with the reduction of `agency costs', which are costs 
"... resulting from managers misusing their position, as well as the costs of 
monitoring and disciplining them to try and prevent abuse" (Blair, 1995, p. 97). 
This issue of managerial self-interest, and the means of regulating behaviour and 
attitude towards risk, is the dominant theme in agency theory. 
The means for achieving the required incentive and control structure to regulate 
the agency problem is conceptualised by the setting of contracts. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976, p. 310, italics in original) considered firms as "... legal fictions 
which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals". 
They used an analysis of agency costs and the diffusion of the shareholder base 
to question the prevalence of a corporate form where investors bear the residual 
risk for their investments. In turn, this investment is entrusted to a management 
who are prone to self-interest, rather than delivering a maximised return. 
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Shleifer & Vishny (1997) outlined the difficulties encountered when proposing 
remedial action in instances of managerial abuse of power. They highlight the 
intractable problem of a wholly prescriptive contract to govern managerial 
behaviour. Such problems are exacerbated by an unpredictable set of future 
circumstances and the expert judgement offered by managers in their role in the 
organisation. Their discussion centres on the locus of control between managers 
and financiers, determining that control is often skewed towards managers. This, 
in part, is as a result of the dilution of share ownership where shareholders 
cannot exert viable individual influence on and regulation of managerial activity. 
This scenario is further complicated by the myriad ways managers can use their 
residual power of control to utilise funds for personal interest, rather than optimal 
corporate benefit. 
They conclude that, though the agency problem is serious, there are several 
mechanisms which serve to protect providers of finance. Foremost is legal 
protection for this (often disparate) group, as well as large shareholding groups, 
as a "... nearly universal method of control that helps investors get their money 
back. " (p. 774). They recognise that these methods do not satisfy the agency 
problem. They contend that further questions remain to be answered before a 
suitable approach can be accepted as a deterrent to managerial control of power. 
Highly incentivised contracts are proposed as one method of preventing 
misappropriation of wealth away from investors. However, whilst 
acknowledging the central role of law in corporate governance, they question the 
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role of political (as well as economic) forces in the progression of efficient 
corporate governance systems. 
An important feature in a dynamic governance environment is the role of 
institutional investors. These entities concentrate power through the control of 
large portions of corporate shares, and as such have potentially great influence in 
the shareholder-side control of the corporation (Davis, 2002). 
2.2.2 TRANSACTION-COST ECONOMICS 
Transaction-cost economics (TCE) asserts the firm as governance structure, as an 
alternative interpretation of the nexus of contracts view (Mallin, 2004). Initial to 
its development was work by Coase (1937) and the `theory of the firm' concept, 
though other contributors include Hayek (1945), Simon (1985) and North and 
Davis (1971). Therefore, rather than being a theory of economics per se, it has 
developed from a variety of origins, from organisational theory and sociology to 
law. Later work in institutional economics, for example by Williamson (1979, , 
1984) provided further development of the new institutional conception. The 
essence of this theory is to examine the unit of `transactions' rather than 
contracts. TCE readily acknowledges the incompleteness of contracting, hence 
supporting the governance structure rather than nexus of contracting. The 
structure intends to mitigate against incomplete contracting, by way of 
minimising inefficiencies of transactions made by a firm. Transactions occur as 
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a result of the firm's activities, for example with suppliers in the intermediate- 
product market. The efficient firm will transact internally, until the firm grows to 
such a size where equilibrium cannot be maintained. In the event of this, 
transactions are more favourable externally, and this can be used to explain the 
rise of large and multi-national corporations (Coale, 1937). Where raising 
internal capital is no longer a feasible (efficient) option for the firm, then external 
sources are sought in order for the corporation to remain viable and competitive. 
These transactions are examined according to three main qualities: there 
frequency, the risks incumbent upon them, and the assets to which they apply 
(Williamson, 1998). Governance then, is concerned with the structures in place 
to minimise the risk associated with transactions, factored by the value of the 
assets to which they apply. The better the structure is at managing transactions, 
the better it is likely to perform on a cost-transaction basis. 
Within the governance structure, activity is moderated by the Board of directors, 
whose role remains one of control. The primacy of governance structure is what 
Williamson (1998, p. 26) refers to "the play of the game": the on-going 
management of the firm and control of sub-Board level actors. 
TCE shares many common elements with agency theory, and primarily 
adopts a shareholder perspective (though allusion to stakeholder involvement at 
Board level is made in Williamson, 1984). Both agency theory and TCE focus on 
efficiencies of the corporation, the need to regulate management that in effect 
control the corporation, and the important role of contracting. Similarly, both 
face criticism by focussing too narrowly on creating efficiencies and the 
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provision of shareholder value, rather than a broader consideration of corporate 
impact on stakeholders. Furthermore, both theories have an empathetic view of 
the corporation, with little scope for applicability to other organisational forms. 
Conceptually, both agency theory and TCE are concerned with the corporation in 
its private form, pertaining to ownership rights and the effective role of the 
market in moderating managerial activity. This contrasts with the subsequent 
section, which examines the origins and implications of the social institution 
conception of the corporation, and alternative theories of governance (Parkinson, 
2003). 
2.2.3 STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
The third corporate governance theory under examination is stakeholder theory. 
This approach to governance departs from the neoclassical view of the firm, and 
has origins in organisation theory (Argandona, 1998). Stakeholders are defined 
by Freeman and Reed (1983, p. 91) as: "Any identifiable group or individual 
who can affect the achievement of an organisation's objectives, or who is 
affected by the achievement of an organisation's objectives". This definition 
encapsulates the broad sense with which the term is applied, though Freeman 
proposed a narrower definition, which highlights the role of such groups in the 
continual survival of the organisation. The stakeholder concept has become 
synonymous with the recognition of a range of groups, and also with a more 
holistic approach to business: for example, it is central in corporate social 
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responsibility research (Carroll, 1979, Carroll, 1999, Preston, 1975). In terms of 
corporate governance, it provides the basis for the stakeholder governance model 
(Campbell, 1997, Daniels, 1993, Donaldson and Preston, 1995, Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2003, Slinger, 1999). The stakeholder theory of governance 
contrasts to the previous theories discussed above, primarily due to the difference 
in conception of the corporation. As Parkinson (2003) makes explicit, the 
stakeholder perspective of the corporation is that of a social institution, rather 
than a private entity. This view recognises the broad influence of corporations in 
society, and vice versa. This has implications for the way that these organisations 
are governed. 
In examination of the nature of trusteeship inferred on managers of the 
corporation, Dodd (1932, p. 1149) underlined the challenges that faced the 
corporation given the legal and economic context of the time. He maintained that 
corporations had a "social service" as well as a profit-making one, and that it is 
only the law that allows business to serve society, rather than make profit. Dodd 
advocated business as a profession (as opposed to trade) and indicated that 
manager-owned business were more likely to uphold moral conventions and also 
be more responsive to public opinion (which at one stage, he asserts, eventually 
becomes law). 
Favouring self-regulation over Government interference, Dodd claimed that 
corporations, who did not adopt a positive stance towards their social role, would 
be forced to do so by competitive forces. The historical context is crucial to 
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Dodd's line of reasoning, given the proximity of the Depression, and the 
favourable legislative conditions for corporations. These conditions had allowed 
them to accumulate wealth and face no impecunious legal provisions that would 
unfairly hinder their wealth creation function. 
As Millon (1990, p. 216) notes, Dodd "... demonstrated how the natural (social) 
entity idea could provide a basis for corporate social responsibility. " Using the 
entity concept as a starting point, Dodd argued that as corporations were bound 
by the same legal restraints as an individual, so they should be expected to 
perform the same moral obligations to society as individuals. Therefore, rather 
than managers acting as agents to shareholders, they serve to represent the 
corporate entity, and owe a duty to other citizens in a way that does not 
compromise moral obligations for profit maximisation. 
One of the crucial features of the stakeholder theory of governance is the 
assertion that corporations have a moral duty to a range of groups. In this view 
the moral duty of the corporation is central to the legitimacy of corporate activity 
and existence. This element of stakeholder theory of governance has also become 
part of the problem. The reason for this is that there is debate over the proper, 
normative foundation of stakeholder theory. Argandona (1998), for example, 
persuasively claims that stakeholder theory lacks a solid foundation, and attempts 
to provide one by linking it with the theory of the `common good'. The common 
good is that good which benefits or `perfects' all of those members of a given 
society. The fulfilment of individual goals is secondary to the primacy of the 
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common good; private good is not excluded, only where it is to the detriment of 
the common good. 
For others, such as Campbell (1997), the matter is best seen in a pragmatic way. 
The stakeholder view is a common sense way to view the firm and that it makes 
good business sense to imbue a feeling of purpose in corporate activity that is 
relevant to the range of stakeholders that depend on the organisation. 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) examined three commonly described bases of 
stakeholder theory, descriptive, instrumental and normative. They propose four 
theses, asserting the descriptive and instrumental value of stakeholder theory, yet 
most importantly the fundamental normative basis and its managerial nature. 
The descriptive element relates to how stakeholder theory is described in reality, 
and how its descriptive application is evidenced by empirical studies. 
Instrumental centres open the role of proposed actions, and then how they relate 
to the achievement of corporate objectives. The normative foundation of 
stakeholder theory represents its moral core. The emphasis is on the decisions the 
managers ought to make, based on moral correctness and moral duties to 
stakeholder constituencies. They contend that agency theory is descriptively 
inaccurate and normatively unacceptable. Furthermore, the concept of property 
rights can be applied to legitimise stakeholder theory, as well as to invalidate it. 
For example, Coase (1960) asserted the complex nature of property rights and 
are intertwined with human rights. Therefore, the allocation of property rights 
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amongst stakeholders, and the level of power managers have in making decisions 
to asset "distributive justice", has relevance to stakeholder theory (Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995, p. 84). A complex view of property rights invites support 
from utilitarianism, social contract and libertarianism, and can be used to 
interpret stakeholder property claims on the basis of "... need, ability, effort and 
mutual agreement. " (ibid). They claim that no single theory of distributive justice 
is appropriate, which supports the use of a pluralistic theory of distribute justice. 
This allows for an "explicit" link between property rights and stakeholder theory. 
By establishing a link between a pluralistic theory of property rights and 
stakeholder theory justifies and legitimises the normative rights of stakeholders 
in corporate governance. 
Gibson (2000) argues that instrumental stakeholder theory is amoral. According 
to Donaldson and Preston (1995) the instrumental basis of stakeholder theory 
determines "... the connections, or lack of connections, between stakeholder 
management and the achievement of traditional corporate objectives. " Amorality 
arises as an issue if, as Gibson does, one asserts the morality of stakeholder 
theory. If the corporation takes consideration of both primary and secondary 
stakeholders as the ultimate beneficiaries of achieving corporate objectives, such 
activities are amoral. The lack of focus on delivering benefit to a single group 
makes it difficult to claim that any one moral cause or right is `superior' to any 
other. In this way, stakeholder theory does not make a persuasive argument for 
the holistic governance of corporations. Corporations require clear, focussed 
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strategies that identifies a key recipient of corporate activity. Stakeholder theory 
cannot offer this. 
Freeman and Reed (1983) examined the role of stakeholder analysis, and 
considered the efficient practice of such analysis as a means to promoting a 
`voluntary' approach to corporate governance. Rather than allowing legislation to 
provide the "elaborate balancing act" of constituency interests (p. 103), proper 
analysis allows organisations to prioritise amongst legitimate claims. They assert 
that the stakeholder analysis they have conducted through their paper is useful 
for the development of policy alternatives, but do not offer practical support for 
the suggestions made. 
Yet, they include a caveat, in that to counteract haste in governance reform, the 
full impact of future actions must be understood. They argue that to 
accommodate this, directors must make the necessary efforts to fully understand 
the issues, the required changes and future commitment. It is through this active 
engagement with the issues that allows all potential options to be considered. 
This discussion has so far identified the core theoretical points within the 
stakeholder theory of corporate governance. It is now necessary to compare the 
relative merits of the dominant corporate governance theories. In a comparison of 
agency and stakeholder theory perspectives on Enron, Culpan and Trussel (2005) 
delineate the governance issues and consider the various management and 
financial implications, and how this impacted on Enron's stakeholders. They 
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consider how agency theory examines the fiduciary commitments of the `agents' 
(p. 74), whereas the stakeholder theory view posits, "balancing the interests of 
various constituents. " (p. 75). By considering the application of the two theories, 
they determined stakeholder theory provides a broader context for further impact 
analysis. The correct interpretation of the use of stakeholder theory in this way, 
classifies it as "instrumental stakeholder theory" (p. 75). This is treated in more 
detail by Donaldson and Preston (1995), with their analysis of the three 
constituents of stakeholder theory, discussed above. 
Boatright (2002) asserts the viability of conjoining the nexus-of-contracts and 
stakeholder theories. He makes explicit the central tensions between stockholder 
/ stakeholder theories of the firm, and considers the role of contracting to govern 
relationships where the stockholder is the bearer of residual risk. Furthermore, 
this analysis asserts that stockholders are not the only party to bear risk, and that 
stakeholders often are the subject of the discretionary power held by 
management (for example, in a situation where managers may `lie' to employees, 
to their detriment). 
Shankman (1999) states that the continued debate between agency and 
stakeholder theorists counterpoises the lack of moral implication of agency 
theory, and the central role of "ethical implication" in business ethics (p. 319). 
The author posits that agency theory, based upon such assumptions, can actually 
be subsumed into stakeholder theory. 
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In relation to the accumulating arguments in favour of the recognition of 
stakeholders in corporate governance, one of the most prominent and wide- 
ranging criticisms of stakeholder theory was presented by Elaine Sternberg 
(1997). The range of the criticisms includes the value of stakeholder theory to 
business in general, corporate governance, accountability and private property 
rights. 
Sternberg (1997) maintains that the definition of stakeholders cited by Freeman 
and Reed (1983) has over time evolved into the reverse of its intended meaning. 
The claim here is that stakeholders, rather than existing to affect the organisation, 
are now seen as being affected by the organisation. This is a shift from external 
forces' (i. e. shareholders) influencing the corporation, to the corporation using 
resources to affect a broad range of constituents. This reinforces the view that the 
term originally applied to a "generalised view" of shareholders, rather than to the 
`infinite' numbers of potential non-owner stakeholders. 
This provides the basis for many of the further criticisms of stakeholder theory. 
By proposing a shift in meaning of the stakeholder term, Sternberg sought to 
undermine elements of the theory, implying that it has changed emphasis to the 
detriment of long term value of the corporation, thus it is not "... a model of, or 
even compatible with, business. " (p. 4). Furthermore, attempting to balance 
stakeholder interests is an "unworkable" pursuit given the numerous stakeholder 
constituencies permissible using a broad interpretation of the term. Allied to this 
is the issue of which stakeholder claims to rank by way of "balancing benefits" 
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(p. 4). Sternberg asserts that there is no simple method of determining stakeholder 
interests, nor does the theory detail how managers are expected to rank and 
deliver these benefits to such a wide range of stakeholders. 
The relationship of stakeholder theory to corporate governance is seen as 
"incompatible" (p. 5), as it "explicitly (denies) that corporations should be 
accountable to their owners", rather they should be accountable equally to all 
stakeholders. This increased accountability actually makes the corporation less 
accountable, due to a reduced focus of resources on a limited number of specific 
(prioritised) owner stakeholders. 
Moreover, stakeholder theory does not provide adequate mechanisms to restrict 
managerial aberrations, i. e. financial mismanagement, or any other `self-serving' 
activity that ultimately works contrary to long-term value creation. By balancing 
stakeholder interests, managers "betray" owners who (by proxy) sanctioned their 
employment to best serve owners' interests. 
In relation to accountability, Sternberg asserts that extraneous stakeholders, e. g. 
the environment, cannot be recompensed adequately by the corporation. A range 
of groups can be identified as stakeholders to an organisation, but the corporation 
should not reasonably be expected to serve them in return. Rather, this would be 
the role of the legislative body (and the welfare state) of the country concerned. 
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The rightful owners of the corporation are shareholders, and they are the sole 
constituents to whom the corporation is to be held accountable. There is a 
potential weakness in this position, as Sternberg admits that there is some value 
in the corporation implementing stakeholder focussed strategies (e. g. delighting 
customers, long-term relationships with suppliers). It is in the shareholders 
interests that long-term sustainable relationships are forged with customer, 
employees and suppliers, as they build long-term value. To reinforce the view 
that practical legitimacy does not infer acceptance of equitable stakeholder 
accountability, the author asserts the right of shareholders as property owners. 
This can be contrasted with Freeman and Reed (1983), and their proposition of 
an explicit link between a pluralistic theory of property rights and the normative 
basis of stakeholder theory. Therefore it is not an easy option to invoke property 
rights as a means to asserting shareholder primacy over stakeholder interests. 
A further criticism is that treating stakeholders as an "end" rather than a means to 
an end is unjustifiable. This is made on the grounds that such an orientation is 
less likely to achieve corporate objectives. Furthermore, rather than supporting 
the emancipation of stakeholder interests, only "rational moral agents" are 
treated as ends in themselves. The inclusion of "abstract groupings" of 
stakeholders (such as the environment) would not be classified in such a way. 
Therefore through the application of Kantian moral logic, corporations are not 
restricted from treating `abstract' stakeholder as a means to an end. By restricting 
"moral agents" from the activity of using stakeholders as a means to an end, 
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stakeholder theory denies such persons from making rational choices that would 
impact upon them, either to their benefit or detriment. 
Jensen (2001) posits that stakeholder theory is fundamentally unsuitable for 
providing managers with the opportunity to increase value maximisation. Central 
to his argument is that in order for corporations to be successful in their defined 
aims, there must be a corporate objective function which provides the impetus 
for managerial decision making. He maintains that placing one constituency over 
another is unsuitable, for example too much focus on shareholders encourages a 
short-term financial return focus in decision making. This, he claims, holds true 
for prioritising any constituency over another where it does not build long-term 
value creation. Conversely, the role of the corporate objective function is to 
avoid potential confusion amongst a myriad of potential variables in the 
decision-making process. By making this process more simplified and 
prioritising value creation (in financial form or otherwise), decisions made are 
more likely to be "optimal" and satisfy the needs of the market. 
In relation to the validity of stakeholder theory, Jensen states that it is detrimental 
to how well a corporation can increase value. Rather than creating an egalitarian 
culture by embracing a range of stakeholder interests, he claims that this 
approach gives managers the opportunity to allocate corporate resources 
"selfishly" (either consciously or sub-consciously), in projects that assist 
organisations or activities that in no way create value for the corporation. 
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The concept of value maximisation is also seen as indicative of short term-ism 
and instead the emphasis should be on value creation. In place of this, Jensen 
proposes enlightened value maximisation, whereby the key to creating value is 
through the motivation of all participants in the organisation. By involving key 
stakeholders equally to achieve a primary corporate objective, enlightened value 
maximisation avoids prioritising constituencies. Further, if such choices have to 
be made, it encourages wider thinking by managers to choose based on value. 
Enlightened stakeholder theory maintains particular aspects of stakeholder 
theory, for example, auditing and measurement practices. Central to this 
modified theory is the addition of the primary corporate function, or objective 
function, for example, "... to maximise long-term market value. " (p. 17). The 
measure of corporate success is the realisation of this objective. This approach 
encourages optimal decision making amongst managers, through the reduction of 
dissonance caused by the competing claims of stakeholders. By enabling 
managers to make decisions based on the objective function (one that 
encompasses relative equality amongst stakeholder groups) it encourages 
independence. By achieving this objective, Jensen maintains that in the long- 
term, greater social welfare will result, thus producing the most favourable 
outcome amongst stakeholder constituencies. 
The three theories have each been discussed in application to corporations. 
Naturally, corporate governance theory and practice transcends the corporate 
sector and infiltrates the study of other types of organisations. Previous studies 
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have applied these, and other theories of governance, to public (Ezzamel and 
Willmott, 1993, Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998, Verdeyen and Van Buggenhout, 
2003) and nonprofit organisations (Alexander and Weiner, 1998, Cornforth, 
2003a, Cornforth and Simpson, 2002, Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997). These 
organisations have an overt social function, and are often aligned with 
stakeholder models of governance accordingly (Abzug and Webb, 1999, Kearns, 
1994b, Laville and Nyssens, 2001, Saidel and Harlan, 1998). However, there are 
a number of other governance theories that have been developed around the core 
theses of the three dominant conceptions that apply to non-corporate 
organisations. These include managerial hegemony (Kosnik, 1987, Vallas, 2003), 
resource dependency (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998, Rasheed and Geiger, 2001) 
and stewardship (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997, Donaldson and Davis, 
1991, Muth and Donaldson, 1998) theories of organisational governance (Hung, 
1998, Turnbull, 1997). Nonprofit governance offers a well established body of 
theoretical and practical governance literature (Cornforth, 2003b). Yet, there are 
variant non-profit types that offer opportunities for further research, such as 
social enterprise. The emergent research in this area provides the focus for the 
remainder of this Chapter. 
2.3 SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 
Social enterprise is defined as: "A business with primarily social objectives 
whose surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose in the business or in 
the community... " (DTI, 2002, p. 7). According to Pearce (2003) social 
enterprises have six common elements: 
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" Having a social purpose. 
9 Engaging in trade. 
" Non-distribution of profits. 
9 Holding assets in trust for community benefit. 
" Democratic ownership. 
" Accountability to a range of stakeholders. 
Given this broad definition, it is worthwhile considering the types of organisation 
that can be classified as `social enterprises'. They take a number of different 
forms, from co-operatives and housing associations, to leisure trusts, credit 
unions, Social Firms, charity trading arms and development trusts (Westall, 
2001). As will be made clear in Chapter 3, of particular focus in this thesis is the 
Social Firm. These organisations are defined by their commitment to enterprise, 
employment and empowerment (Cox, 2006). They exist to provide employment 
for groups previously excluded from the labour market: at least half of the 
workforce must be from an excluded group. Also, it must raise at least half of its 
annual turnover from trade alone. These are the distinguishing features of the 
Social Firm. A good example of a Social Firm is Pack-It, an order fulfilment 
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Social Firm. Half of its workforce have Down's Syndrome, and so provides these 
individuals with the opportunity for paid employment and skills training. It has 
been particularly successful: turnover in 2003 stood at £1.3 million, with profits 
being returned directly to the Social Firm (Cox, 2006). Other notable examples 
include Dove Designs in Liverpool, offering training and development for people 
with mental health needs, and COPE based in the Shetland Isles which has a 
number of enterprise interests: from catering and coffee roasting, to soap 
manufacture. All of these examples pertain to successful Social Firms that 
provide employment and empowerment through enterprise. 
Despite the variety of organisational types, three legal forms typically prevail: 
the co-operative, Companies Limited by Guarantee and Industrial and Provident 
Societies (Spear, 2001). Being neither wholly private nor public sector 
organisations, they belong with the `third sector' or `third system'. This is 
determined by Pearce (2003, p. 28) as one that: "... (Embraces) the domestic 
economy of the family and the informal economy through to the more formally 
structured institutions of the voluntary sector and those of the social economy", 
the social economy being "that part of the third system which is on the trading 
side" (ibid). 
They are not a wholly distinct form of organisation, bearing a striking 
resemblance to non-profits in terms of the social objectives they exist to achieve. 
Where they differ significantly to non-profits is that, as enterprises, they seek to 
provide a product or service that is the primary means of achieving the defined 
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social objectives. Furthermore, non-profits are restricted from distributing their 
earnings, which Hansmann (1980, p. 838) refers to as the "nondistribution 
constraint". Social enterprises can either reinvest net earnings, or redistribute 
surpluses to the primary stakeholder group. Also, non-profits are restricted in 
how they raise capital to grow. This constrains capital resources if the 
organisation seeks growth, thus making it heavily dependent on donations and 
grants. Social enterprise subverts this by trading, so though it may initially be 
established via the aid of a grant, in the long-term the social enterprise should 
become self-financing. Hence there is a need for entrepreneurial skill and 
managerial experience to guide this transition from grant-funding to trading. 
Following a review of the third sector, the UK Government proposed a bespoke 
legal form for social enterprises, the Community Interest Company (CIC). This is 
now another recognised legal form for social enterprises to adopt. Spear (2001) 
asserts that the third sector is built around a number of long-standing 
organisations and newer, smaller enterprises. The role of social enterprise within 
the third sector, as a trading entity, is to contribute to the social economy. As 
political and legislative climates have changed, the role of the third sector has 
evolved. The current focus is on regeneration, and the enhanced profile of social 
enterprises for delivery of some public services. Previously, much of the activity 
from so-called non-profits was cause, rather than enterprise-based (Pearce, 2003, 
Spear, 2001, Westall, 2001). 
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According to Westall (2001) the essence of social enterprise is the 
entrepreneurial spirit, and this drives the sector. Furthermore, the choice of legal 
forms gives social enterprises options of legal structure, enabling the social 
enterprise to better serve its defined social purpose. This pragmatic, 
entrepreneurial attitude is encouraged in the UK Government's official strategy, 
which views these organisations as a catalyst in developing flexible, working 
solutions for social causes. 
A prominent feature of the social enterprise sector in the UK is the work done by 
trade and support organisations, at both local and national levels. The Social 
Enterprise Coalition (SEC) and Social Enterprise London (SEL) are particularly 
vocal and proactive. There are a range of different organisations that support 
particular types of social enterprise, such as CooperativesUK, Social Firms UK, 
and the National Housing Association. Their influence is notable, not least in the 
creation and dissemination of support documents and developing training courses 
for individuals and groups (including Board members). In the latter category, the 
Cooperative College provide access to management and leadership training and 
qualifications. These organisations also attempt to connect with the zeitgeist of 
their sector, developing codes of conduct, for example the codes for governance 
developed by Cooperatives UK. 
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2.3.1 SOCIAL ENTERPRISE GOVERNANCE 
Governance research and policy permeates the public and non-profit sectors. 
Brown (2002, , 2005) 
focused on the role and effectiveness of the Board in 
nonprofit organisations, and how Board performance impacts on organisational 
performance. Also, Carroll, Hughes and Lukseitch (2005) examined the role of 
managerial compensation in nonprofit organisations, concluding that managers 
should (and do) receive tangible (financial) rewards resulting from operational 
success. As mentioned earlier in this Chapter, the historical importance of 
charities and other organisations that operate for the public benefit stretches back 
to the origin of the corporation. The inclusion of an overview of some research in 
this area is relevant, as they share some principle commonalities. 
In the United Kingdom, there have been numerous attempts by the Government 
that have either driven change or been a response to market-based changes in 
corporate governance (Dunn and Riley, 2004). One area of note is the changing 
role of service provision by private and public organisations; leading to 
"... corporate governance concepts entering into the public and charitable 
sectors ... (appearing) to 
be in fluid interaction and mutual dependence. " (Vinten, 
1998, p. 419). Research in this area focuses on some of the more familiar 
organisations classified as social enterprises. For example, Davis (2001) studied 
the governance of co-operatives, finding that the increased professionalism of 
managers is as much an issue for future research as issues such as transparency 
and democracy. 
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2.3.1.1 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
Democracy in governance refers to how accessible governance processes for a 
specified stakeholder group. Dahl (1991) discusses democracy in a broader, 
political context, and as intertwined with two other concepts: liberty and 
equality. This exemplifies the inter-relatedness of democracy with ideals of 
fairness and freedom. Often, political democracy is recognised and interpreted as 
the process of enabling rational actors to influence the composition of state 
bodies through exercised volition. Democracy is a central part of corporate 
governance also, because it pays heed to notions of equity and trust that should 
exist in key, fiduciary relationships, where powerful internal actors represent the 
interests of external principals. For example, democracy is the instrumental 
rationale supporting all activities that promote and sustain the fair and honest 
election of board members. Indeed, many issues arise when considering the 
nature of democracy in organisational governance. In the corporate context, 
democracy refers to the achievement of specific objectives: including the nature 
of director recruitment, tenure, and voting rights. Directors of private and public 
limited companies will often serve for fixed terms, requiring re-election to the 
board as a procedural measure. The election process must be seen to be fair and 
transparent to ensure democratic accountability, and these activities are generally 
confirmed during Annual General Meetings (AGMs). Democracy is crucial to 
governance because it demonstrates that the board is managed appropriately, and 
that its members serve on the basis of approval conferred by key shareholders. 
Also, democracy is embedded in systems of voting, where all interested parties 
have allocated rights to influence the management organisation. Of course, 
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allocation of voting rights must also be representative and ensure fair allocation 
according to investment in, or claim of organisational interests. Institutional 
investors are very influential in these instances, since they can control the voting 
rights for large blocks of shares in the largest public limited companies. 
Essentially, democracy in corporations is determined by the efficacy of voting 
procedures, the stated length of tenure for directors and the degree of control 
over power that shareholders have over recruitment of directors. In international 
governance models, such as in Germany and Japan, staff / stakeholder inclusion 
onto the board attempts to enhance democratic accountability through 
participatory consultation. This inclusive practice attempts to represent a broader 
set of interests, and of a range of stakeholder groups in the strategic management 
of the organisation. Such stakeholder models of governance are also a common 
feature of socially oriented organisations. 
Public sector and nonprofit organisations share similar concerns over democratic 
accountability. As Eisenberg (2000, p. 325) states, nonprofit democracy is 
concerned with: "... providing checks and balances to government, giving 
expression to minority voices, contributing to the public policy debates, 
developing an engaged citizenry, and leveling the playing field for all citizens. " 
The major difference for non-corporate organisations is the principal 
motivation(s) of primary beneficiaries, which are predominantly social rather 
than financial. Within the general area of democratic accountability, issues such 
as the election and role of trustees (Jackson and Holland, 1998), inclusion of 
stakeholders (Brown, 2002, Brown, 2005, Steane and Christie, 2001), chief 
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executives' perceptions of the board (Mole, 2003), and tenure of board members 
(O'Regan and Oster, 2005) are prominent. It is important that these issues are 
studied in more detail for social enterprises, since we cannot assume that such 
problems apply to these organisations in the same way (Robinson and Shaw, 
2003). Issues relating to participation and inclusion are central to the social 
orientation of social enterprises, and important to understand when and how 
these problems are accommodated in social enterprise governance. The length of 
tenure of board members is also a contemporary concern in nonprofit and social 
enterprise governance, paralleling the corporate sector (Salancik and Pfeffer, 
1980, Santora and Sarros, 2001, Vafeas, 2003). There are also problems 
surrounding the selection and availability of appropriate directors and trustees, as 
well as how socially orientated organisations should determine the 
appropriateness of board members. 
According to Borzaga and Solari (2001), social enterprise governance is of the 
multi-stakeholder type. Also, it is critical that managers of social enterprises seek 
legitimacy both internally and externally. The nature of stakeholder groups 
involved in the social enterprise is a reflection of their "heterogeneous 
nature.. . and their different goals. " (Borzaga and Solari, 2001, p. 342). They 
consider this approach more effective in the context of social enterprise when 
compared against the attempts at a multi-stakeholder approach in the for-profit 
sector, for example. They state that a key challenge for social enterprise is the 
development of appropriate governance structures that reflect the local, unique 
mission of each one. The ultimate goal of this approach is to reduce the 
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asymmetry of information between managers and stakeholders to achieve a 
balance between efficiency and social impact. However, one of the obstacles to 
achieving this is the variety of legal forms that can be adopted by social 
enterprises. Also, there is not yet a resolution to the problems of `ownership' of 
the social enterprise, i. e. which stakeholders should be prioritised, thus 
perpetuating asymmetries of information between stakeholders and managers. It 
is evident that social enterprise Boards face a number of challenges, if research 
on nonprofits, cooperatives and voluntary organisations is a reliable marker. Yet, 
as Rochester (2003, p. 119) notes, it is difficult for Boards to meet these 
challenges because they struggle to recruit new members, and those they do 
recruit "... lacked expertise and experience". 
2.3.2 STEWARDSHIP THEORY 
One of the alternative theoretical approaches mentioned previously, stewardship 
theory, has been advocated as an appropriate basis of social enterprise 
governance (Cornforth, 2003a, Harrow and Palmer, 2003, Low, 2006). 
Stewardship theory presents a view of governance that diverts from strictly 
economic interpretations of relationships within the organisation. This is the 
common application of agency theory in corporate governance and neglects the 
salient non-economic influences that guide managerial activity (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991). There are predominantly psychological (such as identification and 
power) and situational (for example, management philosophy and culture) factors 
(Davis et al., 1997). The key assumption is that managers are trustworthy and 
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`pro-organisation' (Davis et al., 1997). They will seek to maximise principal 
interests to progress the overall goals of the organisation (into which their own 
interests are tied), working as partners in the organisations (Muth and Donaldson, 
1998). Crucially, there must be a significant trust culture between the principal 
(or primary stakeholder) and managers to support this approach. In terms of its 
suitability to social enterprise, stewardship theory is more aligned with the ethos 
of social enterprise and the psychological and social profile of its managers. At 
management level there is support for the stewardship approach, where the 
manager / entrepreneur is actually from the defined community that the 
organisation serves. 
Therefore, managerial decision-making is closely aligned with the required needs 
of that community. The success in prioritising, safeguarding but also balancing 
interests, where the manager has an empathy and clear focus on the recipient of 
social benefit, is increased. In this scenario, the Board of directors adopt a 
`support' role to management to enable them to meet stakeholder expectations. 
Their function is to provide strategic direction, rather than "... (ensuring) 
managerial compliance or conformance... " (Cornforth, 2003a p. 8). 
Furthermore, stewardship theory supports the notion that nonprofits, and 
specifically social enterprises are likely to shift to a much narrower business- 
focus (Dart, 2004). This narrow focus will result in the presence of a broader set 
of skills at Board level. In turn, this moves away from the inclusive 
representation at Board level of a range of key stakeholders regardless of their 
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strategic utility, towards a skills-set that can more effectively manage the entire 
operation. In practical terms, the key aim is ensuring that Board composition is 
both representative and sufficiently skilled to enable the social enterprise to 
maximise its value to its defined communities. 
To summarise, rather than adopting the stakeholder model of governance, one 
that is intended to be representative by its nature, it is appropriate that Board 
members are sufficiently able to deliver increasing productivity. Also, they enact 
this through a broad set of skills at Board level, and by supporting management 
in their activities. This view is emergent in the literature and could predominate 
as the social enterprise sector matures to become further distinguished from 
traditional non-profits (Low, 2006). However, for any theoretical approach to 
have utility it must be clear to those governing, managing and served by social 
enterprises where its value lies. There is potential, therefore, in exploration of the 
value of non-profit (and cross-sector) governance theories, which can illustrate 
the ways in which they explain and assist the process of delivering the maximum 
benefit to communities served by a social enterprise (Borzaga and Solari, 2001, 
Low, 2006). However, if the dynamic of the social enterprise sector promotes a 
narrower, business-focus, the likelihood is that governance systems will exhibit a 
hybrid of for-profit and non-profit characteristics (Dart, 2004, Low, 2006). 
2.4 LEGITIMACY 
A key aspect of the institutional environment is legitimacy, as are the processes 
that legitimise the existence of the organisation. Legitimacy is defined by 
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Suchman (1995 p. 574) as: : "... (A) generalised perception or assumption that 
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions". Essentially, 
legitimacy refers to how well an organisation operates in its social environment, 
excluding material requirements and technical functions. Legitimacy is acquired 
when the organisation meets the required standards defined by key groups. These 
groups may be the recipients of benefit created by the organisation. 
Alternatively, they may have control over the allocation of resources needed by 
the organisation. In most instances groups with the authority to confer legitimacy 
play both roles. 
The concept of legitimacy is predominately aligned with organisation studies, but 
has been applied across different fields of inquiry, notably in political science 
(Lipset, 1959, Meyer, 1999, Weatherford, 1992). However, for this discussion 
the focus reverts back to organisation studies and the role of legitimacy. Scott 
(2001) discusses legitimacy in terms of how it applies to the organisation's 
regulatory, normative and cultural-cognitive institutional environments. Each 
strand of these "pillars" of the institutional environment is intertwined to a 
greater or lesser extent in the organisation. Legitimacy is not "... exchanged but a 
condition reflecting perceived consonance with relevant rules and laws, 
normative support, or alignment with cultural-cognitive frameworks. " (ibid, 
p. 59). Most organisations are bound by regulatory constraints, and also the 
normative expectations of internal and external `actors'. 
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Yet, it is the cultural-cognitive element that provides a much deeper 
understanding of individual and group actions and activities in the institutional 
environment and legitimacy. Conceptualising the organisation as a social entity 
supports this approach. It helps to explain how governance activities play such a 
central role in achieving legitimacy. All internal actors have specific roles and 
function that are predefined according to the set of constitutive rules. 
Constitutive rules enable this by defining the ontological reality of the social 
structure that internal actors perceive and subjectively experience. These rules 
also establish the intrinsic behaviours and activities associated with each role. 
Hence, individuals involved in governance (i. e. Board members and staff) must 
act in a way concordant with the institutional environment of the organisation. So 
doing enables legitimacy, whereas activities contrary to the basis of the 
institutional environment de-legitimises. Therefore, it is necessary to understand 
further how influential these cultural-cognitive elements are in controlling 
individual behaviour. This counterpoises an alternative perspective of 
governance to the four theories discussed above. This approach focuses on 
`controls' that are determined by social values rather than legal prescriptions of 
duty to core groups. 
Institutional theory examines a range of factors that influence the organisation. It 
provides the central conceptual grounding for alternative studies of governance. 
This approach prompts examination of the influence of shared values and 
meanings on behaviour and performance of Board members, in a way that prior 
studies in this area have not. 
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There is an emergent debate about the governance of social enterprise that is 
contingent on the maturation of the social enterprise sector. The way that social 
enterprises evolve to meet the changing (or static) needs of their communities 
will be central to the usefulness of either (or neither) of the theories outlined 
above. With this in mind, the core focus of the remainder of this Chapter is to 
examine the common, expected outcomes of governance. The next section draws 
these themes out. Focussing first on social enterprise governance and legitimacy, 
attention shifts to the measurement of governance performance and common 
goals that unite the various theories of governance, rather than divide them. 
2.4.1 LEGITIMACY AND SOCIAL ENTERPRISE GOVERNANCE 
In examining the role of legitimacy in social enterprise, Dart (2004) outlined how 
Suchman's categorisation of legitimacy could be applied to this context. For 
example, pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy, provide interesting 
perspectives on the nature of legitimacy in social enterprise. Further, these 
explanations offer insight into the ascendance of social enterprise as a direct 
result of them being a more effective type of organisation to meet social needs. 
Pragmatic legitimacy has merit as it focuses upon organisational performance as 
a means of legitimisation. However, in cases where the requisite performance is 
not achieved, legitimacy of the social enterprise is compromised (Dart, 2004). 
Moral legitimacy posits that legitimacy is attained when activities are conducted 
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as they should be done. Legitimacy is attained provided that all activities are in 
the interests of the group that provides legitimacy, namely primary stakeholders. 
Cognitive legitimacy is a more subtle form, reflecting upon the `preconscious' 
subjective standards of how activities should be performed. This has value in 
analysis of governance because legitimacy is contingent upon whether 
managerial activities fit (or otherwise) with implicit expectations of performance 
and behaviour. Utilising Borzaga and Solari's (2001) assertion that social 
enterprises seek legitimacy both internally and externally, we can adopt an 
institutional perspective of governance to explain how certain governance 
arrangements arise. In addition, this aids an understanding of how governance 
arrangements may have been developed as a result of endogenous and exogenous 
institutional pressures. 
Therefore, a key challenge for social enterprises is developing appropriate 
governance structures that suit the needs of primary beneficiaries. This is 
important for matching the local needs of primary stakeholders with a 
governance process that enables managers to do this, whilst remaining 
transparent and accountable. Therefore, reducing asymmetries of information 
between managers and stakeholders should achieve a balance between efficiency 
and social impact. However, social enterprises vary in the degree to which they 
are `business-focused' in achieving social aims. As such, it must be determined 
whether this balance is maintainable. This corroborates the predicted shift 
towards a business-orientation, aligning with a stewardship perspective of the 
Board in social enterprises (Cornforth, 2003a, Dart, 2004, Harrow and Palmer, 
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2003, Low, 2006). Therefore, the first of a series of propositions for further 
testing can be established: 
P1: The Social Firm Board must successfully balance social aims with business- 
focus. 
This `hybridisation' involves conjoining two opposing outcomes: maximising 
social benefit using business methods. The recruitment of `experts' at Board 
level, who share interests with managers, is intended to provide entrepreneurial 
flexibility whilst protecting the interests of beneficiaries. The mechanisms of this 
partnership approach to governance require further explanation and support. For 
example, there is little guarantee of regular dialogue between different levels of 
staff, the Board of directors and stakeholder representatives. directors must also 
exhibit the required skills to manage such an organisation. The presence of 
suitably skilled directors, with good experience, is at a premium across the social 
enterprise sector (Thompson and Doherty, 2006). Therefore: 
P2: The Board of directors should have the skills required to govern the social 
enterprise effectively. 
The governance system needs to be adaptable to ensure that actors can legitimise 
their activities. This means that stakeholders should be fairly represented in 
decision-making to ensure normative legitimacy. Spear (2001 p. 253) asserts that 
many of the successful cooperatives in the UK may have achieved this success at 
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the cost of eroding "their guiding values". A crucial aim of the governance of 
social enterprises is to guard against this erosion in the long-term, and achieve 
the appropriate balance between competing claims upon resources. The act of 
seeking and achieving normative legitimacy is achieved via the efficiency with 
which the social enterprise prioritises and delivers social benefit (Dart, 2004). As 
noted previously, the methods for achieving this have previously been framed in 
a stakeholder theory context, though alternative approaches (such as stewardship 
and institutional theories) exist. The outcome of social enterprise governance is 
producing an ethical organisation. Importantly, it is expected that social 
enterprise, given their constitution, should be more ethical than corporations. The 
primacy of their social orientation determines that their performance should have 
positive social ramifications (Mason et al., 2007, Pearce, 2003). Therefore the 
maintenance of ethical standards in social enterprises is expected and should be 
confirmed: 
P3: Social enterprises should be more ethical than their for-profit competitors. 
2.4.2 SOCIAL ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
The importance of the measurement of governance performance transcends the 
boundaries between the for-profit and non-profit sectors. Furthermore, the 
development of effective measures of performance is no less important for non- 
profits and social enterprises than for corporations. For example, Kaplan (2001) 
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presented the application of the Balanced Scorecard for non-profits in the United 
States. He adapted the Scorecard to account for the different measurement 
priorities for non-profits. A recent paper by Somers (2005) highlighted the need 
for an effective performance measurement system for social enterprises. In a 
similar vein to Kaplan (2001), the Balanced Scorecard can be adapted to fit the 
particular needs of the social enterprise, though no empirical work is offered as a 
means of verifying the applicability of this approach. 
The Balanced Scorecard is not the only tool used to measure performance in 
social enterprises. Social accounting builds on the purely quantitative aspects of 
traditional `accounting' with qualitative, contextual elements. Social accounting 
is defined as: "A systematic analysis of the effects of an organisation on its 
communities of interest or stakeholders, with stakeholder input as part of the data 
that are analysed for the accounting statement. " (Richmond, Mook and Quarter, 
2003, p. 3). Rather than focussing on financial data to gauge performance, social 
accounting builds a contextualised report of the impacts of organisational 
activities. This is useful as the collected information can be reported back to key 
stakeholder groups via the Board of directors. Social accounting is merely one 
approach to the effective measurement of social enterprise performance. There 
are a range of techniques available for measuring social impact, for example the 
Social Return on Investment (SROI) method. This approach utilises knowledge 
of stakeholder objectives and organisation performance as a "... useful way of 
illustrating the economic value of the social and environmental impacts of 
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organisations that may otherwise look unviable" (New Economics Foundation, 
2004). 
Paton (2003) highlights the need for further research in measuring social 
enterprises. Due to the hybrid nature of these organisations, design of a 
governance measurement system will need to reflect their unique constitution 
and goals. For example, the overarching social objective for such enterprises is 
concordant with that of non-profits. However, their requirement to trade (and 
eventual goal of reducing of grant dependency) draws them more towards the 
for-profit, rather than the non-profit organisation as they seek to become self- 
financing. Therefore, bespoke performance measurement systems that effectively 
aid the social enterprise in monitoring its operations are crucial for its growth and 
value-creation. This is because of an asserted link between governance and 
organisational performance. Brown (2005) explored the link between Board and 
organisational performance in non-profits, and offers support for a significant 
association between the two factors. Brown (ibid) determined the criteria by 
which Board effectiveness of non-profit organisations can be studied and 
suggests that the research reinforces factors such as Board diversity 
strengthening Board performance. This has implications for the study of social 
enterprise governance, given the shared heritage between some social enterprises 
and non-profits. This might be enforced through greater democracy at Board 
level and stakeholder inclusion in Social Firms, which is a central feature of 
social enterprise (Pearce, 2003). Furthermore, democratic governance could 
encourage stakeholder inclusion at Board level, which is an element of 
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transparent and participative governance practice (Huse, 1998, Luoma and 
Goodstein, 1999). Yet there is little empirical evidence to indicate its presence or 
usefulness to social enterprises. This was highlighted as an issue from the 
exploratory interviews with key informants from the social enterprise sector (see 
Chapter 3). Representation encompasses a range of stakeholder groups, and 
should be an expected feature of Social Firm governance (Owen, Swift, 
Humphrey and Bowerman, 2000, Owen, Swift and Hunt, 2001). Therefore: 
P4: Democracy is an integral part of Social Firm governance. 
P5: Stakeholder inclusion at Board level is a feature of Social Firm 
governance. 
2.5 THE OUTCOMES OF GOVERNANCE 
In the midst of discrepancies between the governance theories presented above, 
there are key links shared amongst them that apply to social enterprise. These are 
features and outcomes of governance, irrespective of business orientation and 
constitution: transparency, accountability and sustainability. When present, these 
three concepts are considered to be a sign of good governance practice. The 
nature of these three concepts is explained below. Furthermore, one particular 
element features most prominently, namely accountability. The importance of 
this concept, in relation to transparency and sustainability is explained. In 
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keeping with an institutional view of social enterprise, the role of accountability 
in relation to legitimacy is also discussed. 
2.5.1 TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY 
Transparency occurs when "... an organisation, in the interests of being 
accountable, openly discloses the findings of its social accounts so that 
stakeholders have a good understanding of how the organisation performs and 
behaves.... " (Pearce, 2003, p. 191). Making organisation activities and decision 
making processes transparent encourages trust in them amongst the relevant 
stakeholders to that organisation. Often, ensuring transparency and efficacy of 
such activities is achieved through subjecting them to external scrutiny for 
verification. In the corporation, this is particularly useful for investors in 
ensuring the business is run properly and in their interests (Strenger, 2004, 
Tullberg, 2005). The aim of transparency is to `open-up' the organisation and 
allow its workings to be monitored and scrutinised by external sources. 
Transparency is recognised as a central feature of good governance across 
sectors, to nonprofit organisations and social enterprises (Aguilera, 2005, Gray, 
1992, Kirkbride and Letza, 2003, Paton, 2003, Strenger, 2004, Tullberg, 2005, 
Turnbull, 1997). Also, research on transparency in corporate governance has 
focused across geographical (and legislative) boundaries (Berglöf and von 
Thadden, 1999, Black, Kraakman and Tarassova, 2000, Bushman, Piotroski and 
Smith, 2004, Mallin, 2004). Other prior research has examined the influence of 
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transparency upon performance (O'Neill, Saunders and McCarthy, 1989, 
Verschoor, 1998). This should be tested for social enterprises: 
P6: Transparency indicates better governance performance. 
The value of transparency is in fostering trust and confidence in key stakeholders 
about the governance of the organisation. The level of commitment to transparent 
governance processes indicates that the Board of directors is performing better 
than if they were not achieving expected standards of transparency. This has 
been shown in the literature in private corporations and non-profit organisations 
(Nobbie and Brudney, 2003, Zand, 1972, Zandstra, 2002). This is yet to be tested 
in the context of social enterprise governance, therefore: 
P7: Trust is an indicator of Board transparency 
The audit process should enhance transparency, and ensure financial disclosure. 
This process enables the efficacy of governance and business operations to be 
examined. As Bushman et al (2004) make clear, there are two types of 
transparency: financial and governance transparency. The former refers to the 
full disclosure of appropriate financial information to investors and other relevant 
bodies. Previous studies have asserted disclosure as a central part of transparency 
(Bushman et al., 2004, Bushman and Smith, 2003, Patel, Balic and Bwakira, 
2002). Transparency is expected of different types of organisation, as an 
76 
indication of good governance. This should be expected of social enterprise, but 
is yet to be tested empirically: 
P8: Disclosure is a facet of transparent governance in Social Firms. 
The drive for greater transparency across sectors confers ethical standards of 
conduct upon directors. They are bound by a fiduciary duty to ensure that the 
ethical standards within the organisation align with the expectations of primary 
beneficiaries (Davis, 1994). Attaining and maintaining ethical standards is 
central to achieving accountability. Hence: 
P9: Ethical performance is a responsibility of Social Firm directors. 
The role of independent directors must also be considered here. The presence of 
independent directors on the Board is considered to be important in increasing 
transparency of Board decisions and activities (Aguilera, 2005, Johnson, Daily 
and Ellstrand, 1996, Roberts et al., 2005, Short et al., 2005, Weir and Laing, 
2001). In governance literature, their role has been examined and discussed, and 
is linked to better transparency (Beasley, 1996). Currently, there is little evidence 
of their role in social enterprises, particularly the Social Firm. Therefore: 
P10: Independent directors enhance transparency in Social Firms. 
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In the institutional view, transparency is represented by the formal and informal 
safeguards and pressures that ensure the proper running of an organisation. 
Formal, or regulative, safeguards can be presented as laws that cover the 
organisation, and define the legal duties of its managers and directors. For 
example, the new legal form of social enterprise in the UK, the CIC, `locks' 
assets to protect them from misuse. Informal safeguards of transparency include 
normative and cultural-cognitive pressures that together with regulative 
pressures, influence the creation and maintenance of the institutional 
environment (Scott, 2001). Both formal and informal elements are integral to 
ensuring that governance is transparent, and ensure legitimacy. 
The central importance of performance measurement of governance to social 
enterprises is to indicate a level of accountability. Notions of accountability vary 
from extremely broad (world-level), to narrow (individual-level). Accountability 
is defined as "[The] duty to provide an account (by no means necessarily a 
financial account) or reckoning of those actions for which one is held 
responsible" (Gray, Owen and Adams, 1996, p. 38). The relevance of 
accountability in governance is as a representation of the level to which directors 
and managers uphold their fiduciary duties to stakeholders. This applies to 
private, public and nonprofit governance contexts (Ezzamel and Willmott, 1993, 
Kearns, 1994a, Sternberg, 2004, Young, 2002). It is important because it 
represents the overall purpose of corporate governance. The essence of the 
subject is to hold individuals to account for the actions. This is particularly 
pertinent following instances where organisations have failed as a result of poor 
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management by executives and directors. The context is also important for 
accountability in corporate governance. More often, it is interpreted broadly, 
focussing on more than just financial accountability. This is true for for-profit as 
well as nonprofit organisations. The pressure for greater public, as well as 
shareholder, accountability has prompted many large corporations to implement 
social auditing and executive positions for `social responsibility'. 
The appreciation of accountability to an increased number and variety of 
stakeholders, other than merely shareholders is a fundamental principle of social 
enterprises (Pearce, 2003). Such practices are yet to become formalised as 
legislation or policy, so remain implicit manifestations of the `social contract' of 
the organisation (Gray et al., 1996, Moir, 2001). Thus, to achieve accountability, 
social enterprises must embed the systems and processes that enable them to be 
held accountable. Board accountability is the central feature of good governance 
across sectors (Deakin and Hughes, 1997), and accountability is an indicator of 
governance performance. It is unclear in the literature whether accountability 
improves or impairs performance (Aucoin and Heintzman, 2002). Therefore, to 
seek clarity on this matter, perceptions towards accountability should be tested: 
P11: Accountability indicates better governance performance. 
Given that business orientation is an element of social enterprise, there is an 
expectation that they should be competitive and efficient. This highlights the 
dichotomy of social enterprise governance: maximising social benefit through 
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competitive business focus. As explained previously, this balance is the expected 
role of the Board of directors (Dart, 2004). Yet within this remit, Boards must 
monitor and manage staff to ensure they are sufficiently focussed on delivering 
on social objectives (Baysinger and Butler, 1985, Miller, 2002): Thus, 
P12: Boards should ensure that they are accountable for performance. 
P13: Boards should ensure Social Firms are competitive in their chosen markets. 
An important role of the Board of directors is the development and 
implementation of strategy. The social enterprise is intended to be collaborative 
at Board level, and the development of strategy should occur in such a way 
(Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001). Yet the directors assume responsibility for 
strategic success or failure, and this is typically expected of directors serving on 
Boards. They should be accountable for their performance for both social and 
business performance, consistent with the accepted definition of social 
enterprises. Hence: 
P14: Boards should provide strategic direction to enable business sustainability 
In keeping with the rationale of social enterprises, any strategy developed for the 
progression of the business must also account for maximising social benefit. Part 
of this task will necessitate supporting managers in their roles to enable this to 
happen. It is an expected part of governance for directors to maintain internal 
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conditions that will progress overall objectives. This is true for all organisations; 
corporations seek the optimal conditions to maximise shareholder value. Non- 
profit and social enterprises seek the optimal internal environment that produces 
the maximum social benefit. This should be enacted in a way that is sustainable 
over time, in keeping with the holistic aims of social enterprise (Stead and Stead, 
2000). Therefore: 
P15: Boards should support managers to deliver on social objectives 
The unique facet of social enterprise is the way that they mix business- 
orientation with the achievement of social goals. As such, it would be expected 
that their ethical nature is in fact a distinctive unique selling proposition for their 
products and services. It has been suggested that social enterprises will continue 
to develop a keener business edge and become more competitive in their chosen 
markets (Dart, 2004, Dees, 1994, Dees, 1998, Low, 2006, Mason et al., 2007). 
Therefore, as social enterprises become more market-focused, it could be 
predicted that they will use their ethical principles in such a way. This is typical 
of successful social enterprises, such as the Day Chocolate Company (DCC), 
who have based their positioning strategy in this way. This been enforced by the 
Board of directors, a significant number of whom are from the farmer 
cooperative who benefit from the surpluses the DCC accrues (Doherty and 
Tranchell, 2005, Thompson and Doherty, 2006). Therefore, we can expect that 
the ethical aspect of the organisation is an integral part of the business model, 
and should be effectively managed at Board level (Davis, 1994). This needs to be 
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examined for social enterprises, to determine whether Boards should build in an 
ethical advantage in their product / service offerings: 
P16: Boards should communicate their ethicality as a competitive advantage. 
There is a well established body of literature examining the relationship between 
performance director and executive tenure. There is some variety in the area of 
director tenure and its relationship with: CEO succession and performance 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988, Santora and Sarros, 2001), Board diversity 
(Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader, 2003), non-executive directors and Board 
performance (Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004, Vafeas, 2003), and organisation 
performance (Cowan, Rohe and Baku, 1999, Preston and Brown, 2004). This 
research indicates that the length of director tenure has an influence on 
performance, though this is yet to be examined for directors of social enterprises: 
P17: Short tenure improves director effectiveness. 
In the corporate sector, executive and director remuneration is a controversial 
topic (Conyon et al., 1995). Incentivised contracts and their relationship with 
performance is a common source controversy given the sums of remuneration 
involved. Research in this area has focused across sectors, and common themes 
include: director pay linked with performance (Main, Bruce and Buck, 1996), 
and the role of remuneration committees (Laing and Weir, 1999, Weir and Laing, 
2000, Weir and Laing, 2001), levels of compensation for nonprofit directors 
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(Oster, 1998). director remuneration is also an integral aspect of the Higgs and 
Greenbury reports on corporate governance in the UK (Mallin, 2004). Therefore 
director remuneration is also a valid area of interest for social enterprise 
governance research. There is little specific evidence to indicate how director pay 
would influence social enterprise performance. However, nonprofit literature 
suggests that level of compensation (for posts that are often voluntary) depends 
on factors such as: organisation size (Oster, 1998), tenure (Cowan et al., 1999), 
CEO incentives and agency control (Brickley, Van Horn and Wedig, 2003), and 
nonprofit / for-profit director pay comparisons (Hallock, 2000). Therefore, the 
study shall determine the validity of the following proposition: 
P18: director Remuneration is not linked to their performance. 
Sustainability is often considered to be the ultimate, long-term aim for all 
organisations (Pearce, 2003). Corporate and related economic activity is (and 
continues to be) a considerable drain on the world's natural and human 
resources. It has long been recognised that organisations need to be held 
accountable for the impact of their operations. Hence, there is considerable 
political pressure on all organisations to consider how they can reduce their 
global impact. The rhetorical emphasis is on organisations that are effective now 
and sustainable in the future. Clearly, there is a link here with the pursuance of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate citizenship. The concept of 
sustainability comprises three elements: economic growth, environmental 
protection and social progress (DTI, 2006). The achievement of these three 
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`pillars' of sustainability are essential to the continuous existence of organisation, 
at no or little permanent cost to limited natural resources. Such developments 
have caused an increase in sustainability `audits', notably through triple-bottom 
line reporting (Bebbington and Gray, 2001, Bebbington and MacGregor, 2005, 
Zadek, 1999). These practices, though more common, increase the burden of 
accountability on organisations, and have attracted criticism (Henriques, 2004, 
Norman and MacDonald, 2004, Owen et al., 2001). Corporate governance is 
integral to notions of sustainability. As `monitors' of performance and use of 
resources, directors are key actors in ensuring that organisations persist over time 
(Johnson and Greening, 1999, Lazonick, 2000). 
Corporations might be more concerned with economic sustainability. However 
attitudes in this arena are changing as strategic decision makers see the value of 
investing in a broader conception of sustainability (Dunphy, Ben and Griffiths, 
2002, Hockerts and Moir, 2004). Social enterprises appear well placed in the 
pursuit of sustainability. They are intended to be economically-sustainable, have 
a neutral-environmental impact and pursue social missions. At such a descriptive 
level, these characteristics certainly fit with the notion of a sustainable 
organisation. The role of social enterprises in achieving sustainability is well 
documented (Alter, 2004, Dees, 1994, Dees and Emerson, 2001, Harding, 2004, 
Paton, 2003, Pearce, 2003). Less clear is the importance given to sustainability as 
part of a long-term strategy for social enterprise: 
P19: Sustainability should be a key long-term objective of a Social Firm. 
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In the institutional view of organisations, governance is the vehicle which 
enables legitimate activity. Prior literature suggests that the key factor in 
achieving governance legitimacy is accountability (Berglöf and von Thadden, 
1999, Kearns, 1994b, Roberts, 2001, Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004, 
Westphal and Zajac, 1998). Hence, it is necessary to test whether accountability 
is a predictor of legitimacy in social enterprises: 
P20: Accountability enhances legitimacy. 
Institutional elements have been shown to be influential in governance (Eisbach 
and Sutton, 1992, Johnson and Greening, 1999, Judge and Zeithaml, 1992, 
Luoma and Goodstein, 1999, Roberts, 2001). Legitimacy in social enterprises 
should be achieved through adherence with institutional norms: shared meanings 
and values between internal actors (Mason et al., 2007). This is consistent with 
the cultural-cognitive view of institutional theory. Recognition of the importance 
of shared values will indicate they are influential in maintaining the social 
mission. This could also show how important they are as informal `controls' of 
managerial and director activity, so these groups remain focused on the social 
mission (Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2001). To do otherwise would be 
`unthinkable' (Scott, 2001, Zucker, 1977). Thus: 
P21: Legitimate governance is linked to the influence of shared values upon 
Board-level decisions. 
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In a similar vein, to acquire legitimacy social enterprise must evidence that they 
are producing the social benefit required by their defined communities. Without 
this social benefit, the impact (and existence) of the organisation is in doubt. The 
main group that provides legitimacy is the defined community the social 
enterprise serves. Without their consent, organisational legitimacy is contrived. 
There are likely to be other bodies from which social enterprises acquire 
legitimacy (e. g. funding bodies, other stakeholder groups). However, defined 
communities are the reason that social enterprise arise in the first place. Thus, as 
primary beneficiaries, directors and managers are responsible to them for the 
outcome of the activities: 
P22: Legitimacy is acquired by maximising social benefit. 
There is evidence to suggest that the presence of transparency and accountability 
enable the achievement of sustainability in the long-term. If this view is 
embedded within social enterprises, it might explain how ethical business can 
equate to sustainable enterprise. 
P23: Transparency and accountability equate to sustainability. 
Finally, the role of institutional carriers (such as scripts and rituals) are little 
understood in the social enterprise context. These can be manifested as processes 
that frequently occur within the organisation to reinforce institutional values. For 
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example, the social audit / accounting process could be viewed as a ritual that 
shows external (and internal) actors that the organisation is accountable, thus 
legitimate. 
P24: Board processes and decisions are based on institutional norms. 
2.6 OUTCOMES OF THE REVIEW - GAPS IN THE LITERATURE 
The above literature review highlights that research in corporate governance is 
well developed, and also that governance is important in non-profit 
organisations. Furthermore, it has identified the importance of measuring 
governance, and that performance measures can be used to this end. Investors 
(particularly institutional investors), and other primary stakeholders can gain 
access to governance ratings to guide investment decisions. Thus efficacious 
governance systems to control and regulate management reduce the risk-bearing 
function of the investor. 
A central issue is how the governance theories included pertain to social 
enterprise. Agency theory and transaction-cost economics are dominant theories 
in the `for-profit' corporation and generally adopt a shareholder perspective; in 
the UK and USA corporation shareholders are the dominant stakeholder group. 
This does differ in other countries, for example the Germanic corporate system 
where employee inclusion at Board level is legislated for. Despite moves by 
industry leading public limited companies such as Tesco and BP in the UK to 
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embrace a form of corporate social responsibility, it remains a strategic decision 
based on extra-market pressures and broader shareholder concerns over unethical 
corporate activity. Therefore, though stakeholder theory is a credible view of 
corporate governance, it plays a subsidiary role to the dominant governance 
theories that resonate with the economic orientation of the USA and the UK. 
Conversely, research into the governance of non-profit organisations more 
inclined towards stakeholder theory. This is partly due to the absence of profit- 
seeking activity; however it is fundamental to the existence of such organisations 
that they can manage relations between different stakeholder groups. Non-profits 
established for a particular cause will find that stakeholder groups have stronger 
competing claims on the resources of the organisation, than either agency theory 
or TCE will permit. The governance problem is how non-profits (who employ 
staff but also rely on volunteers) manage the claims of stakeholder groups. This 
applies to any organisation attempting to prioritise stakeholder claims. 
The stakeholder debate refers to the organisation in its `private' form. The 
organisation has a moral (and often legal) duty to many constituencies. Managers 
need to balance the competing claims of defined stakeholder groups, to fully 
account for their duty to employees, suppliers, the community, and owners. 
Stakeholders need to be managed at every level of decision-making, and there 
are claims for their representation at Board-level. As outlined in the review, this 
approach faces many criticisms, including how managers prioritise between 
competing claims, and how this approach actually improves governance. 
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Stakeholder theory is more implicit in organisations, such as social enterprises, 
where profit and maximising financial return are not the primary focus. 
Furthermore, as non-trading entities (such as charities), non-profits often rely on 
different funding streams to ensure the continuation of their work. Donors have 
little (if any) legal entitlement to realise a financial return on their donations, and 
are reconciled that their donation does not entitle them to financial benefit, even 
as a primary stakeholder. Rather, the primary stakeholder constituency is that 
group whose well-being and best interests the non-profit serves. The donor (as 
well as fundraisers, support groups, volunteers and local and national political 
bodies, for example) forego their claims on the organisation in kind as their 
primary interests reside with the well-being of the non-profits primary 
stakeholders. Stakeholder theory is readily adopted in research of non-profits, 
and it has been applied to social enterprises. 
Due to the relatively small corpus of social enterprise governance literature, the 
inclusion or exclusion of any corporate governance theory cannot be dismissed 
too readily. Further research is required to examine the implications of the 
governance concepts which prevail. Social enterprises may employ staff and the 
role of prescriptive contracts may be a pertinent issue to explore. Alternatively, 
there is no specific evidence to suggest that social enterprise governance can or 
cannot be viewed as an efficiency-seeking entity, or that the concept of 
transactions is irrelevant in this context. There are a number of opportunities to 
study social enterprise governance. It is worth noting that the exploration of the 
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mainstream corporate governance theories would also be valuable and offer 
insight to social enterprise governance. However, for the purposes of 
discriminating between the competing approaches, two theories, one of 
governance and one of organisational theory, are more naturally inclined to the 
nature of social enterprises. Stewardship theory posits the Board as holding 
expertise in running the enterprise, and as stewards of the primary beneficiaries 
interests. In this capacity, they are ideally placed to run the organisation in the 
pursuit of these interests. This approach is emergent in the social enterprise 
governance literature. It is useful because it explains how managers and Board 
members can reconcile two core functions effectively. They can focus on 
pursuing enterprise objectives, because they know that doing so will contribute to 
the overarching social focus of the organisation. Stewardship governance 
facilitates this by setting and maintaining the optimal internal `conditions' for 
managers to perform their roles effectively. 
Institutional theory also counterpoises the organisation as a social, rather than a 
private entity. Stakeholder theory is linked within the institutional model of the 
organisation. Yet the broader institutional theory allows greater consideration of 
the social and cultural values or social enterprises. This negates being drawn in to 
`property ownership' debate and the competing claims of stakeholders. The 
debate between shareholder and stakeholder primacy are typically based on the 
legal and moral priorities of the corporation. However, the broader institutional 
view indicates that non-legal forces, such as cultural norms, are a more powerful 
force in the characteristics of governance arrangements. Since social enterprises 
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are founded on the principle of service to aid a social cause, there is likely to be a 
close affinity between some (or all) of the internal actors, and a strong moral 
ethos embedded throughout. Therefore, using institutional theory as a basis to 
explore these variables and other measures of governance performance (such as 
financial data) would appear to suit the dualistic philosophy of the social 
enterprise: " (the achievement of) primarily social objectives and reinvest 
surpluses for that purpose in the business or in the community... " (DTI, 2002, 
p. 7). 
Adopting the institutional approach for the purpose of further research would 
contribute to the body of knowledge. Such an approach is not typical of 
mainstream governance research. Further, social enterprise governance is under- 
researched and institutional analysis will help to identify some of its key 
components. This method also considers the impact of governance on 
organisational performance. In the context social enterprise, performance entails 
the delivery of value to the primary stakeholder group, as the central focus of 
social enterprise activity. The method of monitoring performance in social 
enterprises (where present) is through the adoption of performance management 
functions, such as social accounting and social auditing. These processes of 
accountability feed into strategic decision-making, informing managers and key 
stakeholders about how well the enterprise is operating. Therefore, in order to 
study the governance of social enterprises, it would be a logical step to analyse 
the performance data collected and comparatively assessing the presence of 
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significant linkages between the governance structure and performance of the 
social enterprise. 
This chapter highlights gaps that are worthy of further investigation. Despite the 
acknowledgement of the multi-stakeholder model of governance in social 
enterprise (Borzaga and Solari, 2001), there is a need to further investigate the 
dynamics of formal or informal institutional factors in regulating managerial 
activity. The prevailing view for stakeholder theory is that stakeholders should be 
involved in the governance of their organisations. The difficulty of representation 
at Board level is that there must be clear recognition of which stakeholder 
group(s) should fulfil this influential role. Furthermore, given the variety of legal 
forms that social enterprises can adopt, it is difficult to generalise this approach 
even within sub-fields of the third sector. For example, Social Firms are a 
particular classification of social enterprise, but can adopt a variety of legal 
forms. Maximising the effectiveness of stakeholder inclusion in governance will 
"vary according to the prevalent nature of specific social enterprises" (Borzaga 
and Solari, 2001, p. 343). If this is so, then it would be logical to examine the 
influence of elements of the institutional environment in specific social enterprise 
types. This is because there is more scope to find an area that is relatively under- 
researched. 
As Chapter 3 will show, the exploratory interviews confirm an appropriate social 
enterprise type for the study. The methodology and analysis of the exploratory 
interviews can be found in Chapter 4. Social enterprises such as cooperatives and 
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housing associations are already covered by governance research (Chaves, 1994, 
Cornforth, 2004, Gorton and Schmid, 1999, Hart and Moore, 1996, Kearns, 
1992, Malpass, 2000, Malpass, 2002). One particular type of social enterprise 
that remains under-researched is the Social Firm. Social Firms are unique 
because they are founded to provide employment opportunities to disabled 
people, and their business interests can comprise anything from job brokerages to 
advertising agencies. Presently, research does not address the role of governance 
in these organisations, thus detracting from the potential insights such research 
may offer. Social Firms provide services to the public and private sector, thus 
engaging in bridging between sectors. For example, one Social Firm's business 
activity is the fulfilment of on-line orders, and it offers this service to a range of 
private and public clients. With a turnover of in excess of £1 million, they are 
significant organisations. The growth of the Social Firm is contingent on its 
commitment to defined stakeholder groups and acquiring the skills to manage 
sustainable growth. In this case, there are key governance issues: 
9 How the Board of directors ensure that stakeholder benefit is not 
compromised by the growth of the business function. 
" How the Board of directors control managerial activity to focus on 
maximising benefit to the defined community. 
" How managers reconcile the competing claims on resources. 
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" How the process of governing this social enterprise conforms to the key 
governance outcomes of transparency, accountability and sustainability. 
Social Firms are an ideal form of social enterprise, in that they most suitably 
represent the expected characteristics: they utilise business activities to provide 
benefits to a defined community. Research of these organisations would provide 
valuable insights into the `local' governance arrangements and, as part of the 
aggregate of social enterprise governance research, produce a worthwhile 
contribution to the existing body of knowledge. Also, the institutional approach 
presents an alternative perspective of governance that is (at least) not wholly 
structural and analyses the informal influences that may play a significant role in 
legitimising managerial activity. There is potential for further analysis, in a way 
that applies existing neo-institutional theories to the social enterprise 
organisation form. For example, the governance arrangements in Social Firms 
could be examined using DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) typologies of 
institutional isomorphism. This approach has already been conceptualised for 
social enterprises (Reid and Griffith, 2006). Examination of regulative and 
constitutive rules, using data derived from internal actors in social enterprises, 
would show whether and / or how these informal mechanisms operate alongside 
conventional, structural mechanisms. In general then, the institutional analysis of 
social enterprise governance would contribute to the body of knowledge by 
determining how the institutional aspects of governance influence processes. At 
present, this field is ripe for further study. 
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2.6.1 RESEARCH QUESTION 
Do attitudes to governance influence perceptions of performance in Social 
Firms? 
Following this research question, research objectives are outlined below: 
" To examine the influence of accountability on the legitimacy of social 
enterprise governance. 
" To determine the role of the social mission in facilitating ethical practice 
by managers of Social Firms. 
9 To determine and analyse the significance of any relationship(s) between 
transparency, accountability, sustainability and legitimacy. 
9 To develop a model of governance that represents a holistic view of the 
formal and informal governance arrangements in Social Firms. 
2.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The purpose of this Chapter was to outline the dominant theoretical positions in 
corporate governance. In recognition of the key role the view of the organisation 
has in corporate governance theory, agency theory, TCE and stakeholder theory 
were introduced in terms of private property, nexus-of-contracts and social 
institution organisational models. Further, the Chapter made clear the 
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applicability of the social institution model to organisations that serve a range of 
stakeholders, rather than giving primacy to shareholders (or where this group is 
not present). Institutional analysis offers a different perspective on the meaning 
and importance of corporate governance. This view fully embraces the influence 
of informal aspects of the organisation, and the degree to which they affect 
governance. The activity of shared meanings and values, and the routines and 
scripts as carriers of these meanings interpret institutional effects. Social 
enterprises are run to produce social benefit from an efficient, effective business 
model. Appropriate analysis of their governance will examine the influence the 
institutional environment has. 
A key outcome of this Chapter was establishing that there are at least three facets 
of social enterprise governance: transparency, accountability and sustainability. 
Adopting an institutional view indicates that the outcome of good corporate 
governance will be legitimacy. Legitimacy is conferred on the organisation, 
permitting the continued allocation of resources and existence of the 
organisation. The relationship between these elements needs to be tested. 
Transparency forms part of accountability, and the latter was recognised to be the 
most likely predictor of attitudes towards legitimacy. Testable propositions were 
formed for the expected elements of each aspect of social enterprise governance. 
Social enterprise governance research is relatively new and requires more 
development. As such, this Chapter does not focus the research on a particular 
social enterprise type. To improve research focus, an exploratory interview stage 
96 
was deemed necessary to clarify the type of social enterprise to be used for 
further research. The outcomes from the exploratory interviews are discussed in 
Chapter 4. Chapter 3 provides a discussion of the methodological design and 
implications for the next stages of the study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY AND OUTLINE OF METHODS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter details the methodology adopted for this research. In so doing, it 
provides a rationale for the adoption of the postpositivist paradigm. This choice 
is made, mindful of the alternatives and their strengths and weaknesses. Also, the 
implications of this choice upon methods and research design are considered. 
Furthermore, attention is paid to the prevailing methodological norms from 
previous research in corporate governance and institutional theory. Details of the 
exploratory study (Stage 1) are provided in Chapter 4. Discussion of research 
instrument development, sampling technique, data analysis, ethical 
considerations and limitations of the methodology and methods are provided in 
Chapter 5. 
3.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Methodology is defined as "... the analysis of, and rationale for, the particular 
method or methods used in a given study, and in that type of study in general" 
(Jankowicz, 2000, p. 214). The development of research methodology is driven 
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by the selection of an appropriate research paradigm. Paradigms are defined as: 
64 ... a general metaphysical world outlook" 
(Blaug, 1992, p. 28). Paradigms guide 
research through the acceptance of key assumptions by the inquirer, related to 
ontology; epistemology; axiology; generalisability; causation and logic 
(Firestone, 1987, Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Their importance is marked by how 
they identify the motivations of the researcher and suit the research to be 
undertaken. It is of importance to understand the relative merits of each 
paradigm. The stages of their development, particularly in the past century, have 
been critical in establishing the range of paradigm options available to aid 
inquiry of social phenomena. A discussion of the key similarities and differences 
amongst the major paradigms is provided below in order to present a thorough 
methodology. Also, consideration is given to the methodological norms in related 
fields of inquiry. 
3.2.1 POSITIVISM 
There exist a number of classified paradigms that are used to frame research 
inquiry. However, one paradigm, positivism, has long been the driving force of 
scientific research. From the `positive philosophy' of Comte to logical 
positivism, this approach continues to play a central role in formalising the 
process of scientific discovery (Giddens, 1978). The positivist paradigm asserts 
key beliefs as `facts' about reality, knowledge, values and logic of inquiry. 
Adoption of this paradigm poses implications for how the inquirer seeks to 
conduct and accomplish the research process. Positivism invokes the idea of a 
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shared reality, which can be explored through experimental, controlled inquiry. 
This empirical study "... formally tests nomothetic propositions.. . towards 
creating enduring theoretical structures. " (Rist, 1977, p. 43). These a priori 
statements are verified by results of inquiry and can therefore be generalised 
across time and space (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). This in turn advances theory 
and knowledge building in the chosen area of inquiry. This is crucial to 
positivism; that observations of phenomena, once verified, represent `real' facts 
that are true in any context. Positivism provides the world with the truth about 
"how things really are" (Guba, 1990, p19: italics in original). To this end, 
quantitative analysis is conducted in order to manipulate and test the data to 
prove its factual qualities. For the positivist, objectivity is integral to the 
relationship between the researcher and the subject of the research. The 
researcher stands independently from the subject of investigation (Smith, 1983). 
This means that inquiry is value free and not subject to influence by the 
researcher. The qualities of positivism are well documented, though they also 
form the basis of criticisms of this paradigm in the latter part of the 20th century 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). These criticisms expose weaknesses in 
positivism as the primary methodological paradigm. 
The period of debate that resulted in positivism being discredited has been 
referred to as the `paradigm wars'. The outcome of this debate was the 
emergence of competing (or accommodating) paradigms to guide research based 
on different core assumptions to those of positivism. Positivism was undermined 
by the changing view of how to study the social world, as something distinct 
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from the study of the physical and natural sciences. Firstly it has been contended 
that the preoccupation within positivism of observation leading to theory 
building is untenable, amounting to `naive realism' (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
Also, historical analysis of the nature of scientific progress has challenged the 
positivist notion of advancement by steady accumulation of theory (Kuhn, 1970). 
Secondly, the claim of value-free study of society is complicated in sociological 
inquiry, where the values of the researcher influence the type of research to be 
conducted. Therefore this asserts the `value-ladenness' of inquiry (Tashakkori 
and Teddlie, 1998). Furthermore, objectivity cannot be assured where research 
occurs outside of laboratory conditions, or where the researcher engages with the 
subject under investigation. This allows the notion of subjectivity as a 
requirement for interpreting the social world, something that could not be 
achieved through objectification. 
Consequently, other paradigms were developed that either accommodated the 
criticisms of positivism (postpositivism), diverged from the traditional view 
(critical theory, constructivism) or reframed the issue to `what works best' 
(pragmatism). The utility of these alternative paradigms is to provide 
philosophical underpinning for research in `new' or non-scientific fields. 
3.2.2 CONSTRUCTIVISM 
The paradigm most distinct from positivism is constructivism (or 
phenomenology). The constructivist paradigm presents a world-view that is 
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directly opposite to positivism, from an absolute to a relative world-view. 
Constructivism was developed as a response to the dominance and dissatisfaction 
with positivism (and postpositivism). Its origins lie in the interpretive / 
hermeneutical methodology of Dilthey (Smith, 1983, Smith and Heshusius, 
1986). Constructivism possesses a number of qualities that present a different 
view of the world and of the nature of inquiry to the prevailing positivist view. 
Primarily, the divergence is ontological where multiple realties are created and 
exist, and change as their creators change (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). Both 
Dilthey and Weber asserted that the positivist / realist approach cannot enable an 
understanding of a complex social reality. This type of reality is constructed 
temporally and is honed by individual values, beliefs, experiences and contexts. 
This provides the rationale for the basic assumptions of constructivism, including 
the intertwining of the `knower and the known' (epistemology), the accepted 
influence of values upon inquiry, and the impossibility of generalisability across 
time and contexts. Furthermore, constructivism advocates inductive, rather than 
deductive reasoning (Janesick, 2003b). 
Constructivist inquiry works from particular findings related to phenomena, 
leading to general theorising - where this is applicable in a given time and 
context. Its methodology is hermeneutical, rather than experimental and aims to 
"distil a consensus construction that is.. . 
informed and sophisticated. " (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994, p. 111) Clear division between proponents of the prevailing 
positivist paradigm and the constructivists, led to the incompatibility thesis. This 
prompted a period where debate amongst proponents of either paradigm seeking 
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superiority (Firestone, 1987, Gage, 1989, Lincoln and Guba, 1985, Rich and 
Patashnick, 2002, Smith and Heshusius, 1986). The outcome of this was detente, 
where the debate was seen to be inimical to progress in methodological research. 
This signified the emergence of pragmatism as a viable paradigm, hence a 
compatibility thesis (Howe, 1988, Rist, 1977). 
In this view, traditional divisions between paradigms are seen as out-dated and 
unhelpful in tackling research problems (Howe, 1988, Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Rather, the focus is on accommodation of paradigms to 
suit the research question, and the orientation and values of the researcher. This 
tailors research on the basis of methodological assumptions that enable an 
examination and understanding of the natural and social world. Thus, there is no 
`best' methodological paradigm to adopt for the research, and the implications 
this has for choice of methods. Given the outline of methodological development 
above, the choice of methodology was made on the basis of suitability with the 
research question, and the methodological norms in institutional analysis and 
governance research. Mindful of this and the need for depth and quality of data 
and rigorous analysis, the orientation and values of the researcher prompt the 
acceptänce of postpositivism, rather than pragmatism. A detailed explanation of 
and rationale for this choice is provided in the next section. 
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3.2.3 POSTPOSITIVISM 
Postpositivism represents the modified view of modern science. The rationale for 
postpositivist inquiry is to accommodate the criticisms of positivism, without 
losing some of its key elements. Postpositivism is marked by key works, such as 
Kuhn (1970) and Popper (2002 [1959]), altering how we should understand the 
use of science in investigating the world. Kuhn's historical analysis of the nature 
of scientific progress altered the way that many researchers understand how 
progression is made in science. Popper's considerable influence is felt mainly 
through the concept of falsification -a key part in discrediting verificationism 
and positivism in the latter part of the 201h century. Further, Popper (1981, p. 113) 
determined that his version of falsificationism modified elements of `scientific' 
methodology. For example, propositions are "`basic statements' rather than 
factual, spatio-temporally universal theories... ". Therefore, it has almost become 
the default option for scientific-orientated social research to adopt a postpositivist 
framework. Another key development of postpositivism came from Campbell 
and Fiske (1959), who pioneered the use of both quantitative and qualitative 
research methods, whilst carefully adhering to key assumptions of the positivist 
orthodoxy. 
Central to the development of postpositivism is the acceptance of three key 
assumptions: value-ladenness of inquiry, nature of reality and theory-ladenness 
of facts (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998, p. 8). First, the value-ladenness of inquiry 
relates to the belief that research (particularly of the social world) cannot be 
devoid of influence by those who investigate it. 
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Postpositivism asserts that all inquiry is influenced by values, including choice of 
research and the methods used, and in the analysis and understanding the 
outcomes of this research. In this relativist outlook, such outcomes can include 
theory that is probably true but cannot claim to be generalisable across contexts. 
As Alexander (1990, p. 532) comments: "Theoretical knowledge can never be 
anything other than the socially rooted efforts of historical agents. " In 
postpositivism, the researcher accepts the theoretical framework they seek to 
progress, and the guarded limitations that any outcomes can have. This diverts 
from the positivist view of inquiry being value-free, and that observation is "the 
final arbiter of what can be believed. " (Phillips, 1990, p. 32). Instead, the 
researcher must also accept that in the study of constructed social realities, values 
are important to understand why the phenomenon presents itself in the way it 
does. This is a concession to the criticisms made of positivism about its 
suitability for studying the social world. Also, this concession infers the presence 
of more than one reality, which is a central aspect of positivism. Hence the 
postpositivist paradigm modifies the traditional scientific basis of `fact' through 
the proposition that findings are `probably true', that are subject to falsification 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1994). 
The key assumption is that there is not one single reality shared by all, where fact 
is the outcome of our rigorous and objective analysis of quantities data. Rather 
there are multiple, constructed realities that upon investigation are influenced by 
values relative to the subject under inquiry. These investigated phenomena are 
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then presented in the context of the identified existing theoretical framework, and 
this develops grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
Postpositivism has been criticised on the grounds that it does nothing more than 
accommodate the failings of positivism, rather than present a completely new 
paradigm (such as constructivism). Furthermore, critics argue that postpositivism 
remains much the same as positivism: an inadequate `realist' lens with which to 
study social phenomena. The same exclusions apply in this case, that attempting 
to state things as `true' or even `probably true' are untenable on the grounds of 
multiple realities advocated in the idealist paradigms. A further criticism is that 
the development of postpositivism (and other paradigms) hastened the `detente' 
in the paradigm wars and the ascent of other relativist paradigms, stymieing a 
valuable debate amongst paradigms (Smith and Heshusius, 1986). Therefore this 
infers that the schism between paradigms was helpful (rather than inimical) to the 
development of solid belief systems of opposing world views. Nevertheless, the 
popular belief is that the debate is no longer valuable as a means to developing 
methodological theory or the dominance of any one paradigm (Patton, 2002, 
Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). In place of a detente, there now exists a period of 
compatibility between paradigms. The value of paradigm choice is how a variety 
of methods fit the assumptions of the researcher, together with the demands of 
the research question and the practical limits imposed upon the research project 
(Patton, 2002). 
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3.2.4 RECONCILING POSTPOSITIVSM 
Social enterprise governance is an under-researched area of inquiry, and 
exploratory research is a valuable approach in assisting theory building by 
researchers in this area. As such, a multi-method approach should be adopted to 
enhance the scope of the study. This is useful because it facilitates the 
establishment of research themes and concepts (in the first instance), and enables 
researchers to focus further research more effectively (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 
1998). Therefore, postpositivism is an appropriate methodological choice 
because it accommodates multi-method research. The conceptual nature of 
postpositivism - placed between positivist and interpretivist methodologies - 
causes some issues related to how the two approaches are reconciled against each 
other. Further, it must be evident where this accommodation has taken place: 
where one approach has evidently informed the use of the other. 
The first element, the conceptual divide, is difficult to resolve. This is because, at 
ontological and epistemological levels, the nature of inquiry rests on a relativist 
form of positivism. This causes an issue because it is not possible to justify the 
methodological choice without conceding its limitations. With the extreme 
positivist and interpretivist methodologies, we accept one in rejection of the 
other, thereby justifying our choice based on the critical limitations of the 
alternative. However, with postpositivism the inquirer has to reconcile 
limitations of one approach whilst accepting the further limitations of the other 
methodology, tempering the view that limitations of opposing paradigms are 
`cancelled out' (Patomaki and Wight, 2000, Phillips, 1990). 
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However, there are practical benefits to utilising two methodological paradigms, 
and the following justifies why this approach has been adopted for the research 
study. Adopting a mixed-methods approach, designed within a postpositivism 
framework, enhances inquiry via utilising both qualitative and quantitative 
methods. Instead of the qualitative and quantitative approaches `cancelling out' 
their respective limitations, the postpositivist approach maximises the usefulness 
of both methods. This provides an opportunity to triangulate findings on a 
`between-methods' basis (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). This type of triangulation 
is considered to be very useful for analysis in exploratory research, because it 
utilises different types of data to uncover and interrogate social phenomena (Jick, 
1979). These phenomena are best explained following a full and proper 
examination of both qualitative and quantitative data to garner the most 
comprehensive view. However, by embedding a scientific, quantitative stage into 
research, there is scope for a systematic process of `falsification' of findings and 
theory building that enables further, detailed analysis of social phenomena. 
3.3 METHODOLOGICAL NORMS 
The persuasiveness of the postpositivist paradigm is that it encourages 
acceptance of aspects of both positivism and constructivism. Therefore the 
subsequent research can utilise both quantitative and qualitative methods in the 
duration. Where it differs from pragmatism is the fixed primacy of scientific 
method over qualitative techniques. Pragmatism asserts that the requirements of 
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the research question takes priority over epistemological and ontological 
assumptions about the nature of reality and inquiry. 
An important factor was establishing the normative methodological approach in 
the study of institutions and of governance. Scott (2001) claims that the study of 
institutions is best achieved with a postpositivist approach. This is explained in 
terms of how postpositivism facilitates investigation of phenomena that fall 
between the metaphysical and the empirical: reconciliation to the realist-idealist 
dichotomy. Models, concepts and propositions can be placed at various points on 
a continuum, relative to the metaphysical and empirical environments at either 
end of it (Alexander, 1983). Essentially this means that each point along the 
continuum represents a certain "admixture of both elements" (Scott, 2001, p. 62 
emphasis in original). Postpositivism advocates such `admixtures', to enable 
research that provides the optimum balance of strengths from either end of the 
continuum. There are further issues related to the investigation of social reality. 
Such investigation is based on the assumption that though there are multiple 
socially-constructed realities, they can be (to a certain extent) determined using 
empirical measurement and analysis. This is linked with the fundamental 
division between truth and reality. Institutional analysis is supported by the 
postpositivist paradigm due to the central role of "both social and physical 
sciences" (Scott, 2001, p. 63). Institutions are human constructions and are 
maintained by human behaviour and belief systems. However, to understand 
them, it is normatively appropriate to test general statements relating to them, 
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and subjecting them to rigorous analysis to produce general theory (Alexander, 
1990). 
To illustrate this, previous research on institutions has utilised a variety of 
methods and techniques to accomplish the task. From the industry analysis 
methods employed by Meyer and Rowan (1977), to the historical analysis of 
March and Olsen (1989) and the financial analysis of Deephouse (1996), a 
variety of methods have been employed to accomplish such research. It is 
common in institutional analysis to present a priori statements, hypotheses or 
propositions, for testing using statistical analysis (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994, 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Alternatively, there is evidence of qualitative 
explanation for institutional phenomena, particularly in the analysis of culture 
(Geertz, 1973, Scott, 2001, Wuthnow, 1987). Furthermore, the institutional 
analysis of isomorphism in organisations has followed similar methodological 
paths, for example historical and social network analysis (Galaskiewicz and 
Wasserman, 1989, Rowley, 1997, Wasserman and Faust, 1994). 
Previous empirical governance research has employed both positivist and 
postpositivist methodologies (Clarke, 1998). The methodological tendency in the 
dominant nexus-of-contracts view has been to focus primarily on financial / 
economic analysis methods to study governance (Fama, 1980, Fama and Jensen, 
1983, Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This includes the scientific analysis of agency 
and contract setting in governance (Freeman and Evan, 1990, Williamson, 1979). 
However, despite emerging from predominantly economic and legal fields, and 
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the prior use of positivist methodologies, corporate governance research utilises 
postpositivist methodologies in empirical work. As the mapping grid (Fig. 3.1, p. 
93) shows, prevailing theories tend to align with positivist methodologies. 
Agency theory, traditionally a concept within sociology, is used as grounding for 
seminal `financial' analysis of governance arrangements (Fama, 1980, Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). 
The mapping shows how mixed paradigms fit within governance research. 
Usefully, it shows how stakeholder and institutional research can be positioned to 
different mixed method orientations. Stakeholder theory is generally examined 
using a constructivist methodology (Jones and Wicks, 1999, Winn, 2001). 
However, there is a growing body of literature that adopts quantitative, or a mix 
of qualitative and quantitative methods (Jones, 1995). As previously noted, 
institutional analysis adopts a quantitative/qualitative (postpositivist) 
methodological stance. As a result, the constructivist influence from sociological 
study, the postpositivist position is rooted in the requirement for a balance of 
evidence types to test propositions about social phenomena (Alexander, 1990, 
Scott, 1987). This variety justifies the choice of postpositivist for this study. It is 
an acceptable methodology for the theoretical grounding of the research. 
Furthermore, it is a recognised methodology in the study of governance and 
institutions (Clarke, 1998, Luoma and Goodstein, 1999). 
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Figure 3.1 Mapping methodological norms in governance research 
Quantitative/Qualitative Quantitative 
Agency Theory 
Transaction Cost 
Economics 
Institutional Theory 
Stakeholder Theory 
Qualitative Qualitative/Quantitative 
3.4 OUTLINE OF RESEARCH METHODS 
Research methods are defined as the "systematic and orderly approach taken 
towards the collection and analysis of data so that information can be obtained 
from those data. " (Jankowicz, 2000, p. 209). Postpositivism advocates a mixed- 
methods approach to research. This enables the integration of quantitative and 
qualitative methods into the research design. Importantly, there is a tendency to 
use qualitative methods to add to quantitative findings (Brewer and Hunter, 
2006, Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). Hence, the primary data collection method 
is quantitative, given the critical-realist belief assumptions of postpositivism. The 
fallibilities associated with positivism are accommodated in postpositivism, and 
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as such qualitative methods are used to add contextual depth to the body of data 
collected. This poses implications for research design, particularly the order in 
how to deploy the different methods in a mixed methods research project. 
In line with the methodological norms explained previously, the chosen method 
of collecting quantitative data is via survey techniques. The questionnaire 
instrument will be developed and deployed to a chosen sample of the chosen 
study population, to collect profile data and perceptions of governance 
performance. Previous studies that have utilised this approach include those 
focussing on aspects of Board performance (Forbes and Milliken, 1999, 
Westphal and Zajac, 1995, Westphal and Zajac, 1998). A specific requirement of 
the research is to understand managerial perceptions, and using survey-based 
techniques allows for the collection of this information. In addition, a survey that 
utilises a structured questionnaire presents the opportunity to standardise and 
quantify this data, thus enabling the required level of statistical analysis. This 
satisfies epistemological requirements for building theory based on testable 
propositions. However, traditional research of the social environment utilises 
qualitative methods (either alone or in combination with quantitative methods). 
As this research is concerned with institutional influences on governance, it is 
reasonable to incorporate methods that can enable exploration of the social 
world. 
Qualitative research "(studies) things in their natural settings, attempting to make 
sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to 
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them. " (Denzin and Lincoln, 1992, p. 2). Qualitative methods can be 
implemented in a variety of ways; in fact the range of qualitative tools is 
extensive and continues to grow (Patton, 2002). The traditional antipathy for 
qualitative research (producing `soft' data) is outdated, with a growing 
availability of qualitative analysis software packages to robustly interrogate data 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2003, Miles and Huberman, 1994). The key informant 
interview technique will be adopted for this research for the exploratory stage, to 
add further quality to the data obtained during the survey stage. 
It is important that the choice of quantitative and qualitative methods must 
complement each other. This is also relevant with a view to analysis of the 
collected data (Caracelli and Greene, 1993, Firestone, 1987). Thus, in relation to 
the types of quantitative and qualitative methods adopted, the development of an 
appropriate research design is the next stage in ensuring the proper 
implementation is achieved. 
3.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH DESIGN 
The preceding section informs research design by validating the use of a mixed 
methods approach. Building upon the accepted assumptions of postpositivism, 
both quantitative and qualitative techniques are employed in order to corroborate 
findings and present a rich and statistically valid data set for further analysis 
(Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
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The review of literature highlights a gap in the body of knowledge concerning 
the lack of governance research in social enterprise. However, the lens of 
research needs to be more closely focussed on a particular type of social 
enterprise. As the classifications of social enterprise are quite diverse, an 
exploratory phase will be conducted (Stage 1). This first phase consists of a 
series of semi-structured interviews with key informants from the UK social 
enterprise sector. The rationale for this approach is to encourage emergent 
themes to arise. Analysis of these interviews will produce a legitimate course of 
action for Stage 2 of the research. 
Stage 2 of the research will be quantitative, focusing upon the social enterprise 
type identified from Stage 1. Central to this research is the measurement of 
attitudes towards the governance of Social Firms. Attitudes can be measured 
quantitatively through the use of attitudinal-scale statements, and qualitatively 
via interviews, case studies and critical analysis. Quantitative techniques are 
employed in Stage 2, to provide the main set of findings for further 
interpretation. The design presented for this research project is an adaptation of 
the typologies presented in Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998, p. 44) and is shown in 
Appendix 6. Full details of the two research stages are discussed in Chapters 4 
and 5. 
The data collection instrument used in the quantitative element will collect 
perceptions of respondents and nominal data on the characteristics and 
performance of the social enterprise where the respondent is employed / 
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volunteers. Using 5-point Likert scale statements, it will collect participant 
responses to the statements relating to the effectiveness of the Board of directors 
related to the predictor variables (Jankowicz, 2000). The predictor variables are 
those factors by which governance is determined: transparency; accountability 
and sustainability. These variables that are identified in the literature are key to 
social enterprise in achieving and maximising positive social impact (Paton, 
2003, Pearce, 2003). They will also be discussed during the exploratory 
interviews, to affirm their appropriateness. 
The dependent variable (DV), legitimacy (in the achievement of social aims), 
will be measured by the degree of response to the attitudinal statements in the 
survey. The appropriateness of the construct of legitimacy will also be confirmed 
from Stage 1 of the research. As is consistent with a postpositivist methodology, 
propositions will be developed and tested, the confirmation or disconfirmation of 
which is contingent upon the significance of the results. The questionnaire will 
be administered in electronic form via email, and in hard-copy, delivered by post 
to the participants. Full details of the research instrument, sampling technique, 
validity/reliability and ethical limitations are presented in Chapter 5. 
Finally, data analysis strategies in mixed-method studies vary according to the 
order in which stages are executed, and the mix of data types collected (Caracelli 
and Greene, 1993). The sequential design of this study will enable progressive 
analysis of data, the result of which informs the next phase of the study. 
Therefore the outcomes of the exploratory stage provide direction for the 
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quantitative element of Stage 2. The findings from the quantitative stage will 
inform the development of the interviews for the qualitative stage. The 
quantitative data will be used to test the propositions formulated from Chapter 2. 
These propositions were developed to be `basic statements' rather than universal 
truths. This is in keeping with the postpositivist methodology (Popper, 1981). 
Further details of qualitative and quantitative analysis strategies are provided in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
3.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The purpose of this Chapter was to present the methodological foundations for 
the research. In so doing, it discussed the role and choice of an appropriate 
paradigm for the research. A discussion of the `paradigm wars', and the bases of 
positivism and constructivism, provided the context for explaining the chosen 
methodological paradigm, postpositivism. This paradigm has many proponents 
and critics, and its use in social science was examined. Further, explanation was 
given for the influence of methodological norms from the theoretical framework 
upon which this research is based. There are a variety of methodological 
positions used in corporate governance research. For an institutional view of 
governance, postpositivism is an acceptable methodology to adopt. Mapping of 
these methodological traditions was provided to show where the existing theory 
is aligned with particular paradigms. Finally, it provided an outline of the 
methods chosen and implications of them upon research design. There are 
implications for validity, generalisability, sampling, and analysis which are 
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discussed in Chapter 5. However, before a more in-depth treatment of the 
methods, it is necessary to explain the process and outcomes from Stage 1, 
particularly how this stage narrowed the research focus. The following chapter 
(Chapter 4) examines this stage in more detail. 
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CHAPTER 4 
OUTCOMES OF THE EXPLORATORY INTERVIEWS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter outlines the development, deployment and findings of Stage 1 of 
the research. Consideration is given to the methodological justification for 
exploratory stages. Also, it explains the practical rationale for Stage 1, the 
methods adopted for data collection and analysis, and the outcomes for the key 
informant interviews. Attention is given to the implications these outcomes had 
for the development of propositions in Chapter 2. Finally, there is a discussion of 
the influence these elements of the study will have on the next stage of the 
research project. 
4.2 THE USE OF EXPLORATORY INTERVIEWS 
The exploratory interviews are needed to provide a focus on one type of social 
enterprise for Stage 2. The literature review established that corporate 
governance in social enterprises is under-researched. The exploratory stage 
(Stage 1) is useful because it provides clarification for theoretical grounding to 
progress the research (Patton, 2002). Being phenomenological by design it 
matches the ontological basis of the research project. The fundamental 
orientation of the research is the exploration and examination of social 
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institutions, as constructions, and their influence on governance practice. The 
exploratory interview allows the interviewer to better understand the nature of 
phenomena present in a particular context (Fontana and Frey, 1994). They also 
enable further research to be built on "... sound conceptualisation and 
instrumentation... " drawn from the exploratory investigations (Oppenheim, 
1992, p. 65). To enable this, expert input was required to narrow down the 
research focus. Therefore, Stage 1 aimed to identify an appropriate social 
enterprise type (hence a sample) for Stage 2. Exploratory research is ideal for 
"confirming and disconfirming cases", as well as determining patterns emerging 
in the field of study (Patton, 2002, p. 329). Furthermore, it is an accepted method 
for adding depth to propositions drawn out of previous scholarly work (ibid). In 
contrast to the standardised form, exploratory interviews are suited to small 
samples where the outcomes of the interview are not pre-determinable. In the 
context of this research, the literature review exposed the need for further 
governance research in the social enterprise sector. However, it did not indicate 
how the research should be focused. The exploratory interviews are well suited 
to the task of providing direction to research where literature surveys do not 
suffice. 
Essentially, this exploratory stage is a stakeholder consultation: giving key 
informants from the sector the opportunity to contribute to and / or direct 
research in their sector. This responsive evaluation is interpretive by design, thus 
representing the first stage of the mixed method design used for this project. 
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4.3 SAMPLING 
In this study, the sample will consist of key informants from the social enterprise 
sector, each with particular expertise relating to a given type of social enterprise. 
An important requirement is that the key informants held posts that meant they 
should have a good level of knowledge relating to their particular area of the 
social enterprise sector (Jankowicz, 2000). For this purpose, key informants were 
contacted from `umbrella' organisations that represent each of the types of social 
enterprise identified from the previous sources. The sample size for these 
interviews is recommended to be no more than six participants (Morse, 1994). 
The population that the sample was drawn from was determined thus: 
" Locating the umbrella organisations for the classified types of social 
enterprise (DTI, 2006, Paton, 2003, Pearce, 2003). 
9 `Social Economy' periodicals in the United Kingdom, confirming the 
relevance of their activities. 
Initial approaches were made via email and telephone to contact points at each 
organisation. This information was located through access of the websites of 
each organisation. Contact details were provided and this served as the initial 
point of contact. The organisations contacted were: 
" CooperativesUK 
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" National Housing Federation (NHF) 
" Social Firms UK 
" Social Enterprise Coalition 
" Social Enterprise Network (Liverpool) 
" Association of British Credit Unions (ABCUL) 
" Development Trusts Association (DTA) 
" National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) 
Following this stage, letters were sent out to the appropriate individuals 
identified from the first phase. An example of the letter sent out to the 
respondents can be found in the Appendices section. Written responses to the 
formal letter confirmed interest in the research and acceptance for a short semi- 
structured interview, at their convenience. Eight letters were sent out, and four 
responses were received (50% response rate). Arrangements for in-person 
interviews were made with 50% of the respondents (with Cooperatives UK and 
National Housing Federation). Where this was not possible, a telephone 
interview was arranged (with Social Enterprise Coalition and Social Firms UK). 
The interviews took place between June and November 2005, at the convenience 
of the interviewees. 
4.4 INTERVIEW STRUCTURE 
Prior to the interviews, a structure was developed by the researcher to facilitate 
the interview. A decision was made that the semi-structured interview format 
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gave enough control to the interviewer (the researcher) to direct the flow of the 
interview. However, this approach also presents the interviewee with enough 
freedom to elaborate on their answers where they see fit. The semi-structured 
format was chosen because it is a flexible and informal style of interview 
technique. It is advantageous to the interviewer because it creates an informal, 
exploratory mood in the interview. This enables the interviewer to engage and 
empathise with the participant, which is useful when inquiry relates to participant 
attitudes towards a subject. The semi-structured format also allows the 
interviewer to tailor the questions asked differently each time depending on the 
answers given by the interviewee. This flexibility provides more useful outcomes 
from the interview that more closely reflect the unique perspective of the 
interviewee. 
During the interview, answers were elicited by asking general, projective 
questions relating to the key areas for exploration identified below. The 
interviewee was given as much time as they required developing their answer 
and the interviewer noted salient points. An important part of the interview was 
moving from the `general' (introduced by the interviewer) to the specific 
(achieved by the interviewee). The semi-structured format allowed the interview 
to be paced appropriately and encouraged the participants to reflect on their 
answers (Jankowicz, 2000). The interviewer's role in exploratory interviews is 
one of `guidance' and minimal interference in the flow of the interview. This 
enables the interviewee more scope to answer in their way. Also, it should reduce 
the likelihood of interviewer bias, through `prompting' particular answers 
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(Oppenheim, 1992). With `subjective' data collection forms, bias is always likely 
to be present in some way. Yet, minimising interviewer influence and couching 
the discussion in general terms allowed the interviewee to decide the specific 
direction of the interview in the way that they determined. This was influenced 
by their particular experience and knowledge of their organisation, members and 
the social enterprise sector. 
4.4.1 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
The interviewer took notes to record interviewee responses. This method is 
dependent on accurate notation of the key point made by the interviewee. 
Furthermore, notes must accurately reflect the perception of answers given at the 
time of the interview. This entails further reflective analysis immediately after 
the end of the interview (Fontana and Frey, 1994, Patton, 2002). The notes taken 
during the interviews were based on interviewer perception of the responses by 
the interviewee to the questions posed. This method is useful because the 
interviewer reflects on accounts post-interview to confirm / disconfirm 
perceptions noted at the time. The method is considered accurate in qualitative 
research (Macan and Dipboye, 1994). To verify their accuracy, notes were sent 
back to the interviewee to ensure that their views have been correctly represented 
as a result of the interview. This method of recording data is a useful strategy 
because it allows the interview to be paced appropriately. It also enables 
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questions to be tailored to the context and `mood' of the interview, and this is 
typical in the semi-structured format (Patton, 2002). 
After the interview, notes were summarised into a separate document which 
served as the `sense-making' element of the exploratory interview analysis. 
These summary documents can be found in Appendices 1 to 4. From these notes, 
latent content analysis identified the commonalities and disparities between key 
informants' accounts. This form of analysis is common in qualitative research. It 
is a more detailed, though subjective version of manifest content analysis 
(Patton, 2002, Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). The latter focuses on the 
descriptive content of qualitative data. Latent content analysis classifies data into 
units, then condenses the meaning from the units into identifiable themes 
(Graneheim and Lundman, 2004). Such an approach enables the identification of 
themes, thus suiting the requirement of this stage of the research project. The 
latent content analysis grids for each interview can also be found in Appendices 
1-4, following each of the interview notes accordingly. 
The inherent limitation of this recording technique is that it does not provide a 
verbatim account of the progress of the interview. This would be useful for 
accuracy and a more in-depth analysis of the data collected through the 
exploratory interviews. Also, note-taking has a practical limitation whilst in 
interviews. Focusing on notes detracts from maintaining eye-contact with the 
interviewee. Thus, the skill of the interviewer is required to make notes at 
moments during the interview where there is a natural `pause' (Conway and 
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Peneno, 1999). Research on the validity of note-taking as a data collection 
method is inconclusive (Huffcutt and Woehr, 1999). The analysis of the 
outcomes from the exploratory consultation found that it was appropriate to 
utilise a descriptive technique to ascertain themes. Clarification of themes from 
the literature review was the objective of this stage. This determined the focus for 
the next stage of the research. The methods adopted achieve this, contingent on 
the interviewees verifying that the accounts were an accurate account of their 
views. 
4.4.2 ETHICAL ISSUES 
There were a number of ethical issues to be considered by the researcher before 
the commencement of data collection. Consideration of these issues enhances the 
credibility of research outputs (Fontana and Frey, 1994, Janesick, 2003a, 
Jankowicz, 2000). Qualitative research is heavily reliant on the level of trust 
between researcher and participant. The amount and quality of data acquired 
from research is contingent upon trust. Therefore, to increase the likelihood of a 
productive (and credible) interview, certain assurances were offered to the 
participants involved. 
Firstly, researchers are bound by the ethical codes of their profession (as 
well as their own conceptions of moral `appropriateness'). This research is 
guided by the Ethical code of Practice at Liverpool John Moores University, the 
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researcher's affiliated institution. This document outlines the key areas for 
ethical consideration, including: 
" Consent 
9 Volunteer rights 
Confidentiality 
" Professional standards 
" Honesty 
9 Openness 
9 Documenting results and storing data 
Ethical consent was not required from the University prior (or following) the 
interviews, as the participants involved were not considered to be vulnerable or 
at risk as a result of the interviews. This was confirmed following the acceptance 
of research proposal and `transfer' document from MPhil to Ph. D. that passed 
before the Research Committee at the University. The latter document was also 
independently verified. However, the researcher built important ethical 
considerations such as (Jankowicz, 2000): informed consent, the right to 
anonymity, careful interpretation, controlling the risk of deception, and 
upholding the expected professional standards of the University. 
Consent was given by individual interviewees upon acceptance of the request to 
take part in the research project. The interviews required no personal or 
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confidential information to be imparted, only a description of their perceptions of 
social enterprise governance. In addition, their attitudes towards areas of 
importance for future research were required. All interviewees were informed of 
their right to withhold their identities if they so wished, and to indicate whether 
any responses made were in a professional or personal capacity. They were also 
given notice that they could withdraw themselves, and any interviewee data they 
had provided, at any time. To date, no such requests have been made. 
4.5 DEPENDABILITY, CREDIBILITY AND TRANSFERABILITY 
Dependability refers to whether the research is "... consistent, stable over time 
and across researcher and methods. " (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 278). To 
enhance dependability for this qualitative stage of the research, there are some 
issues that need to be accounted for, including: 
Table 4.1 Dependability Issues and Justification 
Dependability Issue Justification 
Clarity and connectedness of Propositions elucidated in Chapters 2 
theoretical underpinning. and 3. 
Role / implication of investigator Planned interview `strategy' prior to 
during research. interviews taking place. Impartial. 
(Discussed in Chapter 4). 
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Check for bias / interviewer Collation of notes and checking these 
knowledge. with interviewees. (Discussed in 
Chapter 4). 
Use of peer / colleague review. Through supervisory team and 
publication. 
Adapted from Miles and Huberman (1994) 
The table details the checks established during Stage 1 to enhance the reliability 
of the data. The conceptual orientation for the study was made clear in Chapter 2, 
culminating in several propositions to guide the exploratory research. The key 
informants were chosen on the basis of their knowledge of the social enterprise 
sector. All interviews were conducted by one researcher, and used the same 
semi-structured format. This enabled a consistent approach through this stage. 
All notes were verified with interviewees as a check of reliability. 
Credibility is often described as the qualitative description of validity, used in 
quantitative research (Graneheim and Lundman, 2004). This issue is the 
examination of "... whether or not the explanation fits the description. " (Janesick, 
2003a, p. 69). It aims to ensure that agreement is reached over the correct 
interpretation of the qualitative data collected. In so doing, it legitimises the 
research process by ensuring that findings are representative of the participants 
involved in the study. This enhances the findings of qualitative research, because 
it reinforces the credibility of inferences made by the researcher about the 
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findings. To achieve this, findings from the interviews were offered back to the 
interviewees so they could verify and agree with this interpretation. 
Transferability is equivalent to generalisability in quantitative research. This 
concept refers to the trustworthiness (external validity) of qualitative data (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994). Furthermore, it represents the likelihood that dependable 
and credible findings are applicable across different contexts. Many writers have 
discussed how this is difficult to apply in qualitative research (Kennedy, 1997, 
Patton, 2002, Stake, 1978). Transferability occurs not through exact replication 
of findings over time. Instead, it takes the form of applying experiences and 
learning from one context to another. The scientific connotations of 
generalisability are therefore dispensed with and replaced by naturalistic 
generalisations (Robinson and Norris, 2001, Stake and Trumbull, 1982). 
Therefore, the importance of transferability is how implications are drawn from 
the qualitative data to apply to other situations in a useful way. 
4.6 KEY OUTCOMES FROM EXPLORATORY STUDY INTERVIEWS 
Interviewees confirmed that governance is one of the most pertinent areas for 
further research of social enterprise. Other areas require attention, such as the 
impact of variant legal forms adopted by social enterprises. However, 
interviewees distinguished between the governance of social enterprises and their 
adopted legal form. The rationale for the research of social enterprise governance 
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and exclusion of legal forms per se is provided below. The importance of 
governance was defined by three clear themes from the exploratory interviews: 
9 The role of directors. 
" The role of stakeholders at Board level. 
" The need for appropriate skills across the Board. 
The respondents, the position in their organisations are shown in the table below. 
Each interviewee was labelled accordingly, and these labels are used to identify 
the origin of quotes used in the following section: 
Table 4.2: Interviewee Characteristics 
Label Interviewee Position Organisation Focus 
Al Jonathan Bland Chief Social Enterprise Sector-wide 
Executive Coalition 
A2 Kathy Baker Quality Social Firms UK 
Support Specific 
Manager 
A3 Stephen Bull Head of National Housing Specific 
Membership Federation 
and 
Governance 
A4 Dr. John Butler Secretary Cooperatives UK Specific 
4.6.1 THE ROLE OF DIRECTORS 
Each of the respondents urged an investigation into the role of directors and the 
impact they have upon managers in social enterprises. One issue is how social 
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enterprises can implement standards of transparency in a way expected of them. 
This was seen to be pertinent at a time where corporate governance is of 
increasing importance to the public, stakeholders and customers. This is borne 
out of a need to show transparency and accountability, rather than any reaction to 
governance misdemeanours by social enterprises. It was questioned whether 
long-tenured directors were `in-touch' with the pressing needs of a dynamic 
social enterprise. directors who have been serving on the Board for longer than 
five years offer resistance to change, particularly when the change is proposed by 
managers. This was evident from the interviews, particularly Social Firms UK 
and CooperativesUK. The latter interview identified that: 
"... [many] cooperatives have long-serving directors. It is typical that directors 
will be re-elected with little opposition. This causes problems where cooperatives 
`stagnate', or if change is required and resistance at Board level is found. " 
(Source: A4) 
Paradoxically, directors who are long-serving have experience of the role and 
governance procedure. This is valuable to the social enterprise because it offers 
knowledge acquired through many years of serving on the Board, and also 
provides stability at that level of the organisation. Therefore, the role of directors 
is an important area for investigation because the dynamic social enterprise needs 
leadership and experience that is relevant to the requirements of stakeholders. At 
present, the consensus between those interviewed was the Board of directors 
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does not possess both of these characteristics. Experience is valuable but other 
attributes are required to offer effective strategic leadership to the organisation. 
It was clear that accountability is a key part of governance processes. directors 
are expected to be held accountable to stakeholders. The methods for achieving 
this centre around encouraging directors of `member' organisation to adhere to 
voluntary codes, for example that developed by CooperativesUK: 
"Cooperatives UK have worked with its members in ensuring that they send this 
annual review of their governance performance. This process is self- 
administered by the Board of each member cooperative. " 
(Source: A4) 
4.6.2 THE ROLE OF STAKEHOLDERS AT BOARD LEVEL 
It was acknowledged that stakeholders should be represented and active at Board 
level. Respondents explained how their particular organisations recognise the 
value of stakeholder input at Board level, and actively encourage its adoption by 
members. CooperativesUK encourage such inclusion through the code of 
Corporate Governance. One area of concern is attracting stakeholders to be 
involved at Board level: 
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"Social Firms are encouraged to adopt an inclusive approach to Board 
recruitment. This should ensure an open and democratic governance process. 
The degree to which this is enacted is open to question. " 
(Source: A2) 
Though inclusion is ideal for improving stakeholder dialogue, not all 
stakeholders want to (or can be) represented at Board level. Also, stakeholders 
that do represent their groups, do so voluntarily. There is no financial incentive 
available to compensate for the time spent attending Board meetings and 
"contributing". So the subsequent problem for support groups and representative 
bodies is how to encourage inclusion and a collaborative governance 
environment. 
This issue is obviously an important one for social enterprises. Stakeholders 
should be represented but the interviews indicate that this is difficult to achieve 
in practice. Trade / umbrella organisations can do no more than recommend it as 
`good practice'. CooperativesUK linked stakeholder inclusion with 
accountability, yet did not make clear how they would foresee it to be 
implemented. One possibility is diverting from unitary Board structures and 
instead promoting the establishment of secondary, co-determination Board 
comprising key stakeholders. 
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4.6.3 THE NEED FOR APPROPRIATE SKILLS AT BOARD LEVEL 
A third pertinent issue was the need for appropriate skills at Board level. This 
applies not only to directors, but stakeholders who join the Board. The concern is 
that many organisations do not recruit any stakeholders to Boards. Furthermore, 
when they are recruited, the stakeholders are represented in presence only. They 
are not seen to (or are unable to) contribute to the strategic and procedural 
governance of the social enterprise. Many of the interviewees explained 
Corporate Governance codes that they had developed for their members, and 
training courses they offer directors, trustees and stakeholders. For example: 
"The key element of the code is that members `sign-up' to the code and report on 
their progress each year. CooperativesUK have worked with its members in 
ensuring that they send this annual review of their governance performance. This 
process is self-administered by the Board of each member cooperative" 
(Source: A4) 
These codes are an indication of the level of importance that governance has for 
these organisations. They recognise the general lack of business / management 
skills of new directors as symptomatic of the governance problems that social 
enterprises face. In the case of CooperativesUK, there appears to be a significant 
`push' for greater adherence to ethical principles of governance. Clearly, whilst 
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the system is self-administered there are likely to be legitimacy issues for the 
process. However, it does represent an important step in establishing support for 
social enterprises in this area. NHF have followed in a similar vein to 
CooperativesUK, finding similar problems: 
"Aspects such as director tenure, skills and representation at Board level are all 
important issues. However, to the NHF they are seen as barriers to the 
implementation of a Corporate Governance code" 
(Source: A3) 
It is accepted in both theory and practice that stakeholders should be involved at 
Board level. This is because diversity at Board level should enhance decision- 
making, and focus it more effectively on the needs of primary beneficiaries. Yet 
the voluntary nature of Board membership does not encourage the type of 
individual with the skills to contribute at that level. Therefore, `umbrella' and 
support organisations have to encourage Board member training or `tools', such 
as that run by CooperativesUK at their Cooperative College and the Performance 
Dashboard developed by Social Firms UK. 
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4.6.4 THE EXCLUSION OF LEGAL FORMS 
A clear distinction was made by respondents between a focus on governance and 
legal forms. From the interviews, (with the exception of Social Enterprise 
Coalition) respondents elaborated that any research of social enterprise 
governance should focus more on governance and not necessarily on legal forms. 
Upon further questioning as to the reason for this distinction, respondents 
asserted that the legal form choice for social enterprises is relatively clear and not 
a pressing issue for further research. In light of the recent introduction of the 
Community Interest Company (CIC), social enterprises adopt one of two legal 
forms: Company Limited by Guarantee (CLG) or Industrial and Provident 
Society (IPS). The choice between which form to adopt is a pragmatic one, and 
assistance for this choice is provided by the `umbrella' or trade organisations for 
each social enterprise type. Furthermore, the CIC was viewed as less important 
than the need to tackle some key governance issues. The CIC was considered as 
a `fix' for long-overdue changes to the pre-existing law regulating CLG and IPS 
legal forms. As the Social Enterprise Coalition explicated, a flexible and 
supportive legal framework is required for the social enterprise by the social 
enterprise sector. Further research is required here, though this can be separated 
from examination of the dynamics of the Board of directors and its effects upon 
performance for this research. Stephen Bull of NHF noted: 
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"directors tend to serve for a long time on the Boards of housing associations. 
Their view of housing associations, and of social enterprises, represents the 'old' 
view, rather than as dynamic organisations (the `modern' view of social 
enterprise). " 
(Source: A3) 
From their perspective, though long-serving directors have provided stability for 
housing associations over a number of years, they (housing associations and the 
NHF) face the challenge of evolving the skills set and outlook of Boards to adapt 
to the changing environment in which they operate. Hence, the legal form choice 
is a less pressing issue for social enterprises than ensuring that existing Boards 
are effective in their roles. 
The timing of the research project coincided with the launch of the CIC legal 
form. In its infancy, it appears that the participants in Stage 1 of the study were 
particularly dismissive of its importance. It should be noted that this is unlikely 
to be the case in the coming years. Once the CIC was been `embedded' as an 
established legal form for social enterprise, and its benefits become clear, 
attitudes are likely to become more positive towards it. As Social Firms UK 
made clear: 
"... Social Firms can adopt whichever legal form suits their needs best. The CIC 
legal form was viewed as useful, complimentary option for Social Firms. " 
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(Source: Al) 
4.7 CHOICE OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 
The final outcome of Stage 1 was the choice of social enterprise to focus upon 
for Stage 2 of the research. All of the interviewees acknowledged their 
enthusiasm for research in the area. However, only two, CooperativesUK and 
Social Firms UK indicated that their members would be supportive of any 
research they would be asked to be involved in. CooperativesUK offered the 
well-trodden path for further research. Prior research on the cooperative form and 
its governance is well established (Carpenter, 1988, Chaves, 1994, Cornforth, 
2003b, Cornforth, 2004, Spear, 2000). However, the primary concern was 
whether the research project in this area would significantly add to the body of 
theory. 
Alternatively, Social Firms are under-researched as a type of 
organisation. Adopting this type for the focus of Stage 2 would be beneficial in 
terms of originality and contribution. However, there is a lack of grounding 
literature available. This would position the subsequent research project as 
exploratory, rather than focussed on a particular aspect of governance. 
Yet, the decision was made on the basis of that the Social Firm would provide 
the most unique contribution to the body of corporate governance theory. The 
exploratory nature of the research could be advantageous, if key concepts of 
social enterprise governance can be clarified and tested during the project. 
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4.8 LIMITATIONS 
The exploratory stage of the research was intended to gauge which were the key 
areas for further social enterprise research. In particular, whether governance was 
one of those areas and the key issues that may require particular attention. It was 
crucial that the chosen sample contained individuals with the requisite 
knowledge and experience of the social enterprise sector. Therefore, a purposive 
sampling approach was taken. Efforts were made to contact a suitable number of 
experts in the sector who could inform the research. However, the representation 
of the sample is, of course, open to interpretation. Efforts were made to ensure 
that a broad spectrum of experts in the field had the opportunity to contribute for 
a study on this scale. 
4.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This Chapter provided the rationale for the exploratory stage of the research 
(Stage 1). Furthermore, it detailed the methods used for collecting and analysing 
the qualitative data obtained from the semi-structured interviews. The primary 
outcome from Stage 1 was the confirmation of governance as an area for further 
research in social enterprises. This builds upon the outcomes of the Literature 
Review and confirms the development of the general propositions therein. 
Specifically, the interviews raised a number of themes, which were extracted 
using latent content analysis grids (Appendices 1 to 4). 
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Three major themes were found: The role of directors, the role of stakeholders at 
Board level, and the need for appropriate skills across the Board. Opinions 
tended to coalesce around these factors, though some other pertinent issues are 
relevant to the sector as a whole. These included the role of Government and the 
new CIC regulator being central to the continued development of the sector. 
Also, general dissatisfaction was shown over the Government's past history with 
the sector, and its reluctance to modernise the two predominant legal forms (with 
belated introduction of the CIC form). The CIC is generally viewed as an 
interesting alternative to the predominant forms (CLG and IPS). The 
interviewees were keen to see how the take-up of CIC's across the sector (as well 
as in their own) over the coming years. The choice of social enterprise type, the 
Social Firm, was made on the basis that these organisations are under-researched. 
It also presents an opportunity to add significantly to the existing bodies of 
corporate governance and social enterprise theory. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH INSTRUMENT DEVELOPMENT 
SAMPLING AND ETHICAL ISSUES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter details the methods used to develop the research instrument. Also, 
it explains the consideration given to key issues, such as analysis techniques, 
validity/reliability, triangulation, sampling and ethical issues. The choice of 
nominal categories is justified, in relation to previous research and the outcomes 
from Stage 1. The Chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the 
approach adopted, and justification for the methods to be used mindful of these 
limitations. 
5.2 INSTRUMENT DEVELOPMENT 
This section examines the development of the research instrument from the 
propositions identified in Chapter 2. These propositions were developed 
following a review of the relevant theory. Each proposition relates to the aspects 
of social enterprise governance: transparency, accountability and sustainability. 
These three concepts represent the predictor variables. Furthermore, they are 
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included to establish the institutional influences upon governance, a fourth set of 
propositions relate to the Dependent Variable, legitimacy (DV), particularly as it 
relates to the identified facets of social enterprise governance. A table of the 
propositions, the related statements and the supporting literature for each is 
provided in Appendices 7 and 8. The propositions are tested by the respondents' 
level of agreement (attitude) towards each of the corresponding set of 5-point 
Likert statements. Chapter 2 explained how these propositions were developed 
from the reviewed literature. 
5.3 TRIANGULATION 
Triangulation is "... a strategy that (aids) the elimination of bias and allow the 
dismissal of plausible rival explanations (of) a truthful proposition about some 
social phenomenon... " (Mathison, 1988, p. 13). Triangulation is a means of 
verifying collected data via corroboration of results from different sources, 
investigators or methods. The value of triangulation is to reduce the impact of 
methodological bias upon research. Utilising a single research method (for 
example only quantitative methods) allows the inherent bias of that approach to 
prevail throughout the research. Greene et al (1989, p. 259) state that 
triangulation can "... increase the validity of constructs and inquiry by 
counteracting or maximising the heterogeneity of irrelevant sources of 
variance... ". Triangulation encourages proper verification of findings and 
reduces the likelihood of alternative explanations for the outcomes of the 
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research. It is frequently invoked as a verification strategy in mixed methods 
research. 
Denzin (1978) asserts that the use of across-methods triangulation, rather than 
within-methods is a more suitable way to verify data. A within-methods strategy 
utilises only one method of data collection, therefore a between-methods 
approach (utilising more than one method) is more suitable for triangulation. 
According to Mathison (1988, p. 14), this approach assumes that the inherent bias 
can be "cancelled out" when combined with alternative methods, and that any 
results produced would "... be a convergence upon the truth about some social 
phenomenon. " Crucially, this involves the use of mixed methods as "different 
methods produce different understandings of a social phenomenon. " In addition, 
the equal deployment of different methods (quantitative and qualitative) 
enhances the quality and understanding of each. 
However, it must be noted that triangulation rests on some key assumptions - 
principally that each method measures the same phenomenon independently and 
simultaneously (Greene et al., 1989). As these authors elucidate, there exist 
alternatives to triangulation where key factors such as method independence, 
simultaneous deployment and paradigm congruence are different to the 
conventional requirements for triangulation. These include complimentarity and 
developmental design. In a similar vein to choice of methodological paradigm, 
the appropriateness of each mixed method design is contingent upon 
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assumptions, as mentioned above. A key task of the research is interpreting 
findings from an across-methods approach to align towards convergent findings. 
In this study, the set of a priori statements in Chapter 2 represent the outcomes 
from the review of relevant literature. The exploratory stage was required to 
provide empirical reinforcement for the basic propositions from this stage. Thus, 
the final aspect of triangulation is via the quantitative stage of the research. 
Where the first two stages have produced convergence of findings, the third stage 
will test whether the predictions from the literature and key informants are valid. 
5.4 QUESTIONNAIRE FORMAT 
The questionnaire was designed to facilitate ease-of-completion for the 
participants from the sample population. A further consideration in design was to 
make the completed form suitable for the researcher to input the data into an 
SPSS data form. The structure of the questionnaire placed all category questions 
on the first two pages. The logic of the question sequencing was to feature the 
Likert scale questions to make the structure clear and unambiguous (Oppenheim, 
1992). Initial contact with the sample frame was made via a `standardised' email. 
This email introduced the researcher and the research topic to the sample frame, 
and contained an attached questionnaire. This represented the first of three stages 
to the deployment of the questionnaire - electronic deployment, which also 
served as a small scale piloting of the questionnaire. The second and third stages 
entailed mailing hardcopies of the questionnaire to every member of the 
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sampling frame. Each stage was allocated a two week completion period. The 
electronic version reached all members of the sample. Feedback from the 
participants resulted in the re-development of parts of the questionnaire, 
including some style and formatting changes. For the next two stages of 
deployment, all forms were sent out with a covering letter together with a 
Freepost envelope to minimise cost and inconvenience to respondents, and 
encourage completion (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). It was anticipated that the 
hardcopy deployment would produce a better response rate than the first, 
electronic, deployment. Stage three of deployment was a `reminder' to the 
sample and to improve the response rate to nearer the required level. It was 
important that, given the relatively small sample frame, a minimum number of 
responses could be acquired. For management and organisation research, an 
acceptable response rate is 36% +/- 13 (Baruch, 1999). This is a key factor in the 
choice of statistical analysis for the collected data. Meeting this target range will 
allow parametric analysis of data, and enhance the potency of further analysis. 
5.4.1 NOMINAL DATA CATEGORIES 
The questionnaire contains a series of nominal category questions. These 
questions have been included to explore the presence of significant relationships 
between them and the DV and predictor variables. Each of these categories is 
discussed in turn below, specifically in light of the theoretical support for its 
inclusion in the questionnaire. 
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5.4.2 JOB ROLE 
This category has been included to distinguish the sample into one of two 
elements: whether respondents classify as managers or directors. Previous 
research indicates that directors are crucial to implementing governance, 
therefore exerting influence over managers to ensure they maintain governance 
standards (Wang and Dewhirst, 1992). Furthermore, there is evidence linking job 
role to achievement of legitimacy (Aguilera, 2005, Cohan, 2002, Goodijk, 2000). 
The normative view of director remit is further implied in the corporate 
governance literature (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). The contractual 
responsibilities of managers and directors outline where the boundaries of 
executive power begin and end. In the corporate context, governance is managed 
in environments where internal actors have close, contractually-defined terms of 
responsibility (Cohan, 2002). Managers and directors in social enterprises should 
be expected to have a broader conception of responsibility, where ethical (rather 
than pragmatic) decisions are the norm. Stage 1 of the research indicated that the 
particulars of the director's role should be examined, mainly due to a lack of 
communication to managers and / or strategic leadership. There is a lack of 
previous social enterprise governance research and the realities of operating 
social enterprises, thus warranting further examination in Stage 2 of the study. 
This will determine where respondents indicate the significant differences are. 
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5.4.3 ORGANISATION CHARACTERISTICS 
Previous studies have indicated that the age and size of the organisation are 
linked to governance performance as well as legitimacy (Coles, McWilliams and 
Sen, 2001, De Jong, 1997, Deephouse, 1996, Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993). 
Stage 1 provided evidence that `older' social enterprises had longer-serving 
directors. This was seen to be problematic, given their perceived ineffectiveness 
and `stagnation'. Therefore it is worthwhile exploring whether this is a factor in 
significantly different attitudes amongst the sample. 
Organisation size can be determined in a number of ways, including by turnover 
and number of employees. For this study, organisation size is signified by both of 
these factors. Previous work has shown that organisation size has been used as a 
variable in studies of corporate social disclosure and performance (Cowen, 
Ferreri and Parker, 1987, Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). Furthermore, Stanwick 
and Stanwick (1998) report that organisation size does indeed correlate with 
performance, and they used annual turnover as representative of `size'. 
Meanwhile, the number of staff has also been used to determine organisation 
size, and represents a key organisation characteristic. For example, studies such 
as Mytinger (1968), and Pierce and Delbecq (1977) both advocated this category 
as part of a measure of organisation size. Therefore, it is appropriate that it 
should be combined with another established measure of organisation size. 
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5.4.4 PERFORMANCE 
The role of performance and its influence on governance legitimacy has been 
linked to accountability and sustainability (Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 
2004). Performance influences legitimacy because the social enterprise needs to 
provide evidence that it is achieving agreed strategic objectives. It may also 
influence, or be influenced by isomorphic pressures on the organisation 
(Deephouse, 1996). A common method of assessing performance is through 
financial data, profit and / or turnover. Profit is not a suitable term for the study 
of social enterprise, where the preference is for the term `surplus'. Irrespective, 
social enterprise `performance' can be measured by level of turnover, similar to 
other organisations (Kacmar, Andrews, Rooy, Steilberg and Cerrone, 2006, 
Kaplan and Norton, 1992). However, to use this alone as an indicator of size is 
insufficient (Kaplan, 2001, Paton, 2003). Typically, there are social and 
environmental goals for these organisations and these are discussed below. 
5.4.5 SOCIAL AUDIT 
A common method of testing performance in social enterprise and nonprofit 
organisations is through social auditing / accounting (Paton, 2003, Pearce, 2003). 
This combines methods to capture organisational performance on social, 
environmental and financial grounds, testing the so-called `triple-bottom line' 
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(Elkington, 1997, Gray, Owen, Evans and Zadek, 1997, Gray, Owen and 
Maunders, 1991). The social audit is seen to be vital to accountability and part of 
what social enterprises do (Paton, 2003). However, this is more of a stated 
assumption than supported by a broad palette of empirical evidence. Social 
enterprises should conduct a form of social audit on a regular basis, but there is 
no empirical evidence indicating that they actually do this, or whether it 
influences conceptions of performance. Therefore, it has been included as a 
nominal category for this study to provide some evidence whether it is significant 
to attitudes towards governance legitimacy. 
5.4.6 STAFF 
In unison with assessing the number of staff employed, the research instrument 
also investigates the type of staff employed. Type of staff indicates whether 
employed staff are salaried, volunteers, or a mixture of both. It is common in 
organisations such as social enterprises to employ a varied mixture of both types 
of staff (Cunningham, 1999). In fact, directors, Board Members and trustees are 
also commonly voluntary rather than salaried (Callen, Klein and Tinkelman, 
2003, Hall and Banting, 2000, James, 1983, Saidel and Harlan, 1998). Given it 
apparent relevance to the nonprofit and social enterprise sector, it is included in 
this exploratory research to determine any significant relationships this variable 
may have. 
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5.4.7 BOARD SIZE 
There are many previous studies that have examined Board size and composition 
and links with governance performance. Seminal work in this area is Baysinger 
and Butler (1985), though there is a swath of research here (Bhagat and Black, 
1999, Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999, Daily and Dalton, 1993, Dalton, 
Daily, Elfstrand and Johnson, 1998, Goodstein, Gautam and Boeker, 1994, 
Kosnik, 1987). For example, van der Berghe and Levrau (2004) included both 
academic and more practical determinants of `good' Board composition and the 
impact on performance. Similarly, the effect of Board size on performance has 
been studied in some depth in other sectors (Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells, 
1998, Goodstein et al., 1994, Luoma and Goodstein, 1999). The former work is 
particularly useful here as it examines the efficacy of the range of functions the 
Board has, from governance to strategic (Goodstein et al., 1994). Conyon and 
Peck (1998) further demonstrated the negative impact that Board size has upon 
performance. Hence this category should be included in this study, as prior 
evidence suggests that it is relevant in studies of the Board, and its role in the 
organisation. 
5.4.8 DIRECTOR TENURE 
There has been extensive research on director tenure and performance, either as a 
single variable or as part of a combined study on Board composition and 
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effectiveness. Seminal work here includes Salancik and Pfeiffer's (1980) study 
focusing on corporations in the US and the determinants on tenure of key 
executives. Further work has developed the understanding of whether and how 
director tenure influences performance, control and (Daily and Dalton, 1993, 
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990, Johnson, Hoskisson and Hitt, 1993, Kosnik, 
1987, , 1990). 
Other important studies that have examined this factor in a 
`combined' approach include Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and Westphal and 
Zajac (1995). Both combined a variety of Board-related variables in their studies 
of corporate Boards. 
In the public and nonprofit sectors, existing research can be aligned with a 
number of alternative theories of corporate governance. These include 
stewardship theory (Muth and Donaldson, 1998), agency and institutional 
theories (Young, Stedham and Beekun, 2000), and stakeholder theory 
(Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994, Saidel and Harlan, 1998). There is yet to be 
empirical investigation of this Board characteristic in the context of social 
enterprise. Therefore it is included in this research instrument to explore any 
relationships that may exist. 
5.4.9 DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY 
The locus of decision-making, as well as how decisions are made are both 
important factors to consider in Board research. In any organisation, the role of 
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the Board carries responsibility for strategic direction and an executive function 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Prior studies have focused, for example, on the 
determinants of effective decision-making at Board level (Carpenter and 
Westphal, 2001, Kosnik, 1987, Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001, Westphal and 
Zajac, 1995). Nonprofit Boards have also been the subject of a variety of studies, 
notably in relation to their performance (Nobbie and Brudney, 2003) and 
strategic role in the organisation (Markham, Johnson and Bonjean, 1999, Stone, 
Bigelow and Crittenden, 1999). Evidently, the Board should provide the strategic 
impetus for organisation activities, and some previous work has applied 
institution analysis to study Board decision-making (Galaskiewicz and 
Wasserman, 1989). Thus we can appreciate that determining how important 
(Board-level) decisions are made is a necessary category for inclusion in this 
exploratory study. 
The Likert statements were developed to relate to key propositions as outlined in 
Appendix 7. Furthermore, the table in Appendix 8 exemplifies how each of these 
statements relates to the specified theory. 
5.5 PILOT TESTING 
The piloting of the survey instrument is split into two stages. The first stage 
involves a small scale review of structure, presentation and coherence conducted 
amongst the supervisory team. Following this, any alterations to the 
questionnaire will be executed. The next stage involves deployment of the 
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questionnaire via e-mail contacts sourced from Social Firms UK. Initial 
deployment of the questionnaire yielded six responses, and some amendments 
were made to the form. These were predominantly format and style alterations to 
improve the readability of the form. 
5.6 ANALYTICAI, METHODS 
As noted in Chapter 4, data collected from Stage 1 was analysed using latent 
content analysis of interview transcripts and field notes. The qualitative data 
from this stage indicates a suitable choice of social enterprise, and this was 
explicit in the key-informant interviews. Also, given there was limited time to 
access the interviewees this type of analysis was deemed appropriate. 
The design of the questionnaire provides both nominal and interval data. This 
facilitates the use of parametric statistical tests. The first stage of analysis will 
test which of the predictor variables influence the DV. Multiple regression 
analysis will be used to test for the presence of relationships between the 
variables. This stage will be preceded by testing for normality (Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov test), to reduce the likelihood of multicollinearity. Of course, the actual 
(rather than assumed) normality of distribution must be confirmed before the 
range of further statistical tests are attempted. The statistical analysis software 
SPSS has been chosen to perform the identified statistical tests. This decision has 
been made on the grounds of its suitability to perform such operations, its prior 
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use in professional and academic research, and researcher familiarity (Brace, 
Kemp and Snelgar, 2007). 
Data will be tested against the predictor variables and DV in a number of ways. 
Initially, the composite scores for each variable will be tested by multiple 
regression analysis. This will indicate which of the DV are likely to be predictors 
of the predictor variables. For nominal data split into two classifications, 
independent t-tests will be conducted to a minimum significance level of 95% 
(0.05). These results will enable the acceptance or rejection of formulated 
hypotheses (HI and Ho). For nominal data with more than two categories, 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tests will be performed. This will provide 
confirmation whether there is a difference between the respondents' level of 
agreement for each statement. In the case of significant differences, (posthoc) 
Duncan tests will be performed in order to distinguish where the difference lies. 
Posthoc tests can be problematical in quantitative research where further analysis 
is conducted on unplanned outcomes. In this exploratory study, propositions are 
the sole general predictions for the quantitative analysis. Hence the findings are 
not anticipated according to detailed hypotheses, rather to be explored posthoc 
using the available tests. 
5.7 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
There are important considerations with regards to internal validity, such as 
sampling error and sampling bias. As the sampling method is non-random, the 
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likelihood of more trustworthy results is determined by the selection of 
participants based on their suitability to the study. Sampling bias can be reduced 
by achieving a sample that represents the chosen sub-sector, as closely as 
possible. Sampling error can also be reduced by focussing on one social 
enterprise type, thus the research is intended to be generalisable only within that 
sub-sector, not the sector as a whole. This restricts the cross-sector applicability 
of findings; however it is supported by the methodological paradigm adopted for 
the research. Furthermore, it enhances the `usefulness' of the findings through 
"particularisation" and focusing on depth rather than breadth of knowledge 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 278). 
In Stage 2, it was vital that the outlined method measures the appropriate variable 
and does so without (or minimises) error. Therefore it was important that the 
variables involved have agreed operational definitions, and the measure has 
convergent or divergent validity. A constraining factor in the development of a 
valid set of scales for the identified constructs was the lack of prior studies 
examining them in this context. This exemplifies the exploratory nature of the 
research, and a key outcome will be determining the validity (and utility) of 
measurement scales for further research. Hence, where no prior measures are 
available, there are alternative methods for ascertaining measurement validity. 
Construct validity was tested by examining previous studies of governance and 
legitimacy. Findings that converge with expected (and previous) findings 
indicate valid measurement (DeVellis, 2003). Also, once the measurement scale 
was constructed, it was verified by three experts in the identified research fields, 
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who were present on the supervisory team. This was to further ensure that 
confidence was found in the Likert statements that they would measure the 
defined constructs. Reliability scaling analysis tests, including Cronbach's Alpha 
and split-half correlations (Cronbach, 1951) will be conducted on the predictor 
variables scales to ensure that their measurements are internally consistent and 
accurate. Furthermore, measurement reliability is to be achieved through the use 
of between-methods triangulation, as outlined in the research design earlier in 
this Chapter. 
As discussed previously, triangulation enhances the validity and inference quality 
of the data by attaining convergent validation between-methods (Jick, 1979, 
Mathison, 1988). The use of triangulation is a common approach in the social 
sciences where mixed methods are often employed, to improve validity and 
reliability (Althuser and Heberlein, 1970, Campbell and Fiske, 1959). 
5.7.1 MINIMISING BIAS 
An important consideration when conducting primary research is recognising and 
minimising bias. Given that the methodological approach in this study had a 
dual-focus, there are different types of bias issues that arise during the course of 
such research. In general terms, bias can manifest and potentially subvert 
research quality, in a number of ways. These include sampling bias (both 
qualitative and quantitative), interviewer / interviewee bias, and questionnaire 
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design bias and piloting issues (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2006). Sampling 
bias is the result of obtrusive researcher influence on the actual constituency of 
the sample chosen for a study. This is detrimental to research because results 
cannot be held to be representative of a sample population. The risk of `sampling 
error' is particularly acute in quantitative research, where research is tested 
scientifically and relies on probability sampling to minimise the chances of 
sampling error (Bryman and Bell, 2003). Interviewer / interviewee bias is a 
problem on two counts in qualitative research: interviewers are at risk of 
`leading' interviewees to particular answers through poor question development 
and / or interviewing style. Also, interpretation of interviewee responses is often 
subjective and reliant on reflective analysis of interviewee responses. This 
reflective analysis is the product of interviewer understanding of such responses, 
which naturally indicates a lack of objectivity in understanding social 
phenomena. The following sections section focus on how issues of bias were 
accommodated in the qualitative and quantitative stages of research (Stages 1 
and 2). 
5.7.2 ISSUES OF BIAS IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
The first stage of the study employed qualitative research to provide data from 
semi-structured, key informant interviews. The study utilises a purposive 
sampling method, which was chosen because of the exploratory nature of 
research. This sampling method, as discussed below (4.3, p. 122), was appropriate 
for the choice of key informants, and is based on the tenets of `theoretical' 
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sampling (Corbin and Strauss, 1990, Glaser and Strauss, 1967). This sampling 
approach involves the researcher in selecting informants through non-probability 
sampling. This guides the study through collecting and analysing data which 
guides theory-development and research design (Mays and Pope, 1995). The 
issue of bias in this sampling method arises because the participants are 
selectively chosen from the sample population, rather than at random. This infers 
that meaningful analysis of data is not reliable, since the researcher determined 
the source of the qualitative data. Therefore, because participants were chosen on 
the basis of what they might think and say, this is in fact the researcher 
manipulating outcomes to suit their own predictions for the study. However, in 
qualitative (and especially exploratory research), purposive sampling is an 
accepted, appropriate method for key informant interviews. The participants' 
involvement in such research is intentionally subjective: the study is heavily 
reliant on their particular expertise to guide the remainder of the study. The issue 
of bias in the qualitative stage is reduced by triangulating findings with the 
outcomes from the literature, and quantitative data. This highlights the 
importance of research design as a strategy for reducing bias (Mays and Pope, 
1995). 
Interviewee bias, in qualitative research, is complicated by the interpretative 
nature of study. However, analysis of key informant interviews is heavily reliant 
on the individual responses and opinions of a chosen subject (Tashakkori and 
Teddlie, 1998). Therefore, to minimise misinterpretation of qualitative data as 
well as sampling bias, interviews were requested from a range of potential key 
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informants from the social enterprise sector in the UK. Only those interviewees 
who consented to an interview (i. e. self-selection) took part in the study. 
Furthermore, all notes taken from interviews were sent to interviewees to 
confirm their accuracy. This proved an effective strategy for confirming the 
salience of qualitative data with study participants. 
Interviewer bias was accommodated and limited through interview design. The 
interviews were semi-structured, leading to question development intended to 
provoke interviewee elaboration, rather than direct them to closed answers. This 
reduced potential bias because it allowed the interviewee to respond around a 
general question, rather than be lead to talk about a particular issue. This was in 
keeping with a semi-structured interview format. A second potential bias issue 
arises, that of interviewee bias. If sector-specific interviewees are involved in a 
study about the given sector, then it is arguable that they are likely to provide 
data that only reflects well on themselves, their organisations or on the sector as 
a whole. Naturally, these interpretive methods aim to uncover and explore expert 
views, however they can be contentious and unrepresentative. This issue was 
also accommodated via the semi-structured interview format (prompting 
elaboration on themes rather than specific organisational issues). Having outlined 
the strategies for minimising potential qualitative bias, the next stage is to 
consider quantitative bias that can arise in research and how they can be negated. 
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5.7.3 ISSUES OF BIAS IN QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH 
In quantitative research, issues of bias take different forms to those that impinge 
upon qualitative research methods. Principally, these potential biases concern 
sampling strategies, researcher bias, research instrument design and piloting 
processes. 
Firstly, having focused on the Social Firm type of social enterprise (as 
determined from Stage 1), a simple random sampling strategy was employed for 
the quantitative stage. This strategy is recognised as an effective method for 
minimise selection bias, since all participants in the sample population had an 
equal chance of being included in the study sample. In this study, all Social 
Firms UK members were asked to participate, and indicate their willingness to 
become involved in the research study. The influence of the researcher in 
selection was therefore minimised because participants `self-selected'. 
Furthermore, this approach was appropriate given the relatively small sample 
population, and the difficulties associated with the generalisability of social 
enterprise research. 
Secondly, there is a potential issue regarding the bias inherent in respondents' 
answers to questionnaires. Researchers must seek to nullify the possibility that 
respondents will answer `normatively' regarding their position or their 
organisation. This is a particular concern with research on ethics, and self- 
reporting on ethical attitudes causing social desirability bias (Randall and 
Fernandes, 1991). Social desirability bias can be minimised to some extent by 
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ensuring respondent anonymity, however it is recognised as being very difficult 
to completely mitigate for this influence in ethics research. Therefore, a second 
approach was taken to contextualise the questionnaire data obtained in Stage 2 of 
the study. From the qualitative stage of the study, it became clear that one theme 
for consideration in social enterprise governance research is the divergence 
between managers and board members. Therefore, it was expected that responses 
of managers and board members might differ, casting this potential issue of bias 
in a different light. The quantitative stage sought to contrast participants' 
responses to determine a realistic picture of Social Firm governance: confirming 
divergent views between participant groups in Social Firms. 
Concerning question development, efforts were made to ensure that each set of 
questions related to the variables identified from the qualitative stage of the 
study. The questionnaire was piloted on a small scale, using a simple random 
sampling approach, with participants from the sample population. Feedback from 
this stage allowed for a slight redesign of the form (for ease of use for the slightly 
visually impaired). Further checking of the questionnaire was achieved via 
checking experienced academic researchers to analyse the form for 
appropriateness. These experts were drawn from the academic institution where 
the researcher was based (Liverpool John Moores University). In particular, this 
stage focussed on the type of questions set, how these questions were developed, 
and the efficacy of these questions (and Likert statements) with the propositions 
made following the literature review and Stage 1 of the study. This type of panel- 
based piloting is a recognised and useful method for minimising bias in 
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questionnaires and other researcher instruments (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). 
Therefore, it is clear that steps were taken before and during the quantitative 
stage of the study, to ensure that the influence of any potential biases were 
minimised. Any other issues relating to influence of bias upon data and analysis 
is dealt with in more detail in the Limitations section (Section 7.28, page 319). 
5.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This research adopted two main forms of interaction with participants from the 
sample population. Thus, there were a number of ethical considerations relevant 
to planning the execution this stage of the project. It is common practice in 
research to adopt strategies during research design and data collection that 
conform with the expectations amongst the broader research community (Brewer 
and Hunter, 2006). Principally, the research is bound by the ethical guidelines 
asserted by the code of Good Practice for Research at Liverpool John Moores 
University, which covers non-ethical and ethical standards (LJMU, 2007). This 
section details the ethical issues pertaining to this project, including 
confidentiality, informed consent, data protection issues and beneficence. The 
strategies adopted by the researcher to accommodate them properly are 
explained. 
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5.8.1 CONFIDENTIALITY . 
Firstly, the right of confidentiality is addressed. The LJMU research regulations 
state that: 
"Confidentiality (Regulation 14): 
The confidentiality of the volunteer must be maintained at all times. 
If the viewing of case notes is a necessary part of the study, the 
confidentiality of the subject (and the institution) must be maintained. " 
(Liverpool John Moores University Code of Practice for Ethical 
Approval, 2007, p. 1) 
The individual respondents in the survey were made aware of their automatic 
rights in this area, and all data collected was treated on the basis of anonymity 
and privacy. Issues of confidentiality were addressed through communication 
with Social Firms UK. An agreement was reached that member details would be 
released to the research on the condition that the information would be used 
solely for the defined research. 
5.8.2 INFORMED CONSENT 
As the research relied on volunteers to take part in the survey, informed consent 
was required. Volunteers have the right to know for what purpose they are being 
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contacted, how their information has been released, and by whom. Initial contact 
was made by Social Firms UK, through a standardised email that reached each of 
their registered members. This email explained the rationale for the research, and 
asked for volunteers for their assistance with the survey. If members wished to 
partake in the survey, they could complete the attached questionnaire and return 
by Freepost to the named researcher. This enabled Social Firms UK members to 
`opt-in' to the research if it interested them sufficiently to do so. Clearly, this 
`risk reduction' strategy was in place to encourage volunteers without implying 
any coercion (i. e. that it was member's `duty' to take part). In line with 
Regulation 12 of the code of Practice, volunteers have the right to withdraw their 
information and / or contribution at any time during or after the research process. 
This right was elucidated on the questionnaire. 
5.8.3 HOLDING DATA 
The Data Protection Act (1998) sets out the guidelines applicable for the duration 
data can be held for, and the methods suitable for its storage. All information 
used in the study was stored on a private-use computer used by the researcher 
only. Furthermore, this information held on databases and other programs (such 
as SPSS) were password-protected and inaccessible to other users. No 
information was stored on public-access machines or networks, including those 
in the University. 
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5.8.4 BENEFICENCE 
A key part of the research process is to impart something `good' or useful as a 
result of it. For Social Firms, as part of the social enterprise movement, there is a 
strong ethos of wanting to contribute to something, or making an improvement to 
current standards. It was made clear that this research will contribute to the 
ongoing understanding and development of Social Firms and may suggest ways 
of governing them better. 
5.8.5 TRUST AND CREDIBILITY 
In order to clarify the credibility of the research described to Social Firms UK 
members, efforts were made to encourage any of those interested (or unsure) of 
the motives of the researcher, to contact the University, and the director of 
Studies. This information was prominent in the questionnaire and contact details 
of the named individuals provided. 
5.9 SAMPLING 
The choice of sampling methods is important because it has ramifications upon 
validity. Furthermore, it is important because it should enable the acquisition of a 
representative sample in the study. The purposive sampling method advocated in 
Stage 1 of the study ensures a channelling of participation through the relevant 
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trade or `umbrella' organisation. This should allow access to a large proportion 
of the selected social enterprise type that are members, and also with a variety of 
characteristics. 
For Stage 2, the sample frame will consist of the social enterprise selected from 
the former exploratory stage. This was identified as Social Firms. To facilitate 
access to the chosen sample, cooperation was sought from Social Firms to 
acquire consent and assistance is accessing the sample. Contact details of the 
sample constituents were acquired through cooperation with Social Firms UK. 
They held records of 118 members who were classified as either full or emergent 
Social Firms. Initial contact was made with the sample via email, followed up by 
two hardcopy deployments. The simple random sampling approach was used so 
that results could be generalised to the Social Firms sector specifically. The very 
nature of this sampling exercise excludes the possibility of `representative' 
sampling to a wider population (Patton, 2002). This method may be limited by 
restricting the application of findings to other social enterprise types that are 
established with similar legal forms or display similar governance structures. 
However, this study is intended to be exploratory and unearth findings that can 
be tested further to a range of social enterprises. Key to this will be the use of 
random sampling with a much larger sample frame than has been used here. 
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5.10 LIMITATIONS 
There are limitations associated with the methodology and methods outlined in 
Chapters 3 to 5. In this section, they are discussed in respect to the potential 
influence they may have on the outcomes of Stage 2 of the research. This section 
attempts to draw together the range of limiting factors associated with both 
stages of the research. It also seeks to outline remedial strategies for nullifying 
the negative impact of these limitations. 
5.10.1 METHODOLOGY 
The mixed methodology / methods approach is flawed by its epistemological and 
ontological relativism. Postpositivism diverts from the strict bounded-rationality 
epistemology and ontology of positivism, and embodies aspects of relativism as a 
result. This relativist position is often criticised on the grounds that it seeks to 
find a suitable position between opposing views of the world, and knowledge. In 
so doing, it actually does neither and leads to research that is "loose and 
imprecise" (Smith, 1990, p. 172). Postpositivism remains rooted in the belief that 
there are some truths that can probably be unearthed, though imperfectly. This 
position falls foul of the positivist and interpretivist paradigms for not making 
any definite claims about the nature of reality, science or truth. 
However there are various claims of paradigm superiority by a number of 
leading theorists in this area (Hammersley, 1992, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 
2004, Thorne, Kirkham and Henderson, 1999). The current situation posits a 
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`pragmatic' approach to research - adopting the methodological paradigm that 
suits the research question and also the requirements of the researcher. However, 
the postpositivist approach used in this study suits the requirements of the area 
under investigation. With little previous research to build upon on this area, it 
must be exploratory in nature, featuring a strong scientific component. This 
provides a robust scientific platform on which to interpret and apply the study's 
findings. 
5.10.2 STAGE 1 
There are limitations applicable to Stage 1 of the study. In qualitative research 
the principal limiting issue is the central role of interviewer and the problem of 
bias. Efforts were made to ensure that the role of the interviewer was to `set the 
scene' of the interview, and allowed the respondents to elucidate their thoughts 
on key governance issues, applicable to each of their sub-sectors. The intrinsic 
subjectivity of interviewing is asserted as one limitation of the interview process. 
Purposive sampling has been criticised as a suitable sampling method, due to the 
assumed increase in non-random sampling bias as a result of selection. As 
discussed previously in this Chapter, the `selection' of interviewees for this stage 
was necessary to ensure that a suitable range of experts were contacted for their 
input. However, the onus was placed on each respondent to volunteer through 
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their own volition. Therefore, any actual sampling bias during this stage was 
minimised because the researcher was not actively involved in choosing the 
interviewees. Rather they had the option of enforcing their right to not participate 
in the study. 
Latent content analysis, though a verified choice for many qualitative 
researchers, could have been improved through the use of available qualitative 
software packages (such as NVivo). However, given the relatively small sample 
size used in Stage 1, the adopted approach was sufficient for the level of analysis 
required. To have used a sophisticated software package would only have 
automated the same processes used in content analysis. Furthermore, the quality 
of analysis by such software is questionable, specifically in terms of data loss 
issues (Crowley, Harre and Tagg, 2002). 
5.10.3 STAGE 2 
Stage 2 features the quantitative part of the mixed methods approach, in tandem 
with the prior use of qualitative methods in Stage 1. There are a number of 
qualifying limitations applicable to this stage. In particular, this section will 
focus on construct development, sample size and analytical methods. Following 
Chapter 2, it became clear that the choice of constructs for this study were 
relevant but had not previously been used for governance studies. Therefore, 
efforts to develop a set of measures to properly measure these constructs (i. e. the 
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predictor variables) lacked the support of prior attempt to measure them. Hence 
following construct development, questionnaire deployment and reliability 
analysis, the usefulness of the developed scales could prove to be unreliable. The 
use of internal reliability scales tests will provide an indication of whether the 
scales developed are consistent enough to be used in further analysis. 
The exploratory nature of the study raises some important issues here. In 
particular, the choice of a social enterprise type limited the likelihood of 
achieving a very large sample size. Importantly, the sample population (of all 
Social Firms) needed to be large enough to produce the minimum response rate 
required to utilise the statistical tests described above. However, in tandem with 
the purposive sampling approach used in Stage 1, the sample remains too small 
to be able to draw out generalisations to other types of social enterprise. Also, in 
Chapter 2 attention is draw to the fundamental problem of generalisation across a 
sector that has a large variety of types of organisation. 
5.10.4 ISSUES WITH MEASURING MANAGERIAL ATTITUDES 
Attitude measurement is a key part of social research. Seminal, developmental 
research such as Thurstone (1928), provided critical insight into the value of 
robust analysis of attitudes from participants in such research. There are, 
however, some issues relating the measurement and validity of managerial 
attitudes have been noted (Mezias and Starbuck, 2003). One concern is the level 
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of awareness managers have regarding long-term organisational issues. Where 
managers are concerned more with day-to-day `concrete' matters, there is an 
assumption that they will composite these matters accurately into attitudes of 
strategy and performance. This poses a difficulty for researchers where the 
manager is seen as possessing expert knowledge relating to their experience in 
industry (Jose and Thibodeaux, 1999). The `critical gap' is the difference 
between managerial perception of a given phenomenon, and the actual 
(empirical) value of the same item. 
5.11 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This Chapter has provided further rationale for the choice of methods in this 
study. It has given details of the various factors that have influenced 
development of the research instrument. Issues such as reliability, validity and 
triangulation have been discussed and methods to compensate for, or reduce the 
likelihood of sampling bias / error. A range of potential limitations to the 
methodology and methods were raised and discussed in terms of how they can be 
minimised. An outline and explanation was provided for the range of statistical 
techniques that will be used to analyse the data collected. Importantly, some 
discussion is given to the conditions applicable to the data before these tests can 
be executed. Several ethical factors were detailed and justification was provided 
for how these issues have been carefully considered during the development of 
the study. Particular attention was given to the role of the human subjects used in 
the study and the primacy of their rights during the research process. 
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CHAPTER 6 
QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this Chapter the outcomes of the data analysis are reported. Firstly, descriptive 
analysis outlines the characteristics of the sample and data set. This sets out the 
profile of the data collected from the defined sample of Social Firms. 
Furthermore, means are presented for the set of Likert statements for the entire 
sample. Following this, the findings of a range of identified statistical tests are 
provided and explained. The further implications of the analysis presented below 
are covered in the next Chapter. 
6.2 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
This section outlines the characteristics of the sample used in this exploratory 
study. In so doing, it presents mapping of the salient features of the sample. This 
acts to further illustrate and distinguish descriptive analysis of the sample. 
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6.2.1 SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS: RESPONDENTS 
The sample was drawn from an overall population of 118 Social Firms UK 
members. The number of usable forms returned was 37, thus the response rate 
for Stage 2 of the research was 31 %. 
The respondents from sample were divided into one of two job categorisations: 
managers (57%, n= 21) and directors (43%, n= 16). The sample consisted of a 
slightly higher number of managers to directors. It was important to achieve a 
fair balance of managers and directors in the sample. This was because the 
exploratory research indicated that managers and directors are likely to have 
opposing views towards governance of their Social Firm. Furthermore, it was 
predicted that directors may be less likely to receive the questionnaire; therefore 
managers are more likely to respond. There was slight skewness towards 
managers in the sample, indicating that this may indeed have been the case: 
Table 6.1 Frequency Table: Job Title 
Frequency Percent 
Manager 21 57 
director 16 43 
Total 37 100 
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The `time in role' category showed that predominantly respondents had been in 
their present role between one and five years (57%, n= 21), and six to ten years 
(27%, n= 10). Cross-tabulation shows that a higher proportion of managers to 
directors in the sample had been in post for a shorter time. Managers had a 
tendency to be in post for one to five years (66.7%, n= 14). On the other hand, 
directors were in post for longer (six years or longer, 56% n= 9) compared to 
managers (six years or longer, 19%, n= 4). On a descriptive level, this may 
indicate that one of the core findings from the exploratory stage holds true: that 
directors tend to be in post for a long time. However, this does not indicate 
whether attitudes of both groups differ towards social enterprise governance. 
There was a tendency in the sample towards non-membership of the board (59%, 
n= 22). Between managers and directors, the findings indicated that only a small 
proportion of managers are represented at Board level (14%, n= 3) indicating 
that this type of Board level inclusion is not a prevailing feature of Social Firms 
UK members. Again, it does not provide any indication of why this might be the 
case, pending further analysis. 
A large proportion of the sample, both managers and directors, held positions of 
responsibility and budgetary control (92%, n= 34). This shows that a 
considerable proportion of the sample have financial responsibilities to the 
organisation and stakeholders. Also, cross-tabulation of job role and perceived 
Board effectiveness showed that, as predicted, directors would perceive their 
performance positively (75%, n= 12). Alternatively, managers provided a 
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divisive view of perceived Board effectiveness, with a slight majority of 
managers indicating that the Board is not (52%, n= 11). 
Furthermore, respondents identified as Board members gave different 
views on Board effectiveness compared with non-members. A large proportion 
of board members in the sample considered the Board to be effective (80%, n= 
12), compared with a lower figure for non-members (45%, n= 10): 
Table 6.2 Cross-Tabulation: Board Membership vs. Board Effectiveness 
Is the Board of 
directors effective? 
Yes No Total 
Board Yes Count 12 3 15 
member? Expected 8.9 6 1 15 0 Count . . 
No Count 10 12 22 
Expected 
Count 13.1 8.9 22.0 
Total Count 22 15 37 
Expected 
Count 22.0 15.0 37.0 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2- 
Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi- 4.416(b) 1 . 036 Square 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.08. 
Chi-squared analysis confirms that this is an association between board 
membership of respondent and perceptions of the effectiveness of the Board (x2 = 
1.416. df = 1, p=0.036). This suggests that non-Board members in the sample 
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have a higher frequency of negative perceptions about Board effectiveness 
compared with Board members. This is perhaps unsurprising given the view of 
managers and directors given by Social Firms UK in the exploratory stage, that 
managers will perceive the Board negatively. In fact, the degree to which 
managers feel the Board is ineffective (55%, n= 11) is less than might be 
expected. However, the cross-tabulation confirms that Board members are 
unlikely to have a negative opinion of their own Board and the work that they do. 
Yet, the difference between views of managers and directors intimates that the 
former group judge Board effectiveness differently to the way directors perceive 
themselves. 
Table 6.3 Cross-Tabulation: Job Title vs. Board Effectiveness 
Is the Board of 
directors effective? Total 
Yes No 
Job Manager Count 10 11 21 
Title Expected Count 12.5 8.5 21.0 
director Count 12 4 16 
Expected Count 9.5 6.5 16.0 
Total Count 22 15 37 
Expected Count 22.0 15.0 37.0 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2- 
Value df sided) 
Pearson Chi- 2.824(b) 1 . 093 Square 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.49. 
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The above tables show the results of cross-tabulation of the two nominal 
categories. Chi-square analysis shows that there was no relationship between job 
role and perceptions of effectiveness of the Board of directors effectiveness (x2 = 
2.824, df = 1, p=0.093). This confirms the assertion from the exploratory stage: 
there is a difference in perception of effectiveness in Social Firms. However, this 
statement is qualified by Board membership, rather than job title per se. 
6.2.2 SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS: ORGANISATION 
The Social Firms in the survey represented a range of sizes and embodied a 
number of different characteristics. This is important because it aids further 
explanation later in the statistical analysis of the data. The Social Firms in this 
study have been established and serving their markets between two and nine 
years (70%, n= 26). This suggests that the sample comprised more `fully 
recognised' (as opposed to emergent) Social Firms. The Social Firms in the 
sample are located throughout the UK. Their locations include England (57%, n 
= 21), Scotland (32%, n= 12), Wales (8%, n= 3) and Northern Ireland (3%, n= 
1). This is generally a representation of the location of Social Firms throughout 
the UK, according to the Social Firms Mapping Study produced in 2005. The 
distribution of their membership is: England 80%, Scotland 12%, Wales 7% and 
Northern Ireland 4%. The response rate from Social Firms based in England is 
lower than expected (though a larger number of these are located here, in 
proportion to the total number of Social Firms). Of the 92 Social Firms based in 
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England in 2005,21 responded to the questionnaire. This is a response rate of 
23%. Conversely, the frequency of responses from Scotland was much higher 
than expected. The 2005 mapping shows 14 Social Firms based there. In this 
study, 12 Social Firms responded to the survey. This represents an 86% response 
for Scottish Social Firms. Response rates for Social Firms based in Wales and 
Northern Ireland closely correspond with the figures from the most recent Social 
Firms mapping exercise. A sizeable number of the sample achieve annual 
turnover of £100,000 or more (60%, n= 22), with 27% (n = 10) generating this 
revenue through trade, without the need for grants. The product and services they 
provide to achieve this are quite diverse. Manufacturing, recycling, distribution, 
retail and professional services represent the most frequent products and services 
offered by the Social Firms in the sample. The ultimate business goal for social 
enterprise is a situation where they are entirely self-financing without the need to 
apply for grants and other forms of equity to make up revenue. The majority of 
the sample (73%, n= 27) raise income through a mixture of trade and grants 
(though not less than 50% through trade): 
Table 6.4 Frequency Table: Source of Income 
Fre uenc Percent 
Trading income 10 27 
Mixture of trading and grant income 27 73 
Total 37 100 
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Cross-tabulation shows the Social Firms that have been established for the 
longest period of time (10 years or more: 22%, n= 8), had a higher level of 
turnover compared to other Social Firms in the sample who have been 
established for fewer years: 
Table 6.5 Cross-tabulation: Years in Operation vs. Annual Turnover 
Annual turnover Total 
Less than 
£50,000 
£51,000 - 
£100,000 
£100,000 
or more 
Years in Less than 1 year 3 0 0 3 
operation 2-5 years 3 2 9 14 
6-9 years 2 4 6 12 
10 years or longer 0 1 7 8 
Total 8 7 22 37 
The majority of Social Firms in the study employ both salaried and volunteer 
staff (65%, n= 24). Very few of the Firms in the sample employ volunteers alone 
(5%, n= 2), and the majority of the sample employ 50 staff or less (95%, n= 
35). Of those organisations in the sample that produce turnover of £100,000 or 
more, 91 % (n = 20) employee 50 staff or fewer: 
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Table 6.6 Cross-tabulation: Number of Staff Employed vs. Annual Turnover 
Annual turnover Total 
Less than 
£50,000 
£51,000 - 
£100,000 
£100,000 
or more 
Number of Less than 10 staff 8 4 9 21 
staff 11-50 staff 0 3 11 14 
employed 51-100 staff 0 0 1 1 
100 or more staff 
0 0 1 1 
Total 8 7 22 37 
Board size varies across the sample. The sample indicated that Board size fell 
into one of two categories. The most frequent response amongst the sample was 
`one to five directors' (60%, n= 21), followed by `six to ten directors' (37%, n= 
13). Cross-tabulation of these findings with duration of director Tenure shows 
that 48% of Boards with up to six members in the study serve for longer than five 
years. 
Table 6.7 Cross-tabulation number of Board members vs. Length of Tenure 
How long do Board members Total 
serve? 
One Longer 
year or 2-5 than 5 
less Years Years 
Number of Board One to Five 2 7 6 15 
members Six to Ten 3 2 8 13 
More Than Ten 0 0 1 1 
Total 5 9 15 29 
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Further analysis of the number of Board members serving on the Board showed 
no relationship between this nominal category and perceptions of the Board's 
effectiveness (x2 = 1.944, df = 1, p=0.163). 
Findings for the social audit question report that a large number of respondents 
do not partake in the social audit process (65%, n= 24). This is in contrast to the 
rhetoric from the third sector and indications from the appropriate literature. The 
social audit is seen as integral to social enterprise, so it is in some ways 
surprising that so many in this study do not partake in it. There may be a number 
of reasons for the frequency of negative responses. These could include strain on 
resources, failure to see benefit of the process, that the respondent is unaware of 
what this process entails or is not in a position to know (especially where the 
respondents are managers without Board membership). Inferential analysis 
shows that annual turnover (x2 = 0.36, df = 1, p=0.850), years in operation (x2 = 
0.0001, df = 1, p=0.985), number of Board members ()2 = 0.199, df = 1, p= 
0.656) and perceptions of director effectiveness have no relationship to whether 
the Social Firm conducts a social audit. 
A majority of the sample reported that the ultimate decision making authority in 
their organisation lay with the Board of trustees (70%, n= 26). The alternative 
options provided drew a smaller frequency of responses. In light of their 
perceived effectiveness, cross-tabulation shows that respondents were evenly 
spread between those who perceived the key decision-making group as effective. 
For example, marginally more respondents believed that the Board of trustees 
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was more effective than thought not (58% vs. 42%). The other categories 
contained very few responses (less than two), so any meaningful inferences 
cannot be made reliably. It should be noted that both Chief Executive (50 %, ) 
and those with Alternative Arrangements (60%) had mixed feelings over Board 
effectiveness. The questionnaire included an open-ended question after Q13 
(Ultimate Decision Making Authority) for respondents to add any supplementary 
comments regarding their previous answers. These comments, where present 
(27% of responses, n= 10) were quite insightful. For example, one respondent 
claimed that the Board of trustees was the notional body of authority, whereas in 
practice it was a Board of directors. This is interesting because it elucidates the 
pragmatic nature of the Social Firm. Either by design or through necessity, power 
is handed to directors who are perceived to be more `in-touch' with the 
requirements of governing the organisation. It is a common perception in the 
social enterprise sector that Boards (particularly the Board of trustees) do not 
pro-actively govern these organisations. This resonates with the findings from 
the exploratory interviews, that managers often feel alienated from Boards who 
do not understand the management requirements of a growing organisation. 
Those organisations that responded to the `Alternative Arrangements' option 
(14%, n= 5), indicated that a Volunteer Board of directors or steering group had 
the ultimate authority in their Social Firms. Inferential analysis shows no 
relationship between ultimate decision making authority and perceptions of the 
effectiveness of the Board (x2 = 1.13, df = 1, p=0.736). This is interesting 
because it signifies that the assumed manager / director difference in perception 
is actually determined on the basis of Board membership. This could imply that 
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those directors / managers without Board membership perceive director 
Effectiveness differently to Board members, or that managers allowed access to 
the Board have negative perceptions of the Board. 
This descriptive analysis has proven to be a useful method of describing the 
presence of relationships present in the nominal data collected. It details the 
salient governance characteristics of Social Firms in the sample, and presents a 
general perspective of what these organisations are like. The Social Firms in the 
sample provide a range of products and services, and their revenue has a 
tendency towards £50,000 and above. As is consistent with the Social Firms UK 
2005 Mapping Report, Social Firms tend to deliver niche products and services. 
Also the sample shows that the location of Social Firms in the UK is 
predominantly in England and Scotland, with smaller number in Wales and 
Northern Ireland. In general, they employ a mixture of salaried and volunteer 
staff, and largely do not partake in the social audit process. With some 
exceptions, the Social Firms have a Board of directors comprised of trustees, 
ranging in size from one to nine members. Typically, Board members serve for a 
minimum of two years, but this is likely to be longer. It might be normal for the 
trustees to serve in a representative or oversight function, with executive 
directors / managers responsible for hands-on governance on a day-to-day basis. 
Inferential analysis showed that, generally, relationships did not exist between 
the nominal categories and perceptions of the Board's effectiveness. However, 
one category (Board membership), did show a relationship with Board 
effectiveness. 
185 
As the next section will explore in a more robust fashion, managers and directors 
view the effectiveness of Social Firms Boards quite differently. From the 
descriptive analysis, managers in the sample are divided regarding the perceived 
effectiveness of the Board of directors. Conversely, directors almost 
overwhelmingly support the Board in perceiving it as effective. At this point, it is 
now that we turn to an examination of the characteristics of the Likert statement 
data. Furthermore, statistical testing for significance of difference and association 
of these nominal categories of the Likert responses is reported in the following 
sections. 
6.3 LIKERT STATEMENT MEANS 
This section examines the responses to the Likert statements in-depth. The means 
for the Likert statements are broken down into the order each statement appeared 
on the questionnaire. The statements have been delineated by variable, and will 
be discussed in turn. 
Table 6.8 Transparency Statement Means 
Transparency Statements N Mean 
1. Board clearly understands needs of 37 8 3 
stakeholders. . 
2. Transparent Board decisions indicate Social 37 2 4 Firm run properly. . 
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3. The more transparent our organisation, the 37 4 1 better we will perform. . 
4. Democratic election of directors is more 
important than business skills. 
37 3.1 
5. Performance results are disseminated to all 37 4 3 
staff by the Board. . 
6. Staff members are represented at Board 37 3.6 
meetings. 
7. Board member elections are democratic and 37 6 3 
externally scrutinised. . 
8. directors consult range of stakeholders before 37 3 9 
making important decisions. . 
9. Independent directors likely to improve 37 4 1 Board effectiveness. . 
Statements One to Nine refer to the transparency statements include in the 
exploratory questionnaire. The mean responses from the sample present 
interesting findings. In general terms, the sample showed a tendency towards 
agreement with the premises of transparency statements (numbers 1-3,6 - 9). 
Statements 6 and 7 showed a weaker tendency towards agreement than the other 
statements; whilst statements 4 and 5 presented a tendency towards the mid-point 
of the attitude scale (neutral). 
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Attitudes towards the Board understanding the needs of stakeholders showed a 
general trend towards agreement that the Board in fact does understand the needs 
of key groups. The sample showed agreement toward the importance of 
transparency as a signifier of a properly run Social Firm. Also, they concurred 
with the asserted link between transparency and improved performance. Further 
agreement was observed in relation to the presence of consultation as an element 
of Board decision-making, and also that the introduction of independent directors 
would improve the effectiveness of the Board. 
Issues such as staff representation at Board meetings and the external scrutiny 
over Board elections presented a weak tendency toward agreement within the 
sample. Furthermore, the sample showed a stronger neutral tendency on the 
primacy of democracy in the Social Firm. 
Table 6.9 Accountability Statement Means 
Accountability Statements N Mean 
Valid Missing 
10. directors meet ethical standards. 36 1 4.3 
11. directors monitor staff to maintain ethical 37 0 3.6 
standards. 
12. Trust is important in Board effectiveness. 37 0 4.2 
13. directors should monitor job role and 
performance. 
36 1 4.4 
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14. The process of auditing can improve our 37 0 4 1 
performance. . 
15. Social enterprises should have better ethical 37 0 3 3 
performance than expected of for-prorits. . 
16. Frequent review of directors would improve 37 0 3 8 
control and performance. . 
17. Important that Board informs stakeholders about 37 0 4 2 
performance. . 
18. Board significantly influences how I do my job. 36 1 4.0 
19. Board promotes professional standards to 37 0 3 7 improve the standard of work. . 
20. Ensuring Board accountability is key aspect of 37 0 4 4 
good governance. . 
21. Paying directors a competitive salary would 37 0 3.3 improve their performance. 
22. Board change if not competitive. 37 0 3.4 
23. Importance of proper procedure. 37 0 3.4 
The responses to the accountability statements showed more variety in the range 
of tendencies within the sample. There was a strong tendency towards agreement 
for several of the statements (10,12 - 14,17,18 and 20). A weak tendency 
towards agreement was shown in statements 11,16 and 19. The remaining 
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statements showed a tendency towards the neutral mid-point of the scale 
(statements 15,21 - 23). 
The means in the above table show that respondents agreed with the premise of 
several statements, principally that directors meet the ethical standards inferred 
upon them in their role. Respondents agreed that trust is an important factor in 
ensuring Board effectiveness and that Board accountability is a central facet of 
good governance. Furthermore, the sample mean indicates that the Board should 
disseminate performance related information to key stakeholders. The sample 
agreed that the Board is influential in the performance of roles undertaken by 
Social Firm employees, and that the Board should monitor the performance of 
staff. The sample of respondents agreed that auditing plays a part in improving 
Social Firm performance. 
Respondents were less in accord over the issue of Board member financial 
remuneration and improvement in their performance. Finally, there was an 
indication of uncertainty in the sample relating to the expected ethicality of social 
enterprises compared with `for-profit' corporations. 
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Table 6.10 Sustainability Statement Means 
Sustainability Statements N 
Valid Missing Mean 
24. Sustainability as part of strategic direction. 37 0 4.2 
25. directors have promoted awareness of business 37 0 3.8 
strategy of Social Firm. 
26. Board provides strategic direction to better serve 37 0 3.9 
stakeholders. 
27. directors maintain balance between business and 37 0 4 1 
social objectives. . 
28. Board are supportive. 36 1 3.6 
29. Board understands how manager adds value. 36 1 3.5 
30. directors should ensure the Social Firm is efficient 37 0 3.8 
to compete in chosen markets. 
3 1. Board has clear vision of how to sustain 37 0 3.8 
stakeholder benefit. 
32. Board has range of skills to sustain social benefit 37 0 3.9 
we deliver. 
33. Sustainability is a key long term objective of this 37 0 4.3 firm. 
34. Important that our Social Firm performs well 37 0 4.4 
compared to our competitors. 
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35. My organisation is successful at meeting the needs 37 0 4 2 
of its customers. . 
36. directors communicate distinct ethical approach as 37 0 3 8 
a competitive advantage. . 
37. Transparency and accountability affect 37 0 4 1 
sustainability. . 
For the set of sustainability related statements, the sample showed less variety in 
the range of means, with a general tendency towards agreement on the majority 
of statements (statements 24 - 27,30 - 37). The two exceptions to the emergent 
theme were statements 29 and 30. Generally, respondents felt that sustainability 
was a key element of Social Firm strategy, and directors have made clear their 
strategic vision to staff. Furthermore, respondents agreed that the directors can 
deliver more value to stakeholders as a result of the strategic direction adopted. 
directors maintain an appropriate balance between business-focus and social 
objectives set for the Social Firm. The sample indicated agreement that a key part 
of the director's role is to ensure that the Social Firm is competitive in its chosen 
markets. Also, the sample agreed that the Social Firms in the sample are 
successful in meeting the needs of their customers. Agreement was less clear in 
terms of the Board being supportive of staff, and understanding how managers 
add to stakeholder benefit through service delivery. 
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Table 6.11 Legitimacy Statement Means 
Legitimacy Statements N Mean 
Valid Missing 
38. Reconciling business and social objectives is 37 0 4 1 
important task for the Board. . 
39. Staying true to our mission is central to future 37 0 3.5 
success. 
40. Board acts in a way that is faithful to our guiding 37 0 3 6 
values. . 
41. Social Firm has strong set of values allowing us to 37 0 4 1 fulfil obligations to stakeholders. . 
42. Success is how well we serve our stakeholders, 37 0 3.4 
rather than by business performance. 
43. Board acts "as done in the past". 37 0 2.9 
44. Empathy with our stakeholders makes it more 36 1 4.1 
likely that governance will be run in their interests. 
45. Our work is worthwhile only if we see real benefit 37 0 4.2 
to our stakeholders as a result of it. 
The final set of Likert statement means pertain to perceptions of legitimacy and 
the link therein with the defined constructs of transparency, accountability and 
sustainability. There is a range of means derived from the responses of the 
sample. The act of balancing social and business objectives is agreed to be a key 
task of the Board. Also, it was agreed within the sample that empathy with key 
stakeholder beneficiaries is central to the strategic direction of the Social Firm. 
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Finally, agreement was met relating to the legitimate focus of the Social Firm. 
Legitimate claims of the `success' of operations are couched in terms of how 
much benefit is received by defined stakeholders. Yet there is a discrepancy in 
agreement over the role of guiding values in the Social Firm. The sample shows 
less agreement over the role of guiding values as a means to future success. 
Furthermore, respondents indicated a lack of agreement on the issue of the Board 
acting concordantly with the set of values that focus the Social Firm on the needs 
of the key beneficiaries of its activity. The range of responses to the premise that 
the Board's activities are rooted in the cultural-cognitive and `accepted' 
environment tended towards disagreement (statement 43). 
6.3.1 NORMALITY OF DISTRIBUTION 
The first stage of statistical analysis examines the normality of the data set. As is 
clear from the table below, the one sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z test reports a 
set of scores for each of the variables used in the exploratory study. The grouped 
variables each report aZ score > 0.05. This indicates that the data is from a 
normal distribution and reduces the likelihood of multicollinearity in the multiPle 
regression analyses. In turn, this allows progression on to further analysis of the 
data set using the identified methods of independent Nests and ANOVA. 
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Table 6.12 Normality of Distribution 
Transparency 
statements 
Accountability 
statements 
Sustainability 
statements 
Legitimacy 
statements 
N 37 35 35 37 
Mean 18.216 15.686 35.000 10.676 
Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov Z . 
613 . 765 . 984 . 814 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) . 
846 . 601 . 288 . 522 
a Test distribution is Normal. 
B Calculated from data. 
6.3.2 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
The data set was analysed for reliability using established statistical techniques. 
As a means of assuring certainty of the score, a number of tests were used. The 
Cronbach 'Alpha' reliability test is a common method for ascertaining reliability 
of a set of scales (Cronbach, 195 1). The output for these tests is shown in the 
table below: 
Table 6.13 Internal Consistency Results 
Reliability Test Score 
Cronbach Alpha 0.888 
Guttman Split-Half Coefficient 0.794 
Parallel 0.895 
Strict Parallel 0.884 
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The above table exemplifies that the data set is intemally consistent. As 
observed, the scores above indicate that the scales developed are internally 
consistent and reliable as a basis for further inferential statistical analysis. 
Individual tests for the scales measuring the predictor variables are shown below: 
Table 6.14 Individual Predictor Variable Reliability Scores 
Independent Variable Cronbach's Alpha 
Transparency 0.815 
Accountability 0.752 
Sustainability 
1- 
0.679 
L- I 
The above output shows a range of reliability scores. However, mindful of 
Schmitt (1996), it should be noted that the Cronbach's Alpha score is limited in 
its common use as a guide of homogeneity and unidimensionality. Further, the 
purported unreliability of a scale with a score less than 0.7 is questionable, and 
an Alpha score of less than 0.5 does not necessarily infer that the scale lacks 
validity. Therefore, the presence of lower scores does not mean that we preclude 
these scales from the next stage of analysis. Yet, it does infer that the measures in 
this exploratory study are in need of refining to ensure that they can be seen to 
measure the identified constructs in a consistent, reliable way. This is particularly 
so for the measure of sustainability, and as such further work should seek to 
improve upon this construct as a reliable measure. 
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6.4 STATISTICAL TESTS 
The following subsections outline the findings from the statistical analysis of the 
quantitative data. All tests were conducted using a minimum 0.05 level of 
significance. In some instances, this level was insufficient and further levels 
(0.01 and 0.001) were adopted as required. All tests are two-tailed, unless 
otherwise stated. 
6.4.1 MULTIPLE (STEPWISE) REGRESSION TESTS 
A number of multiple regression tests were used to interrogate the data. 
Principally, these tests were used to establish the nature of associations between 
the variables defined in this study. In order, regression analysis was performed 
on the identified predictor variables to ascertain the nature of association 
between them. This will enable further inferential analysis of any identified 
relationships. Finally, a regression is performed using the three predictor 
variables and DV in the study. The significant statistical output is presented in 
tabulation, together with summation of the findings for each test. 
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6.4.2 TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
The regression test below tests for association between two of the variables 
identified in the study. The tables below report the key statistical output for this 
test: 
Table 6.15 Transparency and Accountability Regression 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Regression 107.351 1 107.351 14.749 . 001(a) 
Residual 240.192 33 7.279 
Total 347.543 34. 
a Predictors: (Constant), Transparency statements 
b Dependent Variable: Accountability statements 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
I . 556(a) . 
309 . 288 2.69788 
a Predictors: (Constant), Transparency statements 
As we can see from the test output, the adjusted R square = 0.288, Fl, 33 = 14.7, p 
0.001 (using the stepwise method). This infers a weak association between the 
two independent variables of transparency and accountability. This result is very 
significant, reporting ap value of 0.001. In this study, there is a relatively weak 
model present. 
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6.4.3 ACCOUNTABILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY 
The second part of this series of regression examines the presence of association 
between the variables accountability and sustainability. 
Table 6.16 Accountability and Sustainability Regression 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Regression 334.816 1 334.816 43.568 . 000(a) 
Residual 245.919 32 7.685 
Total 580.735 33 
a Predictors: (Constant), Accountability statements 
b Dependent Variable: Sustainability statements 
Model 
1 
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 
. 759(a) _. 
577 . 563 2.77218 
a Predictors: (Constant), Accountability statements 
The tests presents an adjusted R square = 0.563, Fl, 32 = 43.568, p<0.0001 
(using the stepwise method). This shows that there is a clear association between 
accountability and sustainability in the model. 
The final multiple regression tests intended to establish whether there is a link 
between the identified predictor variables and DV. The presence of any link 
between the predictor variables and DV would indicate that legitimacy (DV) is 
associated with one or more of the predictor variables. A series of multiple 
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regressions were executed. The output from the multiple regressions is provided 
below: 
Table 6.17 Multiple (stepwise) ReRression 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
I Regression 46.130 1 46.130 14.453 . 001(a) Residual 102.135 32 3.192 
Total 148.265 33 1 1 1 
a Predictors: (Constant), Accountability composite 
b Dependent Variable: Legitimacy composite 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 
I . 558(a) . 311 . 290 1.78654 
a Predictors: (Constant), Accountability composite 
Adjusted R square = 0.290; Fl, 32 = 14.5, p<0.00 1 (using the stepwise method). 
The stepwise regression presents a weak model of association between the 
predictor variables (Accountability) and the DV (Legitimacy). The test revealed 
no association between two of the predictor variables, transparency and 
sustainability, with the DV legitimacy. 
The outcomes of the multiple regression tests offer general support for 
Ii Propo I sition 20. This is interesting, because it goes some way in confirming the 
assumed link between accountability and legitimacy in governance. As efforts to 
enhance the accountability of internal actors increases, it is likely (though not 
certain according to this model) that legitimacy is directly' proportional to it. 
What is clear is an association between these two concepts, and that efforts to 
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enhance legitimacy to defined groups should be built around improved levels of 
accountability. 
6.4.4 INDEPENDENT T-TESTS 
The independent t-tests were conducted to test for significant relationships 
between nominal categories and the Likert, statement responses. A total of seven 
independent Mests were successfully completed. The significant results and brief 
explanation of these findings are discussed in turn below. The further 
implications of these findings, and discussion of the effect of them on the 
Propositions outlined in Chapters 2, are discussed in Chapter 7. 
6.4.4.1 JOB TITLE 
The statistical test showed that job role of participants was significant for 
perceptions of the Board promoting professional standards. The table below 
shows the data output for the two significant statements: 
Table 6.18 Independent t-test: Job Title 
Sig. (2- 
Statement F Sig. t df tailed) 
Equal 
19. Board promotes variances 5.376 . 026 -2.235 35 . 032 
professional standards assumed 
to improve the standard Equal 
of work variances -2.321 35 . 026 
, not assumed wmn= 6ý 
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The above test can be surnmarised thus: As Levene's p<0.05, equal variances 
are not assumed. Therefore t= -2.321, df = 35, p=0.026. We reject the null 
hypothesis at the 0.05 level. There was a significant difference between job title 
and perceptions of the Board promoting professional standards throughout the 
organisation. 
From the exploratory interviews, it might be expected that job role would present 
a range of differences. The findings from these interviews indicated that Boards 
may lack support from managers, who do not believe that the Board is equipped 
to deliver strategic direction for the social enterprise. It is expected of the 
director's role to 'lead by example', to set and ensure professional standards 
through the organisation. For social enterprises, as the sector matures, some 
predict evolution towards 'professionalisation'. Thus, the gradual move towards 
these standards is contingent upon effective leadership at Board level to embed 
them. The findings in this study indicate disharmony of opinion between 
manager and directors in this aspect of the Board's role. 
6.4.4.2 BOARD MEMBERSHIP 
This series of tests investigated the presence of any significance between Board 
membership and perceptions of Social Firm governance. In total, five significant 
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relationships were located in the data set. The table below provides a summary of 
the key findings, with explanation following: 
Table 6.19 Independent t-test: Board MembershiI2 
Sig. 
(2- 
Statements IT Sig. t df tailed) 
5. Performance results are Equal 
disseminated to all staff variances . 343 . 562 2.125 35 . 041 
by the Board assumed 
6. Staff members are Equal 
represented at Board variances . 993 . 326 2.503 35 . 017 
meetings assumed 
27. directors maintain Equal 
balance between business variances . 267 . 609 2.788 35 . 009 
and social objectives assumed 
Equal 
3 1. Board has clear vision variances 15.493 . 000 2.530 35 . 016 
of how to sustain assumed 
stakeholder benefit Equal 
variances 2.907 29.878 . 007 not 
assumed 
34. Important that our Equal 
Social Firm performs variances 
. 475 . 495 -2.308 35 . 027 well compared to our assumed 
competitors 
Test One presents an output as follows: As Levene's p>0.05, equal variances 
are assumed. Therefore t=2.125, df = 35, p=0.041. Thus, we reject the null 
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hypothesis at the 0.05 level. There was a significant difference between Board 
membership of respondents, and perceptions of performance dissemination to all 
staff by the Board of directors. The dissemination of information by the Board to 
staff is considered a key part of their role. As an overt representation of 
transparency, the Board should make all information related to the organisation's 
performance clear to all affected stakeholders. This finding would be a cause for 
concern because a lack of commitment to full transparency by the Board is a 
move away from the tenets of good governance practice. Staff play a key role in 
the delivery of social benefit to stakeholders, and often have a personal interest in 
assuring the maximisation of benefit to these groups. Therefore, access to such 
information would provide staff with an awareness of how effective they are (and 
the Social Firm is) at meeting its business and social objectives. Without that 
information they are likely to lack any idea of the impact (and benefit) to their 
stakeholders they make. For example, this would typically be shown through a 
set of Social Accounts, or Social Return on Investment (SROI). If such exercises 
are conducted at all, then there is a significant indication in this study that these 
findings are not disseminated fully to all staff. 
In a similar vein to the above findings, Test Two output shows a significant 
difference involving staff members. As Levene's p>0.05, equal variances are 
assumed. Therefore t=2.503, df = 35, p=0.017. Thus, we reject the null 
hypothesis at the 0.05 level. There was a significant difference between Board 
membership or respondents and perceptions of staff representation at Board 
meetings. As we have seen from earlier descriptions of social enterprises, these 
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organisations are said to promote an ethical business agenda, and to place 
democracy, transparency and accountability (for example) at the forefront of 
their business model. Therefore, it is assumed that social enterprise governance is 
democratic and inclusive. These findings indicate that this is not the case for 
Social Firms. Non-Board members, whether managers or directors, are excluded 
from the Board. Such inclusion is seen as a good governance practice, because it 
4opens' up the governance process to other interested (and influential) parties. It 
is seen to build trust between a range of staff / stakeholders, and contribute to a 
consultative approach to the process of governance. Where this is absent, or seen 
to be unnecessary, an issue arises over the actual effectiveness or appropriateness 
of such inclusion for these organisations. 
The third set of findings focuses on perceptions of directors' ability to balance 
conflicting objectives. The test output shows that as Levene's p>0.05, equal 
variances are assumed. Therefore t=2.788, df = 35, p=0.009. Thus, we reject 
the null hypothesis at the 0.01 level. There was a significant difference between 
Board membership of respondents and perceptions of directors ability to balance 
business and social objectives. Social enterprises are defined by the 
reconciliation of business and social objectives. Clearly, the Board of directors 
should be integral to ensuring the necessary (and appropriate) balance. In this 
instance, analysis shows that there is a discrepancy over the directors' ability to 
deliver this equilibrium. The normative position here is that social objectives are 
the priority, followed by business objectives. Without the achievement of social 
objectives, the legitimacy of the Social Firm is open to question. These findings 
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can be interpreted as a sign of 'no confidence' in the ability of directors to ensure 
the future legitimacy of the organisation through effective (ethical) governance. 
Alternatively, this may be recognition of the latent skills gap at Board level in 
Social Firms. As social enterprises professional ise, Board members may be 
finding they lack the required range of skills to ease this transition. As identified 
in the exploratory study, directors' are often viewed by managers as a constraint 
rather than as a source of leadership and strategic direction. This reinforces the 
view that directors who serve on Social Firm Boards (often voluntarily), require 
proper skills support and training to deliver effectively in their roles. In 
particular, maintaining the appropriate balance between business and social 
objectives. 
Test Four pertains to the aptitude of directors to sustain social benefit to 
stakeholders. The test shows that as Levene's p<0.05, equal variances are not 
assumed. Therefore t=2.907, df = 29.878, p=0.007. Thus, we reject the null 
hypothesis at the 0.01 level. There was a significant difference between Board 
membership of respondents and perceptions of the Board's vision for sustaining 
social benefit. Thus, there is an issue here relating to the apparent lack of trust 
that non-Board members have in the existing Board to achieve a sustainable 
future for the enterprise, and the cause that it intends to serve. This could have 
arisen as a result of a breakdown in communication and openness by the Board to 
the rest of the organisation. Alternatively, this could be caused by a poor return 
on social investment by the Social Firm. In either case, the Board of directors / 
trustees carry the responsibility for safeguarding the future productivity of the 
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Social Firm. There may be an implicit link here with the prior discussion, that 
there is a skills gap for the Board that is not being sufficiently filled. Hence non- 
Board members do not foresee how the current Board can possibly ensure future 
success without some set of changes at that level of the organisation. 
The fifth and final independent t-test for this section looks into the degree of 
business orientation of the Social Firm. Levene's p>0.05, thus equal variances 
are assumed. Therefore t= -2.308, df = 35, p=0.027. There was a significant 
difference between Board membership of respondents and perceptions of the 
importance of performance versus competitors. This result presents an interesting 
perspective of the tension between the social / business dichotomy of the Social 
Firm. Clearly, one group perceives this as a central element of growing the 
Social Firm and delivering performance improvements. The alternative view is 
that the business performance of the Social Firm less important than other 
factors, such as focussing on benefit to stakeholders rather than growing revenue. 
Hence, another dichotomy emerges in this view of the Social Firm; a clear split 
between those that believe in the business-function of the organisation 
contrasting the social benefit orientation of their constitution. The Board's role 
here is to ensure that the Social Firm operates as a viable business, and to do so it 
must become competitive in its chosen markets. According to this result, part of 
this role should also be to embed competitive awareness as a feature of the 
institutional environment. 
207 
6.4.4.3 BUDGET RESPONSIBILITY 
The significant themes from this series of tests showed differences in perceptions 
of democracy, expected ethical and business performance and the role of guiding 
values in the Social Firm. These differences were determined on the basis of 
whether respondents held a position involving budgetary responsibility. 
Table 6.20 Independent t-test: Budget Responsibility 
Sig. (2- 
Statements F Sig. t df tailed) 
Equal 
7. Board member variances 10.705 . 002 -. 699 35 . 489 
elections are democratic assumed 
and externally Equal 
scrutinised variances -2.385 33.000 . 023 
not assumed 
12. Trust is important in Equal 
Board effectiveness variances . 053 . 819 2.736 35 . 010 
assumed 
Equal 
15. Social enterprises variances 9.135 . 005 1.787 35 . 083 should have better assumed 
f ormance ethical per Equal 
than expected of for- 
profits 
variances 6.093 33.000 . 000 not assumed 
22. Board change if not Equal 
competitive variances 2.043 . 162 -2.139 35 . 039 
assumed 
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29. Board understands Equal 
how manager adds variances . 716 . 403 2.161 34 . 038 
value assumed 
40. Board acts in a way Equal 
that is faithful to our variances . 111 . 741 2.318 35 . 026 
guiding values assumed 
The first test focuses upon transparency and democracy of Board elections. As 
Levene's p<0.05, equal variances are not assumed. Therefore, t= -2.385, df = 
33, p=0.023. There is a significant difference between respondent's budgetary 
responsibility and perceptions of the democratic nature and transparency of 
Board member elections. The supposition here is that budget holders, be they 
managers or Board members, have different views of the democratic nature of 
these organisations. If this role has political capital in the organisation, these 
individual holders of power and control over assets are likely to have better 
access to Boards than non-budget holders (Levine and Hyde, 1977). This is due 
to the need to audit and hold budget holders accountable for their activities. This 
Gaccess' will expose the budget holder to the actual working of the Board, hence 
possibly informing their perceptions of how democratic the organisation is. Also, 
if budget holding is a Board-level responsibility only, the significant difference 
could simply be the result of directors / trustees continuing to be re-elected on the 
basis of their experience and prior success. Thus, non-budget holders (i. e. non- 
Board members) might perceive a link between the powers held by existing 
directors as influential on the length of tenure. 
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Secondly, trust in the Board is analysed. The test shows that as Levene's p 
0.05, equal variances are assumed. Therefore, t=2.736, df = 35, p=0.01. Thus, 
we reject the null hypothesis at the 0.01 level. There is a significant difference 
between respondent's budgetary responsibility and perceptions of trust as an 
important factor in the effectiveness of the Board. This outcome could signify 
that budget holders, being subjected to regular auditing, could perceive 'trust' as 
an absent variable in Social Firm governance. As prior research has shown, trust 
is not always possible when faced with self-serving behaviour of internal actors 
in a number of different organisations, and 'trust' is a dynamic concept 
(Alexander and Weiner, 1998, Child and Rodrigues, 2004, Farber, 2005, Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999, Steane and Christie, 2001). Therefore, the most valuable 
interpretation of this outcome is to prompt further study of the role of budget 
holders and the replacement of a bond of trust between internal actors, with the 
mechanisms of financial accountability. 
The assertion that social enterprises are more ethical than for-profit organisation 
is the next statement under consideration. As Levene's p<0.05, equal variances 
are not assumed. Therefore, t=6.093, df = 33, P=0.0001. Thus, we reject the 
null hypothesis at the 0.0001 level. There is a significant difference between 
respondent's budgetary responsibility and perceptions of social enterprises 
having better ethical performance than for-profit organisations. Once more, we 
can see that the role of budget holder appears a critical one when it comes to 
examining the constituent elements of a Social Firm. In analysis of this outcome, 
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we can infer that the perception of ethical behaviour and judgment is jeopardised. 
Non-budget holders could view the budget holders in their organisations as 
unethical through perceived or actual malpractice, a lack of trust in key 
individuals or in the process of accountability itself. Alternatively, budget 
holders may view the process to which they are audited are less than robust and 
this reflects poorly on the role that the Board has. 
Next, the issue of Board responsibility for organisation performance is 
considered. As Levene's p>0.05, equal variances are assumed. Therefore, t= 
-2.139, df = 35, p=0.039. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level. 
There is a significant difference between respondent's budgetary responsibility 
and belief that Board member changes are required if the Social Firm is not 
competitive in its chosen markets. This outcome could reflect the expectation of 
budget holders (if also serving as Board members) that they should be able to 
demonstrate how their decisions have impacted on organisation performance. 
Likewise, non-budget holders may perceive this differently: that budget holders 
should be judged on social performance rather than business performance. The 
study certainly suggests that the Social Firms in the sample are still seeking the 
best balance between these two objectives. 
The penultimate test in this series analyses the importance of the Board 
understanding the value of staff. As Levene's p>0.05, equal variances are 
assumed. Therefore, t=2.161, df = 34, p=0.038. Thus, we reject the null 
hypothesis at the 0.05 level. There is a significant difference between 
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respondent's budgetary responsibility and perceptions of the Board 
understanding how managers add value. Once more, interpretation of the 'budget 
holder' is contingent on the level of position held by the individual: be they 
Board level or otherwise. From the perspective of the Board-level budget holder, 
they may perceive themselves as having knowledge of managerial added-value. 
This would place them at odds with perceptions of non-Board members who do 
not feel that their contributions to the Social Firm are sufficiently appreciated by 
the Board. This is a critical issue because it is necessary to understand the 
components of added-value to properly account for budget-related decisions. 
Hence this provokes the view that budget-holders cannot be fully transparent or 
accountable if they do not have sufficient knowledge of added-value activity. 
Furthermore, it portrays these individuals as dislocated from managers and other 
staff, unaware of the specific deeds that improve service delivery and social 
benefit creation. 
Finally, we examine the perceptions of the Board being guided by the distinctive 
set of social values that apply to the Social Firm. The test shows that as Levene's 
p>0.05, equal variances are assumed. Therefore, t=2.318, df = 35, p=0.026. 
Thus, we reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level. There is a significant 
difference between respondent's budgetary responsibility and perceptions of the 
Board remaining to be guided by the social values that drive the Social Firm. 
This could reflect that staff with budget holding responsibility are aware of 
heightened pressure from the Board to exhibit transparency and accountability 
throughout the organisation. Alternatively, this pressure may be the result of a 
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drive for greater efficiencies for budget allocation and spending. Whether this 
spending is targeted for organisation growth or social benefit, this is a pressing 
issue for small and medium sized enterprises. In the event that there is a duty 
held by the Board to funding bodies, they need to be able to show that the 
funding is properly apportioned and, for example, delivers on service-level 
agreements. The study indicates a degree of disaffection on behalf of non-Board 
members - the result of the implementation of measures to ensure that the 
organisation is transparent and accountable to a number of different stakeholders. 
This presents implications for the nature of governance and the difficult task the 
Board has in dealing with a variety of pressures, from within (managers and 
staff) and externally (primary beneficiaries, funding bodies). Further discussion 
of these pressures and its affect on governance structures can be found in Chapter 
7. 
6.4.4.4 MAIN SOURCE OF INCOME 
This test focused on the source of income for Social Firms, and perceptions of 
the DV and predictor variables. The table below outlines the key statistical 
information: 
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Table 6.21 Independent t-test: Main Source of Income 
Sig. (2- 
Statement F Sig. t df tailed) 
32. Board has range of Equal 
skills to sustain social variances 1.472 . 233 -2.428 35 . 020 benefit we deliver assumed 
For the Source of Income category, only one test showed a significant amongst 
the sample. The output of the test showed that as Levene's p>0.05, equal 
variances are assumed. Therefore, t= -2.428, df = 35, p=0.02. There was a 
significant difference between source of Social Firm income and perceptions of 
the Board's abilities to sustain the delivery of social benefit. Social Firms who 
are 'self-funded' through earned revenues have different perceptions of the 
Board's abilities to deliver sustainable social benefit than those who are 
maintained through a mixture of trade and grants. Social Firms that have become 
self-sustaining through business performance would appear to be better placed to 
deliver (sustainable) social benefit in the long-term. If business and social 
, performance are not mutually exclusive, this scenario might bear out. Yet it 
could be the case that managers of these organisations feel that the Board of 
directors does not orientate the Social Firm to its social obligations sufficiently 
enough. Therefore, focusing too closely on performance delivery where business 
and social performance is mutually exclusive. Secondly, the converse scenario 
might prevail. Social Firms that are (and perhaps intend to be) grant dependent 
do have a capable skill set at Board level to deliver sustainable social benefit due 
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to their apparent focus on objectives other than business success. In either case, 
these findings show that Boards skills and abilities are likely to be perceived 
differently according to the actual source and balance of revenues / grants that 
, 
_they 
receive. 
6.4.4.5 NUMBER OF BOARD MEMBERS 
This test examined the key relationships between the number of Board members 
and perceptions of the DV and predictor variables. Four key themes emerged as a 
result: Trust and Board effectiveness; the promotion of business strategy; the link 
between transparency, accountability and sustainability, and the influence of 
stakeholder empathy upon governance. A table of relevant output is provided 
below: 
Table 6.22 Independent t-test: Number of Board Members 
Statements 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2- 
tailed) 
1'2. Trust is important in Equal 
'Board effectiveness variances 1.563 . 220 2.127 32 . 041 
assumed 
25. directors have Equal 
promoted awareness of variances 3.169 . 085 -3.114 32 . 004 business strategy of Social assumed 
Firm 
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37. Transparency and Equal 
accountability affect variances . 005 . 946 -2.177 32 . 037 
sustainability assumed 
44. Empathy with our 
stakeholders makes it Equal 
more likely that variances . 368 . 548 -2.437 32 . 021 
governance will be run in assumed 
their interests 
The first test focuses on the importance of trust as a determinant of Board 
effectiveness. The test shows that as Levene's p>0.05, equal variances are 
assumed. Therefore, t=2.127, df = 32, p=0.41. Thus, we reject the null 
hypothesis at the 0.05 level. There is a significant difference between the number 
of Board members and perceptions of trust as an important feature of Board 
effectiveness. This is interesting because it indicates a clear disparity between the 
size of Boards and the value of trust in governance. Trust may be lacking where 
managers have taken on the responsibility of running the organisation in the 
absence of Board leadership. Therefore, it is not important to trust the Board 
where they offer very little instrumental value to the way that managers run the 
organisation. Alternatively, where larger Boards are present (and possibly in 
newer or smaller Social Firms), trust may be important because managers need 
the guidance and support to enable them to fulfil their roles properly. This may 
well be the case if the Board is responsible for the management of a grant 
received from a funding body. To summarise, trust may be less important (or at 
least a less pressing issue) for well established Social Firms, as it might be for 
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newer organisations where Boards have a fiduciary duty to stakeholders for 
appropriate use of grants. 
The second test examines the promotion of a business strategy by the Board. The 
test shows that as Levene's p>0.05, equal variances are assumed. Therefore, t= 
-3.114, df = 32, p=0.004. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis at the 0.005 level. 
There is a very significant difference between the number of Board members and 
perceptions of how effectively the Board has promoted an awareness of business 
strategy throughout the Social Firm. We can infer from this test that smaller 
Boards are significantly different to larger Boards in the way they have promoted 
a business strategy. It is possible that smaller Boards have better control over 
how they communicate with staff and may be more responsive to business and 
social challenges than a larger Board. 
Next, we consider the significance of perceptions towards the three predictor 
variables used in the study, transparency, accountability (and the link with) 
sustainability. As Levene's p>0.05, equal variances are assumed. Therefore, t= 
-2.177, df = 32, p=0.037. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level. 
There is a significant difference between the number of Board members and 
perceptions of transparency and accountability affecting sustainability. Further 
examination of the possible causes for this difference may also be linked with the 
first test in this series: the conditions under which trust is not a key feature of 
Board effectiveness. 
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Finally, we consider the influence of stakeholder empathy on Board decision- 
making. The test shows that as Levene's p>0.05, equal variances are assumed. 
Therefore, t= -2.437, df = 32, p=0.021. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis at 
the 0.05 level. There is a significant difference between the number of Board 
members and perceptions of stakeholder empathy influencing governance 
practice. Where Board size is larger, there may be a greater degree of Board- 
level stakeholder representation. In this instance, it is highly likely that the 
influence of stakeholder empathy will significantly differ from smaller-sized 
Boards or Boards with no stakeholder representation at all. Further work is 
required to test the significance of Boards with a high degree of stakeholder 
representation and consultation, and business performance. In this study, there is 
insufficient data to properly analyse this relationship. 
6.4.4.6 SOCIAL AUDIT 
The social audit is considered to be an aspect of good practice for social 
enterprises (as well as other types of organisations). Independent t-tests found 
some significant differences within the sample, where respondents indicated 
whether their Social Firm did, or did not partake in the social audit process. 
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Table 6.23 Independent t-test: Social Audit 
Sig. (2- 
Statements F Sig. t df tailed) 
7. Board member Equal 
elections are democratic variances 
. 009 . 927 3.524 35 001 and externally assumed . 
scrutinised 
18. Board significantly Equal 
influences how I do my variances 3.257 . 080 2.204 34 . 034 job assumed 
20. Ensuring Board Equal 
accountability is key variances 
. 292 . 592 3.334 35 002 aspect of good assumed . 
governance 
27. directors maintain Equal 
balance between variances 1.532 . 224 2.460 35 . 019 business and social assumed 
objectives 
Firstly, perceptions of the democracy of Board member elections were analysed. 
As Levene's p>0.05, equal variances are assumed. Therefore, t=3.524, df = 35, 
p=0.01. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level. There is a 
significant difference between the presence of a social audit, and perceptions of 
the democracy and transparency of Board member elections. The social audit is 
the main aspect of accountability 'in practice' for many organisations. The 
findings above show that there are different perceptions of the transparency of 
Board elections and the presence of a social audit in the institutional framework 
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of the Social Firm. Those Social Firms that do not partake in the social audit 
process perceive the transparency of Board member elections very differently to 
those that do. It can be asserted here that the absence of a social audit reflects 
poorly on the Board for not ensuring their activities can be seen to be transparent, 
or be held openly accountable by stakeholders. Clearly, those organisations that 
do not perform any type of social audit may well lack the appropriate levels of 
external scrutiny (which are a feature of any form of social audit) to Board 
processes such as the elections of Board members. 
This test focused on perceptions of the Board having influence over how the 
respondents perform their job role. As Levene's p>0.05, equal variances are 
assumed. Therefore, t=2.204, df = 34, p=0.034. Thus, we reject the null 
hypothesis at the 0.05 level. There is a significant difference between the 
presence of a social audit, and perceptions of whether the Board significantly 
influences how respondents conduct their roles. Certainly, if no social audit is 
carried out on an annual basis, there is likely to be little information available (or 
disseminated) to staff to gauge how Board decisions may have influenced their 
performance. Information such as stakeholder feedback, environmental impact 
and business performance, is indicative of how staff have contributed. The 
absence of this information signifies another reason why staff perceives the 
Board as ineffective, in its apparent lack of will to be held accountable to key 
stakeholders (who may also be staff in the Social Firm model). 
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Test three examined the perceptions of Board accountability as part of good 
governance practice. As Levene's p>0.05, equal variances are assumed. 
Therefore, t=3.334, df = 35, p=0.02. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis at the 
0.05 level. There is a significant difference between the presence of a social 
audit, and perceptions of accountability as a key aspect of good governance. This 
result is perhaps unsurprising. Those Social Firms that do conduct a social audit 
are likely to see the value of accountability in the specific context of Board 
practice and good governance. Therefore we can reliably assert that the social 
audit is utilised as a method of ensuring the accountability of Boards in Social 
Finns. However, it is difficult to claim that the reverse is true of Social Firms 
that do not utilise the social audit. There may well be contingency factors 
(resource constraints, for example) that restrict opportunities to embed the social 
audit in the institutional fabric of the organisation. There is no evidence here to 
suggest that Social Firms in this situation do not foresee the social audit to be 
practicable in the future. 
The fourth test returns to a statement already shown to be significant earlier in 
this Chapter, the ability of the Board to strike the appropriate balance between 
business and social objectives. As Levene's p>0.05, equal variances are 
assumed. Therefore, t= 2.460, df = 35, p = 0.019. Thus, we reject the null 
hypothesis at the 0.05 level. There is a significant difference between the 
presence of a social audit, and perceptions of the Board's ability to balance 
business and social objectives. This final test shows that perceptions of Board's 
aptitude for balancing these two objectives are contingent upon the social audit. 
221 
Without the credibility of a social audit, Social Firm Boards will struggle to 
justify their performance on the basis of equilibrium between the two objectives. 
The social audit is intended to show any interested stakeholder groups the impact 
that a social enterprise has made. The absence of this reporting process would 
signal to stakeholders that the Social Firm has a Board that cannot prove its 
impact, and therefore present a problem of legitimacy. 
6.4.4.7 BOARD EFFECTIVENESS 
The final series of independent t-tests examined the nature of relationships 
between the effectiveness of the Board and perceptions of the DV and predictor 
variables. Several themes emerged, including information dissemination, strategy 
and the Board, and the appropriate balance between business and social 
objectives. 
Table 6.24 Independent t-test: Board Effectiveness 
Statements 
IF Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2- 
tailed) 
1. Board clearly Equal 
understands needs of variances 1.473 . 233 2.134 35 . 040 
stakeholders assumed 
5. Performance results Equal 
are disseminated to all variances . 469 . 498 2.321 35 . 026 
staff by the Board assumed 
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18. Board significantly Equal 
influences how I do my variances 1.466 . 234 2.503 34 . 017 job assumed 
25. directors have Equal 
promoted awareness of variances 2.104 . 156 3.159 35 003 business strategy of assumed . 
Social Firm 
26. Board provides Equal 
strategic direction to variances 1.920 . 175 2.454 35 019 better serve assumed . 
stakeholders 
27. directors maintain Equal 
balance between variances 3.840 . 058 4.941 35 000 business and social assumed . 
objectives 
28. Board are Equal 
supportive variances . 126 . 725 2.535 34 . 016 
assumed 
Firstly the Board's understanding of stakeholder needs was examined. The 
output shows that as Levene's p>0.05, equal variances are assumed. Therefore t 
= 2.134, df = 35 and p=0.040. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 
level. There is a significant difference between Board effectiveness and 
perceptions that the Board understands the needs of key stakeholder groups. 
Respondents in the survey show that those without confidence in the Board's 
effectiveness results from their inability to understand the needs of key 
stakeholder groups. It would be expected that for socially-orientated 
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organisations such as social enterprise, the proper understanding of stakeholder 
needs is a principal component of the institutional environment. This should be 
the initial objective of any enterprise: to serve the needs of defined groups (be it 
customers, stakeholders, etc) effectively. In this exploratory study, it has been 
shown that negative perceptions of Board effectiveness are directly proportional 
to how well the Board understands stakeholders. If internal actors feel that the 
Board does not know the requirements of the groups they intend to benefit (for 
example, over time stakeholder needs may have changed) the organisation. enters 
a legitimacy constraint. It is important to stress that the study does not purport 
that Social Firms do not actually understand stakeholder needs. Rather managers 
and directors involved in the study do not perceive that the Board (as a 
collective) understand stakeholder needs sufficiently. However, it does illustrate 
that respondents in the study have a different understanding of stakeholder needs 
than their Boards do. 
Secondly, attention focused on the dissemination of information to staff by the 
Board. The test output shows that as Levene's p>0.05, equal variances are 
assumed. Therefore t=2.321, df = 35 and p=0.026. Thus, we reject the null 
hypothesis at the 0.05 level. There is a significant difference between Board 
effectiveness and perceptions of dissemination of performance results to Social 
Firm staff. Again, this issue has been found to be a significant issue for Social 
Firms in the sample. As previously discussed, information dissemination (as a 
function of transparency) is a key part of the Board's role. This finding strongly 
indicates that the absence of transparency can make a Board appear to be 
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ineffective in the mind of key stakeholders. This reinforces many of the earlier 
points made related to the apparent poverty of dissemination and communication 
by the Social Firm Board. The further ramifications of this outcome are 
discussed in the subsequent Chapter. 
The third test considered the perception of the Board as an influence upon the 
performance of internal actors. The test showed that as Levene's p>0.05, equal 
variances are assumed. Therefore t=2.503, df = 34 and p=0.017. Thus, we 
reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level. There is a significant difference 
between Board effectiveness and perceptions of the influence the Board has on 
individual's roles. This finding indicates that it can be considered an important 
part of the Board's remit to play an instrumental role in the way that staff 
conducts their activities. The lack of such influence could signify a 'benign' 
Board, thus one that does not proactively seek to ensure the optimum use of staff 
in the achievement of stated objectives. 
Next we look to the Board's implementation of business strategy. The test shows 
that as Levene's p>0.05, equal variances are assumed. Therefore t=3.159, df = 
35 and p=0.003. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis at the 0.01 level. There is a 
significant difference between Board effectiveness and perceptions of the 
Board's promotion of a business strategy throughout the Social Firm. This 
finding reveals that, irrespective of previous discussions on the priority afforded 
to the business objectives of the Social Firm, Boards could be considered 
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ineffective if they do not formulate and disseminate a business strategy 
throughout the organisation. 
In tandem with the above analysis, the following test also focuses on the Board 
and strategy in the Social Firm. The test itself shows that as Levene's p>0.05, 
equal variances are assumed. Therefore t=2.454, df = 35 and p=0.019. Thus, 
we reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level. There is a significant difference 
between Board effectiveness and perceptions of the Board's ability to provide 
strategic direction to better serve stakeholders. So, in a way that strengthens the 
previous result, this test shows that a significant proportion of the sample believe 
that the Board does not equip the organisation with a strategy to benefit its 
stakeholders. Taken together, these two results show that the Board does not 
disseminate a strategy, thus internal actors cannot determine how the direction on 
the Social Firm will better serve stakeholders. The consequence of this is that the 
Board is expected to provide leadership and strategic support for the entire 
organisation. Therefore, in this scenario the Board has a legitimacy problem. 
Without the development and implementation of an appropriate strategy, the 
Board contravenes its expected role in the organisation. Logically, the further 
consequence in such a situation is a legitimacy crisis for the organisation as a 
whole. 
The penultimate test examines perceptions of the Board's ability to maintain 
equilibrium between business and social objectives. The test shows that as 
Levene's p>0.05, equal variances are assumed. Therefore t=4.941, df = 35 and 
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0.0001. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis at the 0.0001 level. There is a 
very significant difference between Board effectiveness and the perception of 
directors' ability to balance business and social objectives. Once more, the issue 
of balancing of objectives has proven to be a significant issue. In this case, we 
can almost certainly verify that where a Board is considered to be ineffective at 
balancing business and social objectives, it contravenes its perceived legitimacy 
with internal actors. This is a very important consequence because without a 
Board that can balance these two factors, the Social Firm cannot sustain the 
benefit it does produce, in the long-term. 
Finally, inspect the perception of the Board's 'support' role in the organisation. 
As Levene's p>0.05, equal variances are assumed. Therefore t=2.535, df = 34 
and p=0.016. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level. There is a 
significant difference between Board effectiveness and perceptions of the 
Board's supportive function in the Social Firm. The Board is seen to be 
ineffective where it does not provide appropriate levels of support to staff. This 
support could be strategic or job-specific support such as required training for 
managers. The Board is required to partake fully in the running of the Social 
Firm, and as such should contain experienced members, and / or with specific 
skills to deal with and support various organisational function (for example, 
marketing). Where these skills are absent from the Board, effectiveness as a 
useful resource for a growing organisation is limited. Even in situations where 
the Social Firm does not intend to expand, the support role is still valuable and 
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can enable the development of better service provision and the achievement of 
social objectives. 
6.4.5 ANOVA TESTS 
The one-way ANOVA tests were performed to examine the presence of 
relationships between nominal categories and statements. The data set provided 
an opportunity for this test where nominal categories had more than two 
properties. Where variance is present, (posthoc) Duncan tests were conducted for 
further analysis to establish the underlying factor associated with the variance. 
The test for significance is at the 0.05 level, and all tests are two-tailed (unless 
otherwise stated). 
6.4.5.1 EXCLUDED NOMINAL DATA CATEGORIES 
Having performed an ANOVA test on the data set, no significant differences 
were found irf relation to respondents' time in role or director Tenure, and their 
answers to the Likert statements. 
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6.4.5.2 YEARS IN OPERATION 
Table 6.25 ANOVA test: Years in Oneration 
Statement df F Sig. 
5. Performance results are 
disseminated to all staff by the Board 3 
11 
3.671 
1 
. 022 
The above table shows that there is a significant difference between the duration 
of existence of Social Firms, and respondents' perceptions of performance 
dissemination by the Board: F3,33 = 3.671, p<0.05 (rejection of the null 
hypothesis at 95% level of confidence). This finding needs to be examined 
further using posthoc analysis. The relevant output of the Duncan test follows 
beneath: 
Table 6.26 Post-hoc Duncan test: Years in Operation 
Years in operation Subset fo alpha = . 05 N 1 2 
2-5 years 14 2.7143 
Less than I year 3 3.3333 3.3333 
6-9 years 12 3.5833 3.5833 
10 years or longer 8 4.1250 
Sig. . 149 . 188 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
a Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 6.524. 
b the group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. 
Type I error levels are not guaranteed., 
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This test shows that the longer established Social Firms do perceive 
dissemination of performance information by the Board to staff. Conversely, 
newer organisations generally perceive this activity as missing from the Board's 
activities. The contextual difference of this findings compared with earlier tests 
in the study, prompts the exploration of the age of the organisation. It can be 
asserted here that newer organisations are yet to embed transparent processes that 
in older organisations are part of the institutional environment. Alternatively, the 
cause may be a pragmatic consideration of time and resource constraints upon 
Board members trying to grow the Social Firm. Irrespective of the actual cause, 
&newer' organisations are perceived to have poorer transparency of performance 
amongst staff than older organisations. This adds a layer of meaning to the earlier 
findings from the independent Wests. 
1 
6.4-5.3 TYPE OF STAFF EMPLOYED 
Table 6.27 ANOVA test: Type of Staff Employed 
Statements df F Sig. 
3. The more transparent our organisation, the better 2 4 642 . 017 we will perform . 
45. Our work is worthwhile only if we see real 2 5 591 . 008 benefit to our stakeholders as a result of it . 
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The above output identifies that there is a significant difference between the type 
of staff employed by a Social Firm and perceptions that transparency is directly 
proportional to performance: F2,34 = 4.642, p<0.05 (rejection of the null 
hypothesis at 95% level of confidence). 
Also, the test highlights a significant difference between the type of staff 
employed and perceptions of how worthwhile a Social Firm's work is according 
to stakeholder benefit: 
F2,34= 5.591, p<0.01 (rejection of the null hypothesis at 
99% level of confidence). The output from the posthoc test is provided below: 
Table 6.28 Post-hoc Duncan test: Type of Staff Employed I 
3. The more transparent our organisation, the better we will perform 
Type of staff employed N Subset for alpha = . 05 
1 2 
Volunteers 2 2.5000 
Salaried I1 3.9091 
Salaried and Volunteers 
1 
24 4.2500 
L- 
Sig. 1.000 . 518 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
a Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 4.743. 
b The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. 
Type I error levels are not guaranteed. 
From this test, we can observe perceptions of transparency linked to performance 
are much more positive in Social Firm's that employ salaried, rather than 
voluntee I rs alone. This is interesting because the strongest belief in this statement 
comes from those organisations with a mix of salaried and volunteer staff. The 
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Social Firms in the sample employing only volunteers was very low, so little 
inference can be taken from this. 
Table 6.29 Post-hoc Duncan test: Type of Staff Employed 2 
45. Our work is worthwhile only if we see real benefit to our stakeholders as 
a result of it 
Subset for alpha = . 05 Type of staff employed N 
1 
Salaried 11 3.5455 
Volunteers 2 4.5000 
Salaried and Volunteers 24 4.5417 
Sig. . 087 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
a Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 4.743. 
b The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. 
Type I error levels are not guaranteed. 
Again, this test shows that the mixture of salaried and volunteer staff have much 
more positive perception of social benefit as the key outcome of Social Firm 
operations. Alternatively, those Social Firms that employ salaried staff alone 
have a mixed range of perceptions for this issue. This could indicate that without 
the literal presence of a 'volunteer' ethos, the organisation might begin to erode 
its ethical founding principles. Further study on the difference of perceptions 
according to type of staff employed would be required to clarify this issue - little 
inference can be made from this outcome. 
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6.4.5.4 NUMBER OF STAFF EMPLOYED 
The next test focused on any significant differences between the number of staff 
employed and perceptions of the identified DV and predictor variables. 
Table 6.30 ANOVA test: Number of Staff Employed 
Statement df F Sig. 
45. Our work is worthwhile only if we see real benefit 3 6 380 002 
to our stakeholders as a result of it . . 
There was an observable significant difference between the number of staff 
employed by a Social Firm and perceptions of how worthwhile a Social Firm's 
work is according to stakeholder benefit: F3,33 = 6.380, p<0.005 (rejection of 
the null hypothesis at 99% level of confidence). The table below shows that 
larger organisations, those employing more than 50 staff members do not wholly 
agree that providing social benefit is the core activity of the Social Firm. 
Therefore, other facets of operations take priority, for example successful 
delivery and production of professional services. The underlying reason for this 
may be the nature of the Social Firm's business, rather than any size-related 
erosion of ethical values. More often, Social Firms provide niche services (for 
example, advertising agencies, recycling etc). The social objective is the result of 
providing employment for disabled people, rather than producing social benefit 
233 
as an outcome of its operations. Though the provision of employment 
opportunities is central to the existence of the Social Firm, the 'work' of the 
Social Firm is purely business-focussed. Therefore, the Board may not 
necessarily be culpable for failing to maintain the social objectives of the Social 
Firm. This is because there is considerable variety to the activities that Social 
Firm pursues, making these assertions context-dependent. 
Table 6.31 Post-hoc Duncan test: Number of Staff Employed 
45. Our work is worthwhile only if we see real benefit to our stakeholders as 
a result of it 
Subset for alpha =. 05 
Number of staff employed N 
1 2 
51-100 staff 2 3.0000 
Less than 10 staff 21 4.2857 
11-50 staff 14 4.3571 
Sig. 1.000 . 902 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
a Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 4.846. 
b The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. 
Type I error levels are not guaranteed. 
6.4.5.5 ANNUAL TURNOVER 
These tests examine the presence of relationships between annual turnover and 
the perceptions collected from the sample. Discussion of the findings follows 
from the table below: 
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Table 6.32 ANOVA test: Annual Tumover 
Statements df F Sig. 
6. Staff members are represented at Board meetings 2 3.659 . 036 
24. It is important that the Board offers strategic 
direction to support what managers do. 
2 3.840 . 031 
Firstly we consider staff representation at Board meeting. There was a significant 
difference between annual turnover of Social Firms and the presence of staff 
members at Board meetings: F2,34 = 3.659, p<0.05 (rejection of the null 
hypothesis at 95% level of confidence). 
Secondly, we examine the importance of strategic leadership on staff. There was 
a significant difference between annual turnover of Social Firms and perceptions 
of sustainability as a central part of strategic direction of the Social Firm: F2,34 ý 
3.840, p<0.05 (rejection of the null hypothesis at 95% level of confidence). 
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Table 6.33 Post-hoe Duncan test: Annual Tumover I 
6. Staff members are represented at Board meetings 
Annual turnover N Subset for alpha =. 01 
E 100,000 or more 22 3.1818 
E5 1,000 -f 100,000 7 3.8571 
Less than E50,000 8 4.5000 
Sig. 11 . 030 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
a Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 9.575. 
b The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. 
Type I error levels are not guaranteed. 
We can see from this test that as annual turnover increases, perceptions of staff 
representation at Board level are less positive. This indicates that as the Social 
Firm becomes more successful in its business function, staff consultation is 
perceived to be less important. The logical inference is that staff members may 
support non-business interests during Board consultation. This diverts the 
operational focus away from the delivery of products and services, hence re- 
focusing on the primacy of social objectives. Normatively, the Board is expected 
to seek out and foster a consultative ethos for Board decision-making. The reality 
may well be that Boards perceive staff involvement as unnecessary are 
burdensome to the decision-making process. 
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Table 6.34 Post-hoc Duncan test: Annual Turnover 2 
24. It is important that the Board offers strategic direction to support what 
managers do. 
Annual turnover N Subset for alpha =. 01 
f 100,000 or more 22 3.9545 
E5 1,000 -f 100,000 7 4.2857 
Less than E50,000 8 4.6250 
Sig. . 026 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
a Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 9.575. 
b The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. 
Type I error levels are not guaranteed. 
In this test, we observe perceptions of the Board's strategic direction role are 
perceived as less crucial in Social Firms with annual turnover of more than 
E100,000. The range of responses is still tightly clustered around agreement, 
though organisations with a smaller annual turnover indicate that the Board 
should develop strategy that supports managers in their roles. Applied to the 
smaller Social Firm, we can infer that managers require support to ensure that the 
Board is effective in guiding how the Social Firm is run. Contrariwise, larger 
(flOOk or more) Social Firms see this function as less important, signifying that 
the Board has either aligned managerial activities with the strategic goals of the 
organisation, or manager's are used to operating without strategic support for 
managers. It is clear that respondents see this support role to be crucial, though 
smaller Social Firms may require more support from the Board. Whether the 
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Board is considered equipped and able to deliver this support is the subject of 
other tests discussed earlier. 
6.4.5.6 DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY 
This group of tests examined the locus of decision-making authority on the 
Board, and perceptions of the DV and predictor variables. The pertinent findings 
from these tests follow: 
Table 6.35 ANOVA test: Decision-Making Authority 
Statements df F Sig. 
1. Board clearly understands needs of stakeholders 3 3.666 . 022 
5. Performance results are disseminated to all staff by 
the Board 
3 3.903 . 017 
11. directors monitor staff to maintain ethical standards 3 3.176 . 037 
13. directors should monitor job role and performance 3 2.976 . 046 
26. Board provides strategic direction to better serve 
stakeholders 
3 2.957 . 047 
Board has clear vision of how to sustain stakeholder 31 . benefit 
::: 
3 
L 
2.935 . 048 
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The first test analysed the perceptions of how well the Board understands 
stakeholder needs. The test found that there is a significant difference between 
the locus of decision-making authority and perceptions of the Board 
understanding the needs of stakeholders: F3,33 = 3.666, p<0.05 (rejection of the 
null hypothesis at 95% level of confidence). As indicated in the descriptive 
analysis above the majority of Social Firms have a Board of trustees as the 
ultimate decision-making unit. The purpose of the Board of trustees is to 
safeguard the interests of key groups, in theory at least protecting the 
organisation from deviating from its stated objectives. This should ensure that the 
Board understands the needs of stakeholders. In other scenarios, for example 
volunteer Boards of directors or Chief Executive with ultimate sanction, it can be 
asserted that the difference in role (from trustees to executive 'directors') alters 
their ability to recognise stakeholder needs. However, this is an overtly linear 
explanation: it is likely that Boards of trustees, divorced from the day-to-day 
running of the organisation, hold a ceremonial position and oversees 'time- 
honoured' governance processes (such as remuneration committees). It can be 
argued that the Chief Executive would have the ideal position with which to 
understand stakeholders over time (perhaps first-hand), and determine the best 
method of satisfying those requirements. 
Next, the test examined the perceptions of dissemination of information to staff. 
There is a significant difference between the locus of decision-making authority 
and perceptions of the dissemination of performance to Social Firm staff. F3,33 I-- 
3.903, p<0.05 (rejection of the null hypothesis at 95% level of confidence). By 
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now, we can see that this statement has shown a number of differences for 
different categories throughout this stage of the study. It is logical to assert that 
'decision makers' in an organisation will also be of requisite status to receive 
performance results, and control their dissemination to the Board and other staff. 
The concern is that decision makers and non-decision makers differ not whether 
transparency should be present, but whether it actually does occur. This 
dichotomy could be the result of dissemination to key staff only, or from 
directors to trustees (or vice versa). Whether other staff, such as managers, are 
left out of the loop is unclear. Obviously, there is a distinctive issue here 
regarding which stakeholder groups receive performance information and those 
that do not. Certainly, the processes for ensuring transparency are not clearly 
developed appropriately in the Social Firms used in this study. 
Thirdly, attention switches to perceptions of the Board's need to monitor staff to 
ensure ethical standards are maintained. There is a significant difference between 
the locus of decision-making authority and perceptions of the need to monitor 
staff to maintain ethical standards: F3,33 : -- 3.176, p<0.05 (rejection of the null 
hypothesis at 95% level of confidence). In corporate governance terms, the need 
to monitor staff is asserted in the literature (principally in agency theory). It 
appears in this study that different roles within Social Firms see this 'need' quite 
differently. Given the two-tailed hypothesis, we can suggest that decision makers 
and non-decision makers are divided for a number of reasons. On the assumption 
that non-decision makers in the sample are managers (rather than directors / 
trustees), then it would be equally valid to claim two positions. Firstly, managers 
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do not see the need for the Board to monitor their activities, given the 
expectation of a level of trust between both managers and the Board to do 
conduct their jobs properly. Secondly, and conversely, managers may believe 
that stakeholder interests must be aligned with the motives of staff-, therefore it is 
proper that their performance is monitored by the Board. This would determine 
whether staff are meeting stakeholder needs effectively. This result can be 
combined with the outcome of the test below, which also focuses on perceptions 
of the Board's role as 'monitor'. 
Furthermore, perceptions of job role monitoring as a legitimate function of the 
Board were examined. There is a significant difference between the locus of 
decision-making authority and perceptions of monitoring of job role and 
performance by the Board of directors: F3,33 = 2.976, p<0.05 (rejection of the 
null hypothesis at 95% level of confidence). Decision makers at Board level, 
whether director or trustee, will either view this function as essential or onerous. 
overseeing performance of staff, as is clear in corporate governance theory, is an 
essential role of the Board to ensure that internal actors are acting in a way 
conducive to maximising the interests of beneficiaries. In the context of Social 
Firms, it is also essential to validate staff activities to be sure that they add value 
to the product / service offered by the organisation. Yet, it may too be seen as 
onerous in a situation where resources dedicated to such oversight are limited; 
those conducting the review of performance are likely to be volunteers (if they 
are Board members), and the process is conducted internally rather than 
externally as required for a social audit. On this last point, it is notable that very 
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few of the Social Firms in the sample are active in delivering a social audit at all. 
There are a number of interpretations available here, and the next Chapter 
pursues analysis to a greater level of depth. 
The penultimate test examined perceptions of the Board's aptitude in developing 
a strategic focus that delivers social benefit to stakeholders. There is a significant 
difference between the locus of decision-making authority and perceptions of the 
Board's ability to provide strategic direction to better serve stakeholders: F3,33 ` 
2.957, p<0.05 (rejection of the null hypothesis at 95% level of confidence). This 
outcome is interesting because it shows that there is a concern, as yet undefined, 
that decision makers do not share confidence with non-decision makers in their 
perceived ability to deliver benefit to stakeholders, in a strategic, planned way. 
Ultimate sanction could reside either with a Board of directors / trustees - both of 
whom could play very different roles (i. e. the former could be 'hands-on', where 
the latter may be advisory or play an oversight role). Evidently, there is a 
discrepancy over the ability of one of these entities (where they co-exist in the 
same organisation) to develop a strategy that realises benefit to stakeholders. The 
next finding adds another facet on the perceptions of effectiveness of the decision 
makers in Social Firms. 
This final test examined perceptions of the Board's vision for sustaining 
stakeholder benefit. There is a significant difference between the locus of 
decision-making authority and perceptions of the Board's vision of how to 
sustain stakeholder benefit: F3,33 = 2.935, p<0.05 (rejection of the null 
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hypothesis at 95% level of confidence). It can be inferred that those in an 
executive position on the Board have very different perceptions towards the 
vision of sustainability than those without that responsibility. This reinforces the 
earlier finding that there is a clear discrepancy between internal actors in Social 
Firms regarding the Board's aptitude in this area. In conjunction with the 
previous test, we can see that decision makers clearly perceive the Board's 
ability to deliver a long-term, strategically driven social benefit to defined 
stakeholders positively. There are a number of possible interpretations that shall 
be explored in full in the next Chapter. However, in cursory analysis, we can 
explain this in terms of the decision maker(s) as being part of the Board and 
capable of delivering this long-term strategy of benefit. The discrepancy comes 
from respondents who are not involved in the decision making process for 
Board-level decisions. Alternatively, if the Board is divorced of the ultimate 
decision making authority (perhaps this lays with the Board of trustees), instead 
it provides a hands-on, operational function in the organisation. This would 
signify that the former is well placed to judge the effectiveness of sanctions made 
through the Board of trustees. In either case, this would represent a clear lack of 
faith in the ability of decision makers to deliver long term benefit. 
, 
6.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This Chapter reported the details of the quantitative aspect of the study. In so 
doing it detailed both descriptive and inferential statistical interrogation of the 
data set. From the descriptive analysis of the data set, a portrait of the typical 
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Social Firm in the sample emerged. Principally, they have a relatively high 
turnover for small enterprises, and tend to have relatively large Boards. These 
Boards have the ultimate sanction, and they are generally Boards of trustees, 
rather than directors. 
Reliability tests showed the data set to be internally consistent. Multiple 
(stepwise) regressions examined and clarified the asserted links between the 
variables. Most notably, a weak model of association was discovered between 
accountability and legitimacy. Following this, independent Nests were 
conducted for appropriate categories. The outcomes of the series of t-tests found 
a range of significant differences amongst the perceptions provided by 
respondents in the sample. There were some recurring themes, for example: the 
dissemination of information by the Board, staff representation at Board 
meetings, and the Board's aptitude to balance business / social objectives, and 
providing strategic support and leadership to the Social Firm. The relevance of 
budget-holding as a key role in governance was found, and there are a number of 
implications on governance and the role of the Board here that require further 
analysis. 
Similarly, the ANOVA tests performed on the data set unearthed a range of 
significant findings related to the perceptions of respondents. Dissemination of 
performance results and trust in the Board were held to be significant throughout 
the sample. Also, the locus of decision-making authority was significant for a 
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number of statements. Therefore, a number of rarnifications on the Board and its 
place in the organisation need to be considered in greater depth. 
The main objective of this section was to clearly report and analyse the findings 
of the study. The following Chapter presents a discussion of the implications of 
these findings. In particular, it will present analysis of the propositions 
determined following the review of the literature. In so doing, it will draw 
together the conceptual strands with the findings from this study. 
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CHAPTER 7 
IMPLICATIONS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter discusses the further implications of the findings and analysis 
presented in the previous Chapter. To this end, it addresses each of the 
propositions developed during the study in sequential order. The main thrust of 
the analysis is to examine how the findings from Stage 2 of the study inform an 
understanding of institutional influences on the governance of Social Firms. A 
table showing the link between the each proposition and significant factors can 
be found in Appendix 9. 
7.2 ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN TRANSPARENCY., 
ACCOUNTABILITY, SUSTAINABILITY AND LEGITIMACY 
The most prominent outcome from the multiple regressions analysis was 
establishing an association between one of the predictor variable and DV is the 
relationship between accountability and legitimacy. Accountability is a central 
feature of the many different strands of corporate governance literature (Ezzamel 
and Willmott, 1993, Short et al., 2005, Sternberg, 2004). This applies between 
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sectors, and to different types of organisations, from nonprofits to social 
enterprises (Alexander and Weiner, 1998, Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004, Kearns, 
1994b, Mason et al., 2007, Young, 2002). The nature of this association is that 
legitimacy is contingent upon the 'levels' of accountability of internal actors 
(Boards and managers for example) to stakeholders. If the governance system 
promotes accountability, perceptions of legitimacy increase accordingly. 
Interestingly, this does not infer that levels of performance (social or business) 
affect legitimacy. Rather, the focus here is on the quality of the existing system 
of governance in Social Firms to promote and embed accountability. 
Supplementary analysis of the predictor variable used in the study found a weak 
association between transparency and accountability, and a robust level of 
association between accountability and sustainability. No other pairings were 
found to be significant. We can infer, with some caution, that there is a link 
between the stated pairings of the identified predictor variable. Yet, it is not 
possible to conjoin these three elements into a sequential model. A principal 
cause of this could be that there the scale of the study is too small; hence there is 
not enough data in this study to show a clear link between transparency, 
accountability and sustainability. However, this does not preclude further testing 
of the relationship between these three variables in governance. 
247 
7.3 PROPOSITION 1: SOCIAL FIRMS SUCCESSFULLY BALANCE 
SOCIAL AIMS WITH BUSINESS-FOCUS. 
Many commentators on social enterprise have signified the importance of their 
social and business aims (Borzaga and Defourny, 2001, Pearce, 2003, Porter and 
Kramer, 1999, Westall, 2001). Yet, for all the debate regarding suitable 
interpretations and definitions of social enterprises, there is little empirical 
research available to confirm or disconfirm the variety of viewpoints. Therefore, 
this exploratory research attempted to do this for some of the key features of the 
Social Firm, as a type of social enterprise. Firstly, consideration was given to the 
assumption that Social Firms can balance social and business objectives in an 
appropriate way. The determinants of this are four Likert statements that relate to 
the role of the Board as the body responsible for ensuring the appropriate balance 
is met. 
Two of the four statements linked to this proposition (Statements I and 27) 
showed significant differences according to Board membership and perceptions 
of Board effectiveness. The requirement to balance business and social 
objectives is an essential characteristic of social enterprises (DTI, 2002). The 
Board plays an important role in ensuring that the appropriate balance between 
each factor is reached and maintained. Analysis shows that Boards are perceived 
to be ineffective where they do not manage to achieve the optimum balance for 
their organisation. Legitimate governance of an organisation is affected by the 
Board's ability to deliver on defined objectives - albeit these objectives vary 
depending on the focus of the organisation. Therefore, given that social 
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enterprises are defined by their dual business / social function, failure to maintain 
an appropriate balance would threaten legitimacy. 
Furthermore, upon examination of whether the Board clearly understands the 
needs of stakeholders, they are also judged ineffective where they do not 
properly understand such needs. This confirms that Board effectiveness is 
determined by the Board's ability to balance business/social objectives, and can 
clearly demonstrate an awareness of stakeholder requirements (and 
expectations). These two elements are not mutually exclusive, and to ensure the 
optimum balance the Board must have a fundamental knowledge of what the 
organisation needs to achieve to benefit its stakeholders. 
This prompts discussion of why Boards might fail in this part of the remit. Stage 
I of the study illustrated some possible explanations. Firstly, the Board of 
directors / trustees have insufficient management skills or experience to achieve 
the required balance. Alternatively, severe communication problems between 
Boards, non-Board staff and stakeholders that could adversely affect the 
implementation of strategies to achieve the balance. Third, and related to both of 
the above points, there has been slow erosion in staff confidence in the Board 
and the quality of its input. Irrespective of the Board's abilities, managers get on 
with "managing" and are at the sharp end of delivering the two facets of the 
Social Firm's 'product'. 
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However, each of these possible explanations is too linear and neglects the 
complexities of the Board's role in Social Firms. There are likely to be a range of 
conflicting pressures on the Board, not least from primary stakeholders and 
support agencies, to ensure that benefits are achieved and funding is acquired. 
Further, in an effort to raise professional standards and attempt to become 
competitive, expectations of Boards are very high. The Board often serve 
voluntarily and the demands on individual members to meet these standards is 
neglected. 
If Boards are expected to enable Social Firm growth and be held accountable for 
meeting these two important objectives, then clearly they need support to achieve 
this. A crucial part of the solution is borne by the support agencies, such as 
Social Firms UK, that exist to promote and assist Social Firms. It is evident that 
these organisations are keen to help their members. They do this by developing 
training courses and tool-kits to equip Boards, as well as prospective Board 
members, with the skills that will allow them achieve ambitious goals such as 
business / social benefit reconciliation. Furthermore, social enterprise sector 
6 champions' and success stories have been used to show other social 
entrepreneurs best practice. 
For example the Furniture Resource Centre, which is based in Liverpool, has 
been notable for its success in trade of recycled furniture. In so doing, it has also 
embedded a culture of accountability, and through regular social auditing, has 
shown how its executive team strives to deliver on business, social and 
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environmental fronts. Though it is useful for championing the sector as a whole, 
these role models are distinct from the vast majority of Social Firms, being 
relatively large in terms of turnover and staff employed. The initial remedy for 
achieving business / social benefit resides with improving the provision of skills 
for Board members. Also, joining-up the Board with other staff and stakeholders 
would make strategy formulation more consultative than the evidence presented 
here and the previous Chapter suggests is common for the majority of Social 
Firms. 
Therefore, it is feasible to suggest that the business/social balance is an accepted 
facet of the institutional environment in Social Firms. This discussion accepts on 
both normative and cultural/cognitive levels that it is inconceivable that this 
should not be part of what Social Firms are. Thus director/trustee ineffectiveness 
contravenes the institutional constitution forming the normal 'order of reality' in 
the Social Firm (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). This outcome provokes further 
study of these particular components of the institutional environment. 
7.4 PROPOSITION 2: THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS SHOULD HAVE 
WE SKILLS REQUIRED TO GOVERN THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 
EFFECTIVELY. 
The statement used for this proposition focussed on perceptions of the Board 
skills needed to sustain the delivery of social benefit. The importance of Board 
members possessing the necessary skills was clarified in Stage I of the research. 
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The general outcome from this stage of the study determined that skills at Board 
level tended to be inadequate. Furthermore, the demand for training and 
recruitment of Board members was only slowly being supplied by relevant 
support and trade organisations. The type of skills required of Board members 
could include leadership, general management knowledge / experience and 
specific function expertise, such as marketing. 
The reason why these skills are so important is that previous research on 
nonprofits has found a link between board and organisational performance 
(Alexander and Weiner, 1998, Brown, 2005, Jackson and Holland, 1998, 
Mordaunt and Comforth, 2004). Thus, the better-equipped a Board is, the more 
likely it will be able to meet the challenges facing Social Firms. The problem 
encountered by Social Firms is their lack of success in encouraging and 
recruiting Board members. In particular, they struggle to find those who either 
have the requisite qualities, and / or have the time to dedicate to attend training 
courses funded by their organisations. 
From Stage 2 of the study, the degree to which Board members actually possess 
these skills depends on the Social Firm's source of income. There are a number 
of alternative interpretations of this. Firstly, that those Social Firms receiving 
trade revenue alone are better at delivering on business objectives. Therefore 
they have the Board capable of managing the organisation away from so-called 
6 grant dependency', towards sustainable business. The assumption here is that by 
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maximising the business capability of the enterprise, the Board can maximise 
social benefit. 
Conversely, Social Firms maintaining grant / trade revenue streams present a 
more complex set of explanations. Assuming that the Social Firm intends to 
become self-sufficient through trade, then the grant / trade mix is little indication 
of the Board's abilities. Yet, if the organisation has existed for a long time, it is 
possible that as long as they deliver social benefit it is less crucial that they move 
away from grant funding. Hence, it is difficult to claim that Board skills are 
judged better according to how successful the business delivery of the Social 
Firm is. Rather, Board aptitudes are determined effective by how well they 
deliver the balance of objectives. Thus, it is just as (if not more) likely that the 
perception of Board ability is poorer for Social Firms with income from trade 
alone rather than a mix. There is an emergent view in the governance literature 
that social enterprise Boards will evolve to a model of stewardship, possibly 
through isomorphism (Dart, 2004, Low, 2006, Reid and Griffith, 2006). Yet this 
research suggests that the role of the Board in this process is to facilitate a keener 
business-focus, thus adjusting the balance between business and social 
objectives. 
This study does indicate that Social Firms do not (yet) exhibit such tendencies. 
There are a number of Social Firms that rely on a source of grant funding, and 
will continue to do so. In this situation, the required Board skills involve 
maintenance and enhancing quality of social benefit, rather than managing 
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growth and enterprise. Crucially, the difference amongst the sample of Social 
Firms rests on how the group perceive that the Board can sustain social benefit. 
Therefore, either Social Firm Boards can achieve this through growth and better 
delivery of their defined products / services. Alternatively, this will be better 
achieved through remaining faithful with the status quo, and the Board shall alter 
internal conditions only if the needs of the primary beneficiaries require it. 
A further tangent to this discussion places the institutional 'legacy' of 'nonprofit- 
ism' as the cause of Board ineffectiveness. Social Firms (and social enterprises in 
general) are markedly different from traditional nonprofits. Yet, they share a 
heritage with these organisations, and more besides. It is possible that the 
constitutive rules of Social Firms run along very similar lines to nonprofits. In a 
philosophical sense, the 'social benefit' aspect of the Social Firm, however 
defined, shares much in common with nonprofits. It is the means for achieving 
that benefit that represents the key difference between nonprofit and social 
enterprises per se. This is relevant because social enterprises are expected to be 
entrepreneurial and flexible in finding solutions to social problems. It is common 
for nonprofits, including charities, to 'reform' as social enterprises or set up 
trading arms. Hence, it is likely that they will share elements of the culture of the 
4parent' nonprofit. This might be especially so in situations where Board 
members / trustees are the same core group as those who presided over other 
iterations of the organisation. Therefore, rather than developing the 
entrepreneurial culture often associated with social enterprises, Board's adopt the 
management norms commonly used by nonprofits. This leaves a Board that may 
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not have the skills set to manage the social enterprise to provide responsive, 
flexible solutions to social issues. 
7.5 PROPOSITION 3: SOCIAL ENTERPRISES ARE EXPECTED TO BE 
MORE ETHICAL THAN FOR-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS. 
Organisations that position social, environmental or indeed any non-financial 
goal as their raison d'8tre might be expected to be more ethical than those that 
so-called for-profits (Wilensky and Hansen, 2001). This is the received view on 
nonprofit organisations and their variants (including social enterprises). 
However, at a time of increasing sensitivity towards corporate crime and scandal, 
more of the largest for-profits are willing to entertain notions of corporate social 
responsibility and corporate citizenship (Carroll, 1979, Donaldson and Preston, 
1995, Friedman, 1970, Preston, 1975, Sethi, 1979). Typically, it is the large 
corporations and their activities that garner the majority of media and public 
attention. Less notorious are instances of wrong-doing or unethical behaviour 
involving nonprofits; it is assumed that they are ethical whereas in reality they 
may be less so (Malloy and Agarwal, 2001). It is the possibility of financial 
impropriety by managers, directors and trustees that form the basis of governance 
failure in nonprofits and contrive the expected ethical standards, or codes of 
Conduct, of these organisations (Kearns, 1994b). All organisations share some 
common ethical standards, for example accounting conventions and upholding 
the legal rights of staff and other stakeholders. Hence, this proposition attempts 
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to understand whether this presumption is shared by a representative section of 
the Social Firm community. 
The findings from this study generally confirm this expectation rather than 
challenge it. Social Firms should indeed be of a more ethical constitution than 
their for-profit competitors should. Yet, an interesting divergence in opinion was 
found between individuals with budget responsibility and non-budget holders. 
This outcome could reflect the reality for budget holders in Social Firms, where 
they are more than aware of the attention paid to them during accounting audits. 
Justification of financial accountability is part of the budget holders remit, and 
could challenge their own notions of trust between internal and external actors. 
This signifies a particular feature of the internal environment of Social Firms, 
where the requirement for financial accountability alters perceptions of the 
ethical nature of these organisations. Alternatively, this outcome could reveal the 
experiences of internal actors involved in the verification of financial 
accountability of budget holders. 
In either scenario, the most remarkable outcome is that there is any divergence of 
opinion for this proposition at all. So strong is the received view that nonprofits 
are more ethical that the temptation here is to confirm it as an anomaly. Of 
course, there is a significant amount of research that now suggests otherwise 
(Cornforth, 2003a, Inglis, Alexander and Weaver, 1999, Malloy and Agarwal, 
2001, Oster, 1998, Preston and Brown, 2004). Yet, the general perception of the 
intrinsic ethicality of nonprofits is reinforced by their social or environmental 
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component. However, from this study we observe that for Social Firms, there is 
clearly a perception that they are not ethical in terms of financial accountability. 
This goes some way to dispelling the assumption that Social Firms are ethical. It 
confirms that there are likely to be specific parts of the governance process 
where this unethical activity is located. In this study signifies the importance of 
financial transparency and working with budget holders to ensure that they can 
be held accountable. This process is within the remit of the executive Board of 
directors or trustees, and would normally be examined through an audit 
(accounting, social or both). 
7.6 PROPOSITION 4: DEMOCRACY IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF 
SOCIAL FIRM GOVERNANCE 
Democracy is recognised as an essential feature of transparent corporate 
governance. In the social enterprise, democracy involves establishing a fair, 
robust and externally scrutinised system for the election of Board members. It is 
recognised as integral to good governance practice across sectors. As an outcome 
of efforts to ensure greater governance transparency, Board elections are 
supervised on the behalf of key beneficiaries. In the corporate sector, institutional 
investors hold great sway in demanding that the election process is in accord 
with expected standards (Davis, 2002). In nonprofits and social enterprises, this 
role is taken by key stakeholders. In the context of Social Firms, it is common 
that Boards, at least partly, feature the inclusive practice of integrating 
stakeholders. Of course, the term stakeholder is rather all encompassing. The 
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differentiation of stakeholder inclusion at Board level is discussed in more depth 
in the section below (7.7). The present discussion is focused specifically on the 
role of democracy in Social Firm governance. 
The Board in a Social Firm is likely to comprise of a Board of trustees. As the 
descriptive analysis shows in Chapter 6, the Board of trustees generally has the 
ultimate sanction. This Board may, or may not, be complimented by a Board of 
directors. Hence, there are possibly two components to Board democracy in the 
Social Firm: principally for the Board of trustees; and secondly to a Board of 
directors (if present). Ensuring that election to either of these Boards is 
democratic is complicated for a number of reasons. Firstly, they are small and are 
likely to have only a small pool of individuals who would be willing to donate 
time (often voluntarily) to represent a group at Board level. Secondly, the process 
of making elections transparent (i. e. to be verified by an external party) would 
involve time and resources that are scarce for small organisations. The findings 
showed that the presence of a social audit was significant to perceptions of 
democracy. Where the social audit is absent, staff and other stakeholders are 
restricted from determining for themselves how ethical, accountable and 
democratic their Social Firm is. This is a problem because all social enterprise 
should show that they adhere to the principles that afford the term 'social 
enterprise'. Moreover, though the social audit is not compulsory for social 
enterprise, it is simply good practice by Boards to show how well their 
organisation is meeting defined criteria and objectives. Yet, it is understandable 
given the relatively small size of these organisations and the various demands on 
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resources that might make it difficult for Boards to partake in a regular, full-scale 
social environment and financial audit. 
A further issue is the presence of trustees and directors, and the dynamism of 
relations between both. directors are likely to be under more pressure to show 
how the Social Firm has performed, whilst the Board of trustees will play a 
'checks and balances' function, assuring that key goals are being met. The 
process of becoming a director in a Social Firm should be based on their abilities 
or expertise, whereas trustees are present for the purpose of representation, rather 
than operational expertise. As Stage I indicated, Board members are likely to 
serve for a long time, and various constraints make it difficult to replace them. 
These include both poor performance and mitigating circumstances. Therefore, 
we can assert that issue of democracy is tempered by long-serving directors / 
trustees, who have the legitimacy to continue serving because there are few 
alternatives for replacement. The issue is less that democratic elections are 
somehow subverted, and more that they do not happen that often. 
The crux of the matter is whether the normative principle of democracy has 
enough credence to override the practical problems faced when trying to 
implement it. Clearly, this study has shown that democracy is an important issue 
for those in Social Firms, and that it should be a feature of how the Board(s) 
operates. In addition, because the Board of trustees is likely to hold the ultimate 
sanction, it is a serious matter that the Board is competent and representative of 
the interests that they claim to represent. This includes funding bodies as well as 
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primary beneficiaries. Whether it can actually be implemented depends on the 
presence of the (embedded) social audit, the number of Boards, and opportunity 
for new Board members to become involved (see below, 7.7). 
The study does not show hovv democratic and fair Board member elections take 
place in Social Firms. This provides an opportunity for further investigation, 
particularly with a view to understanding how stakeholders of all relevant groups 
are encouraged and trained to become effective Board members. 
7.7 PROPOSITION 5: STAKEHOLDER INCLUSION AT BOARD LEVEL 
IS A FEATURE OF SOCIAL FIRM GOVERNANCE 
As alluded to in the previous section, the matter of inclusion at Board-level is a 
relevant issue for modern organisations (Kesner, Victor and Lamont, 1986). The 
rhetoric behind stakeholder inclusion points to improvements that can be made to 
governance by building trust and enhancing transparency (Owen et al., 2000). 
Yet, if stakeholder inclusion results in larger Board size, it is difficult to ignore 
studies that have found negative effects on performance in organisations with 
larger Boards (Conyon and Peck, 1998, cf Dalton et al., 1998). Therefore, 
although a still emergent feature of corporate governance (especially Anglo- 
American models), stakeholder inclusion is an accepted and prominent aspect of 
public, nonprofit and social enterprise governance. This study has provided 
evidence that stakeholder inclusion is not always a feature of Social Firm 
governance based on two factors: annual turnover and Board membership. 
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In terms of annual turnover, the logical analysis is that higher turnover is 
achieved by smaller Boards with less evidence of inclusion. The inference here 
supports agency theorists criticisms of stakeholder theory (Friedman, 1970, 
Sternberg, 1997), that stakeholder inclusion at Board level deviates the Board 
(and the organisation) from maximising 'output'. Hence, the Social Firm is better 
at generating income when the Board has the freedom to use its expertise 
effectively. Of course, this presents a scenario that is not at all common for all 
Social Firms. It assumes the presence of an 'executive' Board of directors, 
without the oversight or interference from trustees and suggests a less than 
optimal balance of objectives tipped towards business, rather than social. 
Naturally, there is more than one perspective. If business growth is the driver (as 
has been often suggested) of maximising social benefit, then this scenario is the 
best instance of Social Firm governance: a Board of directors, with stakeholder 
best interests first, enabled to use their abilities to grow a business, whilst serving 
and championing the needs of primary beneficiaries. This is the argument against 
, greater stakeholder 
inclusion in Social Firm governance. 
The argument for greater stakeholder inclusion in Social Firm governance travels 
a similar course of logic. Involving stakeholders in the governance of Social 
Firms is an engrained feature of the institutional fabric of the internal 
environment. Social inclusion is the core purpose of organisations such as Social 
Firms, providing as they do access to employment for disabled people. The level 
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of turnover accrued is secondary to pursuing and delivering on the needs of this 
stakeholder group. 
Thus, a clear distinction can be drawn between those Social Firms with a larger 
turnover focusing on maximising social benefit through improving business 
growth. Alternatively, there is the traditional view that the 'business' is a 
secondary consideration to pursuing social (or other) interests. This distinction is 
striking as it confirms the focal arguments of current theorists, including Dart 
(2004) and Low (2006), who suggest that the social enterprise sector is evolving 
away from traditional, rooted values (as per the latter argument), towards a 
focused, pragmatic approach. 
Although this study eschews generalisation to the entire sector, it would be a 
significant 'evolution' if Social Firms no longer encouraged stakeholder 
inclusion (including managers and other staff) at Board level. So intrinsic is the 
role of the 'stakeholder' in the Social Firm ideology that for such groups not to 
be involved would be assumed contrary to the cultural-cognitive environment. 
Hence, such a scenario would be literally 'unthinkable'. However, it is not 
possible to disregard the link between annual turnover and stakeholder inclusion. 
The idea of change, especially institutional change, is 'cressive' and this 
discussion does support a gradual shift in what is permissible according to 
constitutive rules (Scott, 2001). It is especially poignant when considering the 
second factor relevant to this proposition is Board membership. 
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Board and non-Board members evidently view stakeholder inclusion very 
differently. Given the above discussion regarding the gradual change of 
orientation at Board level, analysis could simply reinforce that belief. Board 
members who do not believe stakeholder representation is a necessary feature of 
Social Firm governance would certainly do this. However if non-Board members 
indicate that they feel that it should be, this portrays two facets of the 
institutional environment. Firstly, non-Board members remain committed to the 
egalitarian principles that form the constitutive rules upon which the Social Firm 
has been created. This group represent the traditional Social Firm: focused on 
delivering social benefit primarily. The second facet is of the progressive Board, 
recognising the challenges facing the Social Firm and trying to implement a 
strategy of growth. The represents the evolving Social Firm: orientated towards 
sustainable social benefit through sustainable trade and growth. 
The first facet offers a powerful, symbolic representation of the history of 
the Social Firm and roots all activity in the traditions of the organisations: 
maintaining and perpetuating the institutional environment. Part of this 
maintenance involves seeking better representation of key stakeholder groups at 
Board level. The second facet seeks to change the orientation of managers, other 
staff and stakeholders to meet the challenges of the external environment in 
which they operate. This conflict has been predicted, and partly in line with the 
UK Government's strategy for social enterprise (for example, greater 
coordination with the public sector and procuring key services). This facet 
propounds pragmatism: stakeholder inclusion is not necessary if it is not useful in 
improving both the delivery of social benefit as well as business performance. 
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Yet, there is an alternative view, which centres on the Board of trustees and their 
role in the Social Firm: in their capacity as guardians of the interests of key 
stakeholder groups. In the Social Firm where a specified Board of directors (with 
executive function) is absent, managers should be guided by the Board of 
trustees. This group is an amalgamation of a variety of interests and stakeholder 
claims. We can postulate that in this scenario, it is likely that the Board of 
trustees represents the group that perceives stakeholder inclusion as necessary. 
Therefore, non-Board members, i. e. managers who are accustomed to little 
strategic input from trustees, are the group that better understands how to 
develop the Social Firm and adopt the role of de facto executive group. In this 
situation, the governance process contravenes the institutional norms relating to 
stakeholder inclusion. However, the subversion of these norms could be made 
acceptable if managers are better at representing stakeholder needs than the 
existing arrangements allow. If managers and staff represent the key stakeholder 
group, this would in fact produce a participative governance dynamic, where a 
Board is required only for oversight and procedural activities. The 'mechanics' 
of how this evolving governance landscape works is unclear in this study. In 
situations where the Board is perceived to be ineffective, and managers 'manage' 
to the Social Firm, the processes by which the Social Firm maintains operations 
should be examined more closely. Stakeholder inclusion is seen to be one of the 
central features of ethical governance. It is established here that it is not always 
present in Social Firms (where it might be expected to be more prevalent). 
Furthermore, there remains an underlying assumption that stakeholder inclusion 
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might not be effective, even at all possible. For stakeholder representation to be 
useful to Social Firms, the stakeholders must be trained appropriately to offer 
value to the Board (either directors or trustees, or both). Social Firms UK has 
evidently recognised this, promoting added-value services to member 
organisations so they can improve the value of the services they provide. Other 
organisations, such as AccountAbility UK, offer guidance on establishing 
effective 'stakeholder panels' and judging their effectiveness in corporate 
governance. 
7.8 PROPOSITION 6: TRANSPARENCY INDICATES BETTER 
GOVERNANCE PERFORMANCE. 
Transparency is a commonly used term in corporate governance, referring to the 
ease with which interested parties can examine the actions of key individuals and 
groups in organisations. Also, transparency is an expected feature of good 
governance as is clear in the salient literature (Bushman et al., 2004, Bushman 
and Smith, 2003, Lowenstein, 1996). The implied syllogism here is that 
transparency and governance equate to legitimacy. From the study, we can see 
that transparency does indicate better governance, though this is contingent upon 
the mix of staff employed by the Social Firm. If transparency is a normative 
expectation of good governance, this outcome runs contrary to the received view 
of transparency. In the absence of transparency, it is unclear whether the 
governance arrangements would have the necessary integrity and accountability. 
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There is a variety of staff employed in Social Firms: salaried, voluntary or a 
mixture of the two types. The division between staff types and their perceptions 
may be the result of a difference of orientation between salaried staff and 
volunteers. In particular, this difference could be manifested in the change of 
ethos towards a business-focus. Different staff may have different expectations 
of the Board and how they expect the organisation should be run. Salaried staff, 
whose financial as well as moral interests are served by their performance, may 
well adopt the more linear transparency-performance position. Given that 
legitimate governance is tied to the level of transparency, evidence of the latter 
(through audit and external verification) may be the minimum requirement to 
legitimise their activities. Volunteer staff may expect more than a regular 
financial audit to prove that governance is working towards the interests of 
primary beneficiaries. Transparency is one facet of governance performance, and 
transparency alone is an insufficient barometer of governance performance. This 
would promote a holistic assessment of the Board (and the Social Firm's) 
performance. The 'social' audit, as well as other performance measurement 
systems such as Social Return on Investment and stakeholder panels, is designed 
to provide a balanced view of performance. These methods incorporate 
quantitative and qualitative appraisals of Board performance from a variety of 
interested groups. It is possible that salaried staff, or staff in more business- 
orientated Social Firms, encourage a straightforward financial assessment of 
governance performance. Hence, establishing that the Board and governance 
activities are transparent is enough to legitimise those activities. However, the 
integration of primary stakeholders as staff in the Social Firm will make it likely 
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that they expect more from any measure of governance performance. As the 
primary legitimating aut ority, t ey have considerable power in ensuring that the 
Board implements checks and balances to account for their (and managers) 
activities. 
7.9 PROPOSITION 7: TRUST IS AN INDICATOR OF BOARD 
TRANSPARENCY. 
Trust in the individuals and groups involved in governance is a crucial feature of 
the internal environment. This has been well established in the governance 
literature as an internal pressure for Boards in a range of different organisation 
types (Huse, 2005, Nobbie and Brudney, 2003, Steane, 2001). Where present it 
symbolises the pressure on key governance roles to perform according to 
normative expectations. Those who confer these expectations have a notion of 
trust that the 'agent' will perform according to those predetermined standards. 
The absence of trust between organisational actors could signify are re- 
assignment of power in the organisation, i. e. the principal (key stakeholders) 
have reduced power of (moral) authority over key governance roles. Hence, 
individuals in the latter group can alter governance arrangements, e. g. the 
introduction of formal audit procedures to verify performance, rather than rely on 
trust. Typically, the informal and formal mechanisms work in tandem. For 
example, there is a general perception of trust between individuals and groups in 
the organisation, though final verification / evidence of performance are also 
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expected to confirm the basis for trust-based relationships. It is common for 
nonprofits to acknowledge the influence of trust and commitment between key 
organisational actors, whilst implementing social accounting procedures on an 
periodic basis. Trust is important because it symbolises a level of belief by 
primary beneficiaries that managers and the Board can deliver on their objectives 
and acquire legitimacy. Hence, for primary beneficiaries to justify their own trust 
in managers and the Board, they must be able to verify that their activities are 
appropriate, and transparent. In the Social Firm, where the primary stakeholder 
group is internal, rather than external to the organisation, they must have 
confidence that the Board is managing their interests openly and properly. 
The study indicates that trust is not important to transparency according to the 
budget-holding responsibility of staff. This perceived lack of trust could be the 
result of the need for a more formal representation of monitoring and 
performance measurement. For example, the rigour and previous reliability of a 
social audit may be seen to have more value to the organisation than informal 
judgements based on trust and maintaining relationships between organisational 
actors. An implication here is that the Board is assuming more responsibility for 
ensuring that staff conforms to expectations. This places greater demands on 
resources to ensure that sufficient monitoring can be carried out. It also removes 
the informal 'human' aspect from managing staff, allowing them the appropriate 
freedom to conduct their roles without hindrance. 
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Alternatively, non-budget holder may view trust as central, principally because 
their interests are influenced to some extent by the decisions taken by budget 
holders. Trust integral to transparency of the Board because key stakeholders, 
such as staff, confer responsibility onto the Board to protect and champion their 
interests. The difference between budget and non-budget holding staff could 
reflect the changing pressures on Boards to insert more rigorous checks and 
balances of managerial activity. 
There are some further implications for the absence of trust as a key facet of 
transparency. In terms of the institutional environment, it is notable that informal, 
trust-based relationships might be supplemented or replaced with formal 
procedures. If trust has an important legitimating function, then the Board must 
act to rebuild trust as a key part of governance. In particular, this study suggests 
that the role of the budget-holder (a key position of responsibility), supplants 
trust with systems of measurement. Measurement and control of financial (and 
non-financial) performance is a common feature and expectation in any 
organisation, and is likely to become more stringent across different sectors. Yet, 
the differentiating element of the social enterprise is its social-orientation, and 
commitment to non-financial objectives. This factor should imbue trust in the 
primary stakeholder group, as the organisations are created with the purpose of 
serving their (social) interests. Therefore, the very fact that trust should be absent 
in any feature of Social Firm governance appears at odds with expectations. The 
institutional environment is built around ethical tenets, and so it is expected that 
these organisations should be run in an ethical way. Moreover, given the 
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supposed presence of stakeholders on the Board(s), it should be very difficult not 
to do so. The current theoretical position on social enterprise governance, 
stewardship theory, places great emphasis on the presence of trust between the 
Board, managers and stakeholders. This outcome suggests that there are some 
key relationships where trust is as much an expectation, though less a salient 
feature of the Social Firm environment. This encourages further examination of 
the dynamism of key governance positions and relationships in Social Firm 
governance. 
The Board must understand the value of trust as a driver and an outcome of good 
governance practice. This study certainly indicates that trust might diminish if 
the Board focuses on audit and accounting processes as the means to establish 
efficacious financial management in Social Firms. This is unusual given the 
sector-wide predilection for 'triple-bottom line' approaches to auditing and 
measuring performance and impact. It is notable that previous study of the role of 
'trust' as an explanation for existence of nonprofit organisations, has disputed its 
influence (Ortmann and Schlesinger, 1997). The prior study examined the role of 
trust as an external cause of nonprofit existence, whereas the present study 
examines the nature of trust in relations between key governance actors. 
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7.10 PROPOSITION 8: DISCLOSURE IS A FACET OF TRANSPARENT 
GOVERNANCE IN SOCIAL FIRMS. 
One element of achieving transparency in governance is the disclosure of 
organisation and Board performance information to interested parties. This 
process tends to focus on the disclosure of financial information, which is often 
used to enable a range of stakeholders to determine for themselves the actual 
level of performance compared with their expectations of the organisation. As 
previous studies have noted, the role of the Board can involve enhancing the 
level of monitoring, which leads to improved disclosure of the quality of 
performance (Yetman and Yetman, 2004). Such rigour is considered good 
governance practice, yet there are complexities to achieving suitable levels of 
disclosure. Prior studies debate whether organisations (particularly nonprofits 
and social enterprises) should follow the legally prescribed minimum, or include 
a range of quantitative and qualitative sources providing disclosure of a range of 
organisation impacts: a triple-bottom line approach (Elkington, 1997, 
Goldschmid, 1998, Keating and Frurnkin, 2003, Paton, Foot and Payne, 2000). 
The study unearthed several significant differences regarding the role of 
disclosure as a feature of transparent governance. The first of these focuses on 
Board effectiveness. Perceived or actual Board effectiveness has been linked 
with levels of disclosure and transparency in prior studies (McNulty, Roberts and 
Stiles, 2005, Roberts, 2001, Tsipouri and Xanthakis, 2004). The logical 
interpretation is that disclosure is a feature of an effective Board, whilst its 
absence indicates the exact opposite. In which case, it is vital that in its absence, 
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Social Firms can rectify such situations and implement a remedial system to 
improve disclosure. There is a clear de-legitimising outcome from a lack of 
transparency. However, if the Board of trustees is thus judged as ineffective, it 
remains unclear exactly how this Board can be reconfigured and systems 
implemented without a second Board (or group) with the authoritY and support to 
achieve it. 
The problems facing the Social Firm are highlighted further in this study, 
because the decision-making authority in the Social Firm was also significant in 
perceptions of disclosure. The perceived influence of disclosure upon 
transparency varies according to the group holding the ultimate sanction. The 
clear concern for a lack of disclosure is that it is counter to good governance 
practice. The problem here is that the variety of different of decision-making 
; groups presents inconsistent support for the notion that social enterprises are 
inherently ethical. Clearly, there are instances where their governance 
- affangements indicate that they are less so. This 'inconsistency' could be a 
manifestation of the (broader) evolving nature of social enterprise governance 
(Mason et al., 2007). It is clear that some types of Boards are perceived as 
enforcing better disclosure procedures than others. In keeping with the idea of a 
divergence between 'old' and 'new' perspectives of Social Firms (and social 
enterprises generally), it may confirm that some older Board's are less proactive 
in disclosing performance information. This was shown in the findings in this 
study: very few of the Social Firms in the sample conduct a social audit (or type 
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of audit thereof), possibly relying on the minimum accounting protocols required 
by relevant UK law. 
In addition, there was a clear difference in perception between Board and non- 
Board members in the study. This is important because both groups should 
(normatively) consider disclosure as a prominent aspect of the process of 
governance in the Social Firm. The disclosure of financial accounts is an 
established task of which the Board has the responsibility for delivering. Thus, 
they may well perceive that this type and level of disclosure is sufficient for 
transparency. Yet, non-Board members and primary stakeholders have different 
views on the type and level of disclosure that ensures transparency. These could 
, 
include non-financial reporting, particularly measuring social impact and how the 
Board's activities and decisions have influenced this. Therefore, the divergence 
between Board and non-Board member could be the result of different 
expectations of disclosure. The Social Firm must deliver on expectations of 
primary stakeholders, so it is of no benefit if the Board is content to deliver the 
minimum prescribed disclosure if stakeholder groups demand more and different 
types of information disclosure. 
Age of the Social Firm is also significant here. Older Social Firms have different 
perceptions of disclosure than more recently established organisations. There is 
some evidence to suggest that, in combination with the points raised in this 
section, more recently founded Social Finns are more likely to embed the holistic 
view of disclosure. This entails using social audits and a triple-bottom line 
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approach. Hence, in certain conditions (i. e. long Board member tenure) older 
organisations may find it more difficult to enact the transition towards this view 
of disclosure. This could especially be so if the primary stakeholder group does 
not demand it. Yet, the pressure to conform to sector norms (i. e. isomorphism) is 
increasingly likely for social enterprises. In turn, there is an increasing pressure 
for Social Firms to 'modemise' and embed new systems of performance / 
governance measurement to remain legitimate and in existence. 
Such situations would favour the presence of a consultative, independent 
stakeholder Board together with an 'executive' Board of directors. This would 
replace the common unitary system of the Board of trustees, where they are 
expected to deliver both the 'stewardship' of a Board of directors, and the 
oversight of a stakeholder committee. Thus, in instances where governance is 
ineffective, the stakeholder committee can pre-empt and dissolve potentially de- 
legitimising activities by the Board or managers through consultation and action. 
There are some obvious issues with such a solution: not least creating and 
maintaining a suitable stakeholder committee with the resources for Board 
oversight and independence. It also assumes that the Social Firm is capable of 
II recruiting a Board of directors with the business knowledge and experience to 
fulfil the executive role suitably. Nevertheless, it presents application of the 
emergent view in the social enterprise literature that Boards will have to adopt a 
stewardship role in the changing social enterprise landscape. It also indicates that 
there are alternatives to the present arrangements that are over-reliant on the 
Board of trustees to deliver on a number of different briefs. In essence, this 
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approach would allow key stakeholder groups the chance to become involved in 
an organisation that serves their interests. Furthermore, by remaining 
independent (i. e. from delivering technical expertise such as finance or marketing 
to add value) they can ensure that the Social Firm continues to operate in the 
pursuance of those interests. 
To conclude, it is evident that though disclosure is central to transparency, there 
are different view about what constitutes disclosure, and its impact upon Board 
effectiveness. The solution outlined above represents an option of governance 
reform that would affect isomorphism with more proactive and successful Social 
Firms. In so doing, they have a better chance of managing the process of change, 
through integrating stakeholders and reporting systems to routinely deliver the 
triple-bottom line and improve the range and quality of disclosure. As a result, 
they improve Board effectiveness, enhance trust (through improved 
transparency) and align Board and non-Board members' views. This enables the 
Social Firm to avoid a looming legitimacy crisis by adhering to good governance 
principles and enabling managers to be held to account. The limiting factor is the 
availability of time and resources to reconfigure governance arrangements. These 
resources include providing the key roles (Board of directors, stakeholder 
committee) with training and opportunity to perform in their roles effectively. 
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7.11 PROPOSITION 9: ETHICAL PERFORMANCE IS A 
RESPONSIBILITY OF SOCIAL FIRM DIRECTORS. 
Each of the three statements related to this proposition were shown to be 
significant. However, each statement was found to be significant according to a 
different nominal category. Firstly, job title showed a significant relationship for 
perceptions of the promotion of professional standards throughout the Social 
Firm. This shows that managers and Board members are split over the degree to 
which Boards promote such standards. Secondly, the number of serving Board 
members was found to have a significant relationship with perceptions of the 
Board meeting ethical standards. Finally, decision-making authority was shown 
to be significantly relevant to this proposition through perceptions of director 
monitoring of staff to maintain ethical standards. 
The onus of ensuring ethical performance of individuals should be placed on 
each staff member. However, it remains that Boards have a fiduciary duty to 
stakeholders to ensure that standards are maintained in their organisations. The 
above findings show that perceptions of the Boards aptitude to accomplish this 
differ in key areas. According to job role, there is a concern that the Board is not 
actively engaged in the promotion of professional standards. If this is so, then the 
view of the Board and its expected roles differs from actual conditions. In reality, 
managers are expected to conform to the ethical norms expected of their roles 
and of their Social Firm, without guidance from the Board. This analysis would 
therefore characterise the Board as stewards of the organisation, and stakeholder 
interests. Rather than hands-on 'running' of the organisation, managers are 
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empowered to act in this role as they are better placed to understand and 
accommodate stakeholder needs. Furthermore, we can posit that the institutional 
environment is influential. Managers can be relied upon to maintain ethical 
standards because this is part of the ethos of the social enterprise. To act contrary 
to this would contravene the cultural / cognitive rules that bond internal actors 
with the expectations of stakeholders. This could especially be the case where 
staff also constitute the primary stakeholder group the Social Firm serves. This 
restricts the role of the Board to procedural issues and an oversight function, for 
example through accounting / social audits. 
Board size and ethical standards have shown to be significant, and this raises 
issues regarding performance appraisal for Board members and the implications 
for optimal Board size. Where Boards (or individual members) are perceived to 
be unethical, this would naturally raise concerns over the actual role of the Board 
in the organisation. Formal processes, such as social audits, examine the efficacy 
of arrangements at Board level whilst accommodating feedback from all 
available stakeholders. If this process of external verification is carried out, 
concerns can be raised over the performance of Boards and their members and 
appropriate action can be taken. What is lacking from this analysis is further 
evidence of why respondents perceive particular Boards (i. e. of a certain size) as 
being unethical. Evidently, this area needs further examination. This is because it 
indicates either a breakdown in trust between staff and the Board, or a 
breakdown within the Board. 
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7.12 PROPOSITION 10: INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS ENHANCE 
TRANSPARENCY IN SOCIAL FIRMS. 
The presence of 'independent' directors on Boards is widely recognised as an 
effective method for ensuring the efficacy of Boards (Fama and Jensen, 1983, 
Goldschmid, 1998). Studies of their role in nonprofits provides a mixed view of 
the positive influence of independent directors and Boards (Brickley et al., 2003, 
cf. O'Regan and Oster, 2002). 
In this study, we observe that this issue was not found to be significant for any of 
the nominal categories. Yet, this lack of evidence does not suggest that further 
examination of the role of independent directors would not yield significant 
findings. The value of an independent representation on the Board is to promote 
transparency and good governance. In addition, the role of the 'independent' is to 
oversee that the Board operates according to expected legal (primarily) and 
moral standards. It is possible that the required role for a Social Firm is less 
'independent', rather 'representative'. An independent evaluation of Board 
performance should be conducted through regular audit, supported by a 
representative Board, and be externally scrutinised. In this way, independent 
directors are less important than ensuring key stakeholders are represented on the 
Board. Clearly, stakeholders would not be described as independent, distinct 
from the organisations and its activities. Rather, they will have 'stakes' in Board 
performance, therefore seeking to ensure that its activities are transparent. This 
kind of Board representation (stakeholder inclusion) has significance throughout 
this study, and is discussed in depth elsewhere in this Chapter. In terms of 
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independent directors, however, it is likely that the role is already performed at 
Board level, though by different individuals with non-financial (i. e. social) 
interests in the organisation. 
7.13 PROPOSITION 11: ACCOUNTABILITY INDICATES BETTER 
GOVERNANCE PERFORMANCE. 
Accountability is a common term used in general discussions of governance for 
many type of organisation. In the same vein, holding key individuals and groups 
to - account for their actions 
is a central feature of good governance. This 
proposition proposed that accountability is a barometer of governance practice. 
Therefore, the accountability of individuals and groups in organisations is a 
reflection of how well governed the organisation is. 
The presence of the social audit in Social Firms was found to be significant. The 
logical interpretation of this outcome is that those Social Firms conducting the 
social audit (regularly) perceive accountability as indicative of good governance 
practice. The implementation of a trusted system of accountability, which 
facilitates the ordered collection of organisation performance data for external 
verification, is a positive step towards accountability. It is likely that processes 
such as these are very important in assuring legitimacy, as a symbolic 
representation of constitutive rules. Therefore, the influence of the institutional 
environment is not sufficient as a control on the activities of Boards and staff (i. e. 
the strength of social 'bonds' between key staff and the primary beneficiaries). 
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Hence, accountability takes the form of a formalised process by which the 
activities and decisions of these groups are in line with those expected by 
primary beneficiaries. In this way, the Social Firm resembles other types of 
organisations that enforce processes of accountability to align behaviour and 
performance with expected standards. Making sure that Boards can be held 
accountable is a responsibility of both the Board and other groups who have an 
oversight role. Thus, the Board is not solelY responsible for determining their 
own performance measurement metrics, or the individuals who undertake the 
social audit process. This means that a secondary 'Board' or committee (not 
solely a Board of trustees) could take the role of instigator of the social auditing 
process. 
The alternative view is that those Social Firms not practising the social audit do 
not value this process in determining good governance. Accountability is firmly 
embedded into the governance literature, so it is difficult to propose that Social 
Firms who do not partake in social audits also perceive it as an important facet of 
good governance. The social audit has some critics and there are several 
alternative processes that aim to prove accountability, utilising different means 
(Gray et al., 1997, Owen et al., 2000). Therefore, this outcome could be 
interpreted as Social Firms failing to implement the social audit properly, or at 
all. This in turn means that accountability is hard to prove, rather than being 
unimportant. The social audit process is funded by the organisation and requires 
Some staff members to take responsibility for data collection. It is not uncommon 
for the social audit to become problematic because it is constrained by financial 
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or human resource issues (Cotton, Fraser and Hill, 2000, Quarter and Richmond, 
2001). A solution for overcoming such resource-based difficulties is to make use 
of support agencies and trade organisations who offer training courses for social 
audit / accounting. Yet, the responsibility to 'prove and improve' remains the 
responsibility of the organisation. concerned, and funding schemes to prove 
accountability are crucial to evidencing performance. 
Accountability has been linked with performance in previous work, often 
showing a positive correlation (Goodstein et al., 1994, Kakabadse, Kakabadse 
and Kouzmin, 2001, Kearns, 1994b). In the present study, differences in annual 
turnover and perceptions of accountability were shown to be significantly 
different. Higher turnover, as an indicator of better trading performance, signifies 
a Board that operates in a focussed way, and a transparent, accountable 
governance process. This description represents an ideal: Boards that are more 
accountable produce well-run organisations. Yet, it may also portray an 
organisation that has sacrificed its social objectives in favour of business. The 
process of accountability is to protect the interests of key stakeholders, and 
serves to legitimise. Key stakeholders set the terms upon which Boards can 
acquire legitimacy. Hence, sacrificing objectives would have a de-legitimising 
effect rather than the opposite. It is difficult to assume that organisations with 
higher turnover are more likely to perceive accountability as part of good 
governance. This is because Social Firms give primacy to social rather than 
business objectives. Thus, this outcome could represent that organisations with a 
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lower turnover, do so because their Boards focus on other objectives, in an effort 
to enhance their accountability to stakeholders. 
Finally, the size of the Board was found to be significant for this proposition. 
Board size and its influence is another interesting theme in the corporate 
governance literature (Eisenberg et al., 1998, Goodstein et al., 1994, Provan, 
1980, Yermack, 1996) . Positive attitudes towards accountability 
"would reflect 
the need to ensure larger Boards are effective. Certainly, with Boards of trustees, 
some Board members can have long tenure amidst perceptions that they are 
merely representative, rather than instrumental in the organisation. Hence, they 
are proactive in ensuring that the Board is held accountable. Alternatively, 
negative perceptions of accountability in governance indicates that the larger 
Board is seen as inaccessible (the "managerial" view) or not dynamic (the 
"Board member" view). The former instance presents a scenario, where the 
Board have disconnected from 'running' the organisation and this task is left to 
managers, who have control over the Social Firm's operations. The latter 
indicates a Board in 'stagnation', perhaps where long-serving or 'unskilled' 
Board members need to be replaced or re-orientate their involvement with the 
organisation. For larger Boards, the emphasis on accountability is to prove that 
each Board member contributes to the process of adding-value in their role. If 
accountability is not a feature of governance, then clearly some remedial action 
needs to occur. However, a problem arises of how this can take place if (for a 
unitary Board structure) no other collective has the authority to remove one or 
more ineffective Board members. Such a situation would have a de-legitimising 
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effect until optimal arrangements can be determined that most appropriately suit 
the needs of primary beneficiaries. 
In the case of the smaller Board of directors, positive perceptions of 
accountability would fit with the notion of 'efficient' Boards being smaller. Of 
course, 'efficiency' refers to the expected improvement in the time it takes for 
decision-making or consultation with staff. This perception of smaller Boards is 
often described as important for growing social enterprises, or those social 
enterprises with more of a business-focus. Conversely, smaller Boards that are 
too business-focussed (i. e. away from key social objectives) could perceive 
accountability to stakeholders a less important feature of governance. In the case 
of the smaller Board, efficiency and effectiveness are only relevant for a Social 
Firm if these qualities enhance social benefit. Therefore, in a similar argument to 
the discussion on large Boards and accountability, it is crucial that the Board 
configuration suits the unique circumstances of the organisation. As the next 
section explains in more detail, it is incontrovertible that Boards should be 
accountable to stakeholders, as should all staff who contribute to achieving the 
social objectives. This confirms its centrality to good governance. Less clear 
however, are the mechanisms to ensure that under-performing Boards can be 
changed and the recruitment and training of new Board members is appropriate. 
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7.14 PROPOSITION 12: BOARDS SHOULD ENSURE THAT SOCIAL 
FIRMS ARE ACCOUNTABLE FOR COMPETITIVE PERFORMANCE. 
The previous section examined the implications of different perceptions towards 
accountability as a feature of good governance. The next stage of analysis 
considers perceptions of holding Boards accountable for competitive 
performance. A well established corpus of literature has examined the nature of 
performance accountability and the Board of directors in a range of contexts 
(notably: Daily and Dalton, 1993, Kaplan, 2001, Klein, 1998, Kosnik, 1987, 
Millstein and MacAvoy, 1998). The analysis presented here examines the nature 
of significant relationships between the Board and competitive (not social) 
performance in Social Firms. 
There should not be any scenario where Boards are not to be held accountable for 
any aspect of their performance. Yet again, the size of the Board has shown to be 
significant in this regard. The 'new' view of Social Firms (and small 
organisations generally) is that larger Boards are unwieldy and inefficient 
(Eisenberg et al., 1998, Yermack, 1996). Conditional acceptance of this premise 
implies that efforts should be made to ensure that larger Boards are accountable 
for the impact they have. The remit of monitoring would include the individual 
and collective influence upon performance, or through a skills audit. As we have 
seen, for Social Firms there are at least two bases upon which to measure 
performance: social and financial. Thus, the onus is on dedicating more resources 
to ensuring that larger Boards are accountable. If Board members can evidence 
that their skills and experience add-value to the organisation then their presence 
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is justified. Development of the systems that deliver sustainable competitive 
advantage, whether through social benefit or unique service delivery, remains the 
strategic task of the Board. Hence, if a larger Board is more effective in this 
regard, it makes sense that they should want to be held more accountable. This is 
because proving performance is a factor in enhancing legitimacy from key 
stakeholders. Contrariwise, if the larger Board is not accountable for competitive 
performance, then the logical step would be to identify how that Board adds- 
value to the Social Firm's operations. This could result in Board alterations or 
streamlining (either re-training existing, recruiting new, or removing ineffective 
Board members). 
Smaller Boards are often seen to be more efficient, focussed and better suited to 
managing and governing organisations (for example, Yermack, 1996). The 
contention that smaller Boards are more responsive and effective does need 
further exploration across sectors. This is particularly possible for 'smaller' (and 
non-corporate) organisations with a variety of competing claims on resources. 
Smaller Boards, with a concentrated base of power, may have less input from 
valuable sources at Board level, as is the possibility with larger Boards and 
hypothetically with Boards of trustees (Callen et al., 2003). Where greater 
political power is concentrated on the Board, potential problems of Board 
accountabilitY could arise. Once more, the possible solution here is to consider 
optimal Board configuration. However, the methods of achieving this are opep to 
conjecture. This position assumes very much, not just that the organisation will 
have the resources and networks available to it to support a re-configuration. 
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Proposing an ideal Board structure / size is difficult, and clearly, such an activity 
is only valuable if it reflects unique 'local' governance conditions and pressures. 
These would include the institutional influences that guide actors' decisions and 
behaviour, and the dynamic pressures from external bodies (such as funding 
bodies, local government and the wider community). Given the power that can be 
exerted by external groups such as funding bodies, it would be very difficult for 
Boards of any size to avoid being held accountable for any aspect of 
organisational performance. The difference in perception here could reflect a 
changing orientation at Board level (from large to small Boards, from social 
focus to keener business focus), and how this differs from normative 
expectations of Boards by non-Board members. 
The second significant finding linked to this Proposition pertains to the locus of 
decision-making authority in the Social Firm. Once more, we are asked to 
consider the relevance of the Board and its structure, and perceptions of its duty 
to be held accountable. There are a number of different groups or individuals 
with the ultimate sanction in the Social Firm, including the Board of trustees, the 
Board of directors (voluntary or salaried) or a nominated Chief Executive. The 
diversity between these categories indicates that 'local' governance structures 
emphasise different expectations on key governance groups. For example, the 
Board of trustees may displace the expectation of accountability for competitive 
performance to other groups, perhaps to a co-opted Board of directors. The 
trustees may have the ultimate decision-making authority, but it is recognised 
that they cannot be accountable for performance when they are not instrumental 
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in performance-related activities. The premise of this argument would give the 
Board of trustees more of a 'backseat' role in governance of the Social Firm. Of 
course, it also presupposes that there co-exists a Board of directors (or other 
executive group) upon which to confer accountability for competitive conduct. 
This study has shown that the majority of Social Firms in the sample have a 
Board of trustees with the ultimate sanction, and is expected to become involved 
in the running of the organisation. There are minority Social Firms that have 
Boards of directors or Chief Executives with nominated discretion over key 
decisions. Such scenarios resemble more conventional (for-profit) governance 
structures, and could signify the expected (isomorphic) development of Social 
Firm Boards exhibiting business-like characteristics. In which case, 
accountability for competitive performance is imperative and the role of a Board 
of trustees would be to ensure that this is enacted. 
Similarly, to the analysis above (7.13), it is difficult to surmise that there is any 
situation where complete accountability is not expected. Thus, whatever the 
governance arrangements within the Social Firm (Board size, locus of decision- 
making authority), there are systems in place to ensure that key individuals and 
groups can be held accountable. It is somewhat disconcerting to note that the 
majority of Social Firms in the sample do not conduct a social audit (however, 
that is defined or comprised). Without such explicit systems of monitoring and 
assessment, a discontinuity in the legitimacy of governance arrangements 
emerges. This poses implications for Board structures and oversight that are 
required to ensure accountability. At the same time, governance must facilitate 
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increased efficiency and performance improvement. These implications are 
discussed further below (7.27). 
7.15 PROPOSITION 13: BOARDS SHOULD ENSURE SOCIAL FIRMS 
ARE COMPETITIVE IN THEIR CHOSEN MARKETS. 
Staying with the theme of Social Firms as 'competitive' enterprises, this next 
proposition refers to an expectation that Boards are responsible for ensuring their 
organisations are competitive, In the study, two clear differences were 
highlighted: Board members of respondents and the size of the Board. 
The difference in perception between Board and non-Board members is 
becoming a central feature of the thesis. It is common for such differences 
between these groups, and the mechanisms ensuring the interests are aligned are 
the focus of more than one corporate governance theory. Initial analysis of this 
outcome should be divided into two conceptions of the Social Firm: as 
traditionally defined (i. e. primacy towards a social orientation), or as expected to 
evolve (i. e. becoming more business orientated as the external environment 
requires of it). In the case of the former, this outcome would indicate that non- 
Board members remain rooted into the traditional ethos of the Social Firm and 
believe that Board's central focus is ensuring the delivery of social benefit ahead 
of other, secondary concerns. This would portray the Board as keen to define the 
Social Firm by its ability to compete and not singly by the fundamental social- 
benefit requirement. The latter conception positions the non-Board group as 
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more aware of the needs of the Social Firm (their instrumental involvement in 
delivering the needs of their customers I stakeholders being very influential in 
this regard). Thus, the Board (whether trustees or directors) are less instrumental 
and adopt the traditional responsibilities associated with their role, namely 
providing representation and oversight. This analysis usefully delineates between 
two opposing portrayals of the manager / Board dichotomy, yet it avoids the 
subtleties of governance reality. Both Board and non-Board members face a 
difficult task in reconciling the need to maximise social benefit whilst building a 
viable business. Without the 'business' element, the organisation would cease to 
be a valid Social Firm and consequently legitimacy withdrawn. 
The size of the Board is a second, recurring item of significance throughout this 
analysis. As already noted, there is a large / small Board distinction in analysis of 
this variable, and the general permutations of Board size have already been 
discussed. However, it is worthwhile reconfirming that competitive performance 
is the responsibility of the Board, in whichever configuration it exists. Also, the 
main issue with larger Boards is not that they are large per se, more that how 
they are composed is absolutely crucial to their effectiveness (Baysinger and 
Butler, 1985, Beasley, 1996, Forbes and Milliken, 1999, Goodstein et al., 1994). 
Hence, the drive for a more competitive culture amongst social enterprise 
generally should encourage pressure on Boards to develop a collective skills set 
to enhance their accountability in this regard. The perceived inability to deliver 
an effective business model would reflect poorly on the Board, whose 
responsibility it is to oversee this element of the Social Firm's operations. In a 
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scenario where this cannot be achieved, there are alternative Board 
configurations available to Social Firms that must determine Board members 
skills and effectiveness. 
Smaller Boards may be better placed to deliver a competitive advantage for their 
organisation, if smaller size is also a reflection their instrumental business / 
management skills and overall effectiveness. This factor may be advantageous as 
a legitimating function of the Social Firm. A Board that is better equipped to 
deliver benefit and perhaps more flexible to real-time demands on decision- 
making is likely to enhance its legitimacy to the organisation. Of course, the 
supposition is that smaller Boards are capable of managing a complex 
organisation with conflicting institutional pressures to deliver social benefit 
whilst building an efficient and competitive enterprise. Hence, it is unwise to 
consign a non-specialist Board of trustees to the past in place of the predicted 
business-like Board. The Board of trustees, although probably larger in 
constitution and less business-capable, will offer a much deeper knowledge of 
the Social Firm's traditional values. For organisations such as Social Firms, 
embedding and maintaining these values is vital to the legitimacy of the 
organisation. Therefore, any solution to the large / small Board dualism is to 
ensure that focus of governance in a Social Firm can ensure maintenance of 
institutional values, whilst enabling instrumental staff to run the organisation 
properly. 
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7.16 PROPOSITION 14: BOARDS SHOULD PROVIDE STRATEGIC 
DIRECTION TO ENABLE BUSINESS SUSTAINABILITY. 
This section scrutinises the role of the Board as a strategic group, and any key 
differences of perception amongst the sample. Strategy development and control 
is a recognised facet of the Board in different organisations, and social 
enterprises are not excluded from this (Hoskisson, Johnson and Moesel, 1994, 
Judge and Zeithaml, 1992, Sanders and Carpenter, 1998, Westphal and 
Fredrickson, 2001). A common aim for all organisations is sustainability, 
including one or all aspects of a triple-bottom line approach. The Board is 
integral to providing the organisation with the strategic impetus for achieving 
long-term (sustainable) corporate and non-corporate aims and objectives. 
Firstly, perceptions of a Board's effectiveness were a significant outcome for this 
proposition. Findings that a Board is deemed effective if it facilitates strategic . 
direction provides a logical explanation between differences, following the 
accepted course of the relevant corporate governance literature. If a Board meets 
this requirement, then clearly it is focussed on the normative expectations of its 
role. This is important, since the organisation's success and failure is largely 
contingent upon the Board's ability to provide strategic support for the Social 
Firm's many activities. The result is enhanced legitimacy for the Board and the 
Social Firm. The opposing view, the Board being ineffective, would de- 
legitimise the Board and its members, further highlighting the importance of the 
Board's strategic input and role. 
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Other findings in this study focus on the effectiveness of the Board of trustees. 
This prompts further discussion of how well equipped these types of Boards are 
to fulfil this element of their role. Given that perceptions of Board effectiveness 
are influenced by the Board's strategic input, a concern arises over whether the 
majority of controlling Boards of trustees have the required skills (as a 
collective) to deliver on these grounds. In a scenario where a Social Firm lacks 
suitable strategic guidance at Board level, the organisation is at risk of failing to 
meet intended aims. Thus, the legitimacy of the Social Firm is jeopardised. It is 
possible that in such situations, contingency arrangements may arise or already 
exist, i. e. managers are accustomed to performing some of the strategic functions 
normally associated with the Board. Therefore, the internal conditions allow a 
shift of power and control to managers from the Board to allow effective 
management of the organisation. Clearly, this is not ideal because the Board 
needs to be integral to how the organisation is run and how it will continue to 
operate in the future. Boards need to (re)focus on how they can deliver a strategic 
plan to drive the Social Firm towards sustainability. The starting point for this 
includes a Board skills audit and collaboration with key internal (for example, 
managers, staff and primary beneficiaries) and external actors (including funding 
bodies, trade organisations, local government). This would at least enable an 
ineffective Board to recognise its strengths and weaknesses, and employ a 
representative approach to changing that status. 
Secondly, the study found that Board membership is significant to perceptions of 
the Board's strategic role. This difference in views between those serving on the 
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Board and non-Board members highlights further the disparity between these two 
groups. This is problematical because Board and non-Board members alike 
should share an understanding of the expected role of the Board and its activities. 
Understandably, Boards and non-Board members must align their expectations of 
each other, to ensure that both groups can be held accountable by the other. It is 
also important to prove that internal actors are fully cognisant of the roles that 
other groups play in delivering on stated objectives. Board members must show 
how they add-value, in a way that confirms the expected standards of 
stakeholders. Likewise, non-Board members must perform to similar standards, 
and the Board should be interested in monitoring how well they reach these 
standards. This shared understanding of roles should represent an expected 
feature of the institutional environment. The fact that it appears not to in this 
study would infer a legitimacy problem for the Board, not least, because non- 
Board members are dissatisfied that, they (the Board) are fulfilling expected 
aspects of their brief. 
Thirdly, the number of Board members provides a further significant course of 
analysis for this proposition. Therefore, a further difference in orientation 
appears according to how large or small the Board in a Social Firm is. Once 
more, this facilitates conjecture that smaller Boards may be somehow more 
attuned to their strategic role, perhaps because of an embedded entrepreneurial 
orientation. This is difficult to support, however, since a larger (less 
entrepreneurial) Board may be quite aware of its strategic responsibility. Yet, it 
could be fairly argued that its focus is a social, rather than business one. As such, 
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we must again seek subtle reasons for the difference found. One such subtlety 
would be to reiterate that there is an accepted division between certain Boards 
that accept or eschew strategic support, relying on instrumental actors 
(managers) to provide this function. Therefore, Boards are not expected to be 
6strategic', and this has been brought about gradually. This line does not assume 
that certain Board sizes are more or less business / socially focussed, instead that 
an ethos of pragmatism dominates the allocation of certain governance tasks. In 
small organisations, it is arguable that it is better for Boards to be encouraged to 
forge closer relationships with staff and involve them in the day-to-day running 
of the business. These Boards, with a better understanding of operations, are 
likely to be better placed to direct and govern strategically. This is achieved by 
utilising information and cooperation from staff. 
Finally, the assignation of decision-making authority is relevant to discussion on 
the strategic input from Social Firm Boards. Unlike any other of the highlighted 
differences found in this study, this category was found to be significant on two 
counts. We can infer from this that decision-making and strategic responsibility 
should not always belong to the same group. Differences clearly exist between 
Boards with this authority and individuals, such as the Chief Executives. There 
are a number of permutations arising from this difference, in particular that a 
division of power is either beneficial or detrimental to the Social Firm. 
Centralising strategic planning with decision-making authority through an 
individual could benefit the organisation by facilitating strategic coherence and 
speed of decision-making. The latter should make the organisation better at 
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responding to dynamic internal / external market conditions. Yet, it would also 
encourage a concentration of control over political power, and possibly even 
preclude participation in the strategic development process. A recurrent theme 
throughout this Chapter has been the ideal of participation and shared 
responsibility in Social Firm governance. The Social Firm is defined by its 
ability to combine traditional values and methods with 'modern' perspectives on 
organisational progress. Therefore, the Board must remain to play a key role in 
ensuring traditional values are upheld (since they form constitutive rules), whilst 
managing the organisation in dynamic internal / external conditions. 
7.17 PROPOSITION 15: BOARDS SHOULD SUPPORT MANAGERS TO 
DELIVER ON SOCIAL OBJECTIVES. 
Conjointly with providing strategic direction, the Board also plays a role in 
supporting the work that managers and staff do for the Social Firm. The Board is 
seen in many organisations as facilitating the development of optimal internal 
conditions within which staff can perform effectively. 
This study has established that Board can be deemed ineffective if they do not 
provide the necessary support to managers (or non-Board staff). This confirms 
both that Boards should provide such support, and that without it the Social Firm 
cannot deliver on social objectives. A supportive Board would add-value by 
ensuring better links between themselves and the needs of staff to achieve 
overarching aims and objectives. By partaking in instrumental activities, the 
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Board plays a key role in realising greater social benefit. This gives them control 
and influence over work that affects the balance between business and social 
benefit. This type of support role is an expected feature of Social Firm 
governance, and is undoubtedly a positive step in ensuring growth and successful 
delivery of social benefit. Without this, the link is absent between the Board and 
management, making it illegitimate. Therefore, we can propose that in order to 
support staff, Boards must be well 'placed' and equipped to provide it. Thus, it is 
integral that Boards are aware of how they must support staff, or what staff 
require from them, in order to be effective. The indications from this study and 
the social enterprise literature are that these needs are both strategic and 
functional. The former addresses concerns that there must be a coherent, relevant 
set of objectives in place, which are developed with key stakeholders and 
communicated to all stakeholders. The latter pertains to the requirement for 
better functional skills (and skills development) in certain areas of operation, for 
example marketing or operations management. It is crucial, therefore, that 
Boards recognise their skills / experience value and determine how they could be 
used optimally to support managers. In the absence of appropriate strategic and 
functional capability at Board level, alternative options include recruiting new 
Board members with such abilities, or "up-skilling" non-Board staff members. 
Budget responsibility was also found to be significant here, which suggests that 
the Board provides different levels of support to budget holders and non-budget 
holding staff. The ramifications of this different orientation are that the 
individuals in the former category possibly focus more on the financial bottom 
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line in their capacity as budget holders. There is a pressure on these positions to 
be held accountable, suggesting that the support they require is less to achieve 
social objectives, more pressingly to satisfy financial efficacy. This differentiates 
from those without that responsibility, whose day-to-day concerns are 
operational and to the end of achieving a positive social outcome. Yet, for budget 
holders, the 'bigger picture' is financial probity to protect the greater interests of 
their primary beneficiaries. Therefore, it is interesting to note that key actors 
within the Social Firm are required to focus their attentions on non-social 
objectives to ensure that the Social Firm is run transparently. 
7.18 PROPOSITION 16: BOARDS SHOULD COMMUNICATE THE 
ETHICALITY AS A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
This proposition attempted to discern how relevant 'ethicality' is to the Social 
Firm, and particularly whether the Board communicates this as a particular 
feature of their strategy. There are some interesting examples of social 
enterprises that do so, including the Day Chocolate Company (DCC): a 
successful farmer-owned cooperative that has a secure, niche position in the UK 
confectionery market. Their unique selling proposition has at its core the fact that 
the cocoa used in the manufacture of their chocolate confectionery is fair trade 
(Doherty and Tranchell, 2005, Tiffen, 2002). Therefore, the Board embeds this 
ethical component (which is also their raison detre) as part of the business 
strategy for the social enterprise. In this study, this 'ethical' factor was not seen 
as significant for any of the sample, or aligned with any of the nominal 
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categories. Certainly, this indicates that it is not a relevant consideration for 
Social Firm Boards. Yet, it also infers that Social Firm Boards are expected to 
build a strategy around other (non-ethical) bases of competitive advantage. Given 
the success of organisations such as DCC, it is surprising that this option is not 
an expected consideration of strategy in Social Firms. This approach is not 
imperative for social enterprises, just that it provides possible strategic advantage 
for these organisations, in the markets they serve. 
7.19 PROPOSITION 17: SHORT TENURE IMPROVES DIRECTOR 
EFFECTI_ENESS 
The duration of director tenure is an interesting sub-theme of the governance 
literature. There is a variety of views on the impact of director tenure on overall 
organisation performance, and this applies across sectors and organisation types 
(Daily and Dalton, 1993, Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988, Kesner et al., 1986, 
Salancik and Pfeffer, 1980). It is common for Board members, particularly 
trustees, to serve for longer tenure in non-profit organisations than directors in 
corporations are (Brown, 2005, O'Regan and Oster, 2005). There are advantages 
and disadvantages associated with the length of tenure, and these are explored 
further for the significant categories, below. 
The study indicates that the size of the Board is relevant to perceptions of shorter 
tenure upon Board member effectiveness. In the sample used in the study, larger 
Boards of trustees are more common than smaller Boards. This is typical of 
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social enterprises and non-profits generally, that have a Board of trustees with 
the primary executive function and / or with an oversight role. A potential benefit 
of larger Boards with longer tenure is the sense of stability that long-serving 
Board members provide. It is very important that Board members have a deep 
understanding of the traditions of organisations, and this is certainly true of 
Social Firms. Ideally, Board members can offer guidance and input that reflects a 
shared understanding of meaning about the Social Firm. Therefore, they assist 
effective governance through decision-making that aligns with institutional 
norms (in particular regulative and constitutive rules). Therefore, in order to 
maintain the status quo, longer tenure offers stability through long-standing 
processes of governance that all institutional actors understand and accept. These 
$processes' also serve to legitimise the role of the Board, provided that they 
continue to prove effective in aiding the production of social benefit and 
delivering on strategic objectives. Yet, as intimated in Stage I of the research, 
problems with longer tenure arise when non-Board members (internal or 
externally of the Social Firm), perceive these long-serving Board members as 
obstacles to progress where they add little value to the organisation's activities. 
With little enthusiasm for the recruitment of new Board members internally and / 
or the availability of voluntary Board members who can add-value, the 
organisation suffers inertia and fails to respond to changing external conditions. 
A division can be drawn here between the two perspectives of Social Firms: 
static vs. growth orientated. Those with longer-tenured Board members tend to 
be associated with 'static' Social Firms, those that are content to remain and 
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continue providing a socially orientated approach to market. In contrast, the 
growth orientated Social Firms are associated with more 'progressive' 
approaches to Boards and governance, adopting characteristics of organisations 
within and without the social enterprise sector (indicating isomorphism). 
Typically, these adoptive activities promote smaller Boards focussed on skills 
and development rather than trustees and stability. Hence, shorter tenure may be 
a more salient feature, rather than traditional Social Firm Boards. The shorter the 
length of tenure, the more performance driven are Board members. If the social 
auditing process can confirm their effectiveness in governing the Social Firm, 
they have a mandate to continue in their role for a longer period. This portrays 
the smaller Board as more likely to exhibit shorter tenure as a mechanism for 
providing better Board performance. 
The above discussion is constrained, of course, by the set of performance 
measures by which directors are deemed effective (or not). If Boards, of any size, 
promote longer tenure to maximise social benefit, then this would indicate Board 
effectiveness. Contrariwise, if the pressure of shorter tenure encourages a 
sharper, business-orientated vision for the Board to enhance social benefit, then 
the main objective is realised. The problem arises when tenure becomes a 
difficulty or issue for governance and guidance of the Social Firm. In which case, 
there must be mechanisms founded in the constitution of the Social Firm to 
resolve any such problem. What is not clear, and requires further investigation, is 
what these mechanisms are. In addition, how they can be enacted to ensure that 
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tenure that affects 'stagnation' or the wrong type of focus (i. e. too short term or 
business orientated) does not become a long-term issue for the organisation. 
The impact of tenure upon those individuals with budget responsibility was 
relevant here also. The requirement for financial transparency and accountability 
is a driver of shorter director tenure across sectors. Those with budget 
responsibility may foresee the value in restraining Board members by shorter 
tenure. The responsibility for ensuring the financial accountability of the social 
Firm will be held by key directors, and cumulatively by the Board. Shorter tenure 
(i. e. the threat of not being able to continue in their assigned capacity) is used as 
an incentive to promote greater scrutiny within the organisation, to enhance the 
scrutiny of auditors. Conversely, non-budget holders may view shorter ensures 
an inimical to the development of long-term relationships with staff and external 
parties. This is important in pursuing a sustainable strategy based on trust 
throughout the organisation. There is clearly a balance of pressures on either side 
of this discussion; this highlights both the dilemma facing Social Firms and 
social enterprises in general, and the nature of discourse throughout this Chapter. 
7.20 PROPOSITION 18: DIRECTOR REMUNERATION IS NOT 
LINKED TO THEIR PERFORMANCE 
The logic of this proposition was that in other (for example, corporate) sectors, 
remuneration is used to incentivise director performance. This issue attracts 
much media attention for the size of financial and non-financial incentives 
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offered to successful (or otherwise) directors, Chief Executives and Chairmen. In 
nonprofits and social enterprises, the issue of director (or Board member) 
remuneration is controversial and problematic for subtly different reasons 
(Frurnkin and Keating, 2004). Firstly, this is because these individuals are often 
expected to serve voluntarily (excluding Chief Executives), since the orientation 
of these organisations is opposite to that of corporations (i. e. non-financial 
objectives). The achievement of these non-financial objectives should serve, as 
requisite 'incentive' to improve performance, since 'doing good' is the primary 
aim of the organisation rather than accruing profit. Much of the literature devoted 
this area of nonprofit governance provides a variety of findings related to 
remuneration and any link to director effectiveness (Hallock, 2000, Wise, 2001). 
Therefore, this part of the investigation focussed on understanding whether this 
issue proved any relevance to particular Board characteristics. 
The major finding was that the size of the Board in Social Firms is relevant to the 
identified proposition. This confirms that we cannot expect all Boards in Social 
Firms to perceive remuneration as an unimportant influence upon their 
performance. Clearly, there are some Social Firm Boards that perceive the level 
of remuneration as an incentive for their current and future performance. 
However, analysis depends on what constitutes large or small Boards. Firstly, 
consideration should be given to the mix of salaried and volunteer Board 
members in Social Firms. Depending on the number of Board members 
permitted in total, the proportion of those that serve will be paid or receive 
incentives for their work. Clearly, this is appropriate where the Board member 
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can demonstrate evidence for the value of their inputs to the organisation. For 
example, if a full-time director is remunerated for providing marketing support to 
the Social Firm, enabling them to launch a new product, then it is reasonable to 
conclude that they could be paid for this service. In contrast, if the Board 
member serves as a trustee and offers little demonstrable, instrumental value to 
the organisation, then it is equally valid to conclude that remuneration would not 
be appropriate. Typically, such decisions are verified by a remuneration 
committee, a function that is served by the Board of trustees (or part thereof). 
Yet, it is possible that those Social Firms with a higher proportion of voluntary 
Board members, i. e. a stronger attachment to a traditional nonprofit / voluntary 
ethos, find remuneration as an incentive for performance as inappropriate. This 
reintroduces the notion that more market-focussed methods of improving 
individual performance is contrary to long established institutional norms that 
form internal expectations and activities. If smaller Boards have more salaried 
directors, each of which offers evidenced instrumental value to the organisation's 
activities, it is difficult to argue that it is inappropriate so long as it maximises 
social benefit. Therefore, if larger Board have a higher proportion of volunteers, 
but cannot evidence or provide skills that enhance performance, then the former 
(smaller) Board has enhanced legitimacy compared with the latter. Of course, 
this is contingent upon the boundaries of acceptable practise within the 
institutional environment. To conclude, if Social Firms develoP along similar 
predicted lines to that of social enterprise generally, then it is foreseeable that 
they will tend to adopt market-focussed mechanisms for improving performance. 
it is arguable that the institutional environment will accept this change, albeit 
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cautiously and over time, if it supports the overall goal of realising long-term 
objectives, enhancing the welfare of defined groups. Upon which, governance 
arrangements will need to adapt to ensure that full accountability can be assured 
where directors are remunerated. This study indicates that very few Social Firms 
make use of a regular social audit, which could pose a problem if full 
accountability is the aim of the Board. 
7.21 PROPOSITION 19: SUSTAINABILITY SHOULD BE, A KEY LONG- 
TERM OBJECTIVE OF A SOCIAL FIRM 
This Chapter has explored the perceived credibility of relationships between 
transparency, accountability and sustainability in the governance of Social Firms. 
As the stepwise regression showed, there is no overt, significant link between 
each of these variables. The study has also found that sustainability is not a long- 
term objective of Social Firms. Though this supports the previous outcome, it is 
surprising that sustainability should not be a central goal for a social enterprise. 
The notion of sustainability is relevant across sectors, for example in 
corporations emphasis has shifted to sustainable shareholder dividend and 
sustainable competitive advantage. There are notable examples of successful 
social enterprises that have built their success around the notion of sustainability. 
These include the Furniture Resource Centre (FRC) and the Day Chocolate 
Company (DCC). However, the lack of particular significant outcomes in this 
study does not infer that sustainability should not be the focus of further 
investigation. Rather, this could be explained by sustainability being a taken-for- 
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granted aspect of the cultural-cognitive institutional environment, so is an 
assumed rather than formulated and stated objective. Therefore, sustainability 
can be an assumed part of long-term strategy, rather than the primary strategic 
aim of organisational activity. 
Of course, there is a less optimistic view: that Social Firms are increasingly 
focussed on short-term performance (or survival) to be concerned about 
grandiose plans for future success and sustainability. This would signify more 
pressing concerns for Social Firms and their support networks. A possible 
response would be to enable start-up / small Social Firms in facilitating the 
internal conditions to promote a longer-term strategic view. It is here that 
governance constitution and systems come to the fore, and the latter section of 
this Chapter deals with how these internal conditions might be designed to favour 
such a reorientation (7.27). 
7.22 PROPOSITION 20: ACCOUNTABILITY ENHANCES 
LEGITIMACY 
Accountability, as a key aspect of the governance of organisations, has been 
linked to governance legitimacy in prior studies (Aguilera, 2005, Charkham, 
1995, 'Judge and Zeithaml, 1992, Mulgan, 2000, Owen et al., 2000). This 
proposition sought to establish the grounds upon which accountability and 
legitimacy were linked for Social Firms, to explore further the relations between 
the two variables. 
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Firstly, the presence (or otherwise) of a social audit was found to be significant 
for Social Firms in the sample. The purpose of the social audit is to prove and 
enhance levels (and perceptions) of accountability in any given organisation. As 
we have seen from earlier analysis in this Chapter (7.2), there is a significant 
association between accountability and legitimacy. Therefore, it is credible to 
claim that those Social Firms practising a social audit enhance their legitimacy as 
a direct result of enhancing their accountability. We can assert therefore that it is 
imperative that Social Firm Boards introduce social auditing to examine and 
legitimise their activities to primary stakeholders. Though it is not the lone 
influence uPon legitimacy, it is evident that accountability must be the focus of 
governance in Social Firms. This has clear benefits in demonstrating how the 
Board operates and manages the organisation in a way that matches the goals and 
needs of defined stakeholder groups. Without legitimacy, a Board relinquishes its 
mandate as responsible stewards of the organisation. Therefore, this study has 
shown that Social Firm governance is the fulcrum for achieving accountability, 
which itself plays a part in achieving legitimacy. 
Perceptions that accountability enhances legitimacy also vary according to the 
number of Board members serving in a Social Firm. Once more, this emphasises 
the difference in perspective according to either small or large Boards. One view 
is that larger Boards have a sizeable non-executive component have a more 
enhanced oversight role. As such, these Boards have an independence from the 
operations of the organisation. It is likely, then, that they will more readily link 
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accountability (the key element of their activities) with legitimacy of the Social 
Firm. Alternatively, smaller Social Firm Boards with a significant functional 
aspect to members' involvement may dispose them to be cognisant of the 
accountability-legitimacy link. Through regular contact and engagement with 
staff and stakeholders, smaller Boards and members are more 'visible', hence 
those groups to which Boards are accountable to have a much better 
understanding of where responsibilities for performance reside. 
7.23 PROPOSITION 21: LEGITIMATE GOVERNANCE WILL BE 
LINKED TO THE PRESENCE OF SHARED VALUES 
A, prime aspect of the cultural-cognitive 'pillar' of the institutional theory of 
organisations is the presence of shared values and meanings (Scott, 2001). If we 
conceptualise the organisation as a social entity, subsequent analysis of it, its 
constituents and actors account for formal and informal rules that bind all 
variables together. The processes that occur within the Organisation are viewed as 
a direct cause of conforming with shared meanings about institutional norms. 
Thus, governance processes can be discussed in terms of how they promote 
conformity with these norms, achieving legitimacy. This proposition sought to 
ascertain the appropriateness of this link: shared meanings are indeed linked with 
legitimate govemance. 
Board size has been shown to be significant for perceptions of governance 
legitimacy and the role of shared meanings and values. There are two general 
, it 01 
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interpretations of this outcome: that shared values are important in governance, 
and / or that the strength of the values does not permeate the governance process 
for extraneous reasons. The former argument fits with the accepted view of 
regulative and constitutive rules in the institutional environment. Shared 
understanding of the meanings of these rules directs internal actors in how to 
perform their roles and the expected outcomes from them. Therefore, the impact 
of this informal regulation of behaviour minimises the need for direct 
intervention through governance (since actors should and do conform to expected 
standards of behaviour). The core of these shared values is manifested in the 
achievement in a common goal, namely maximising social benefit to a defined 
group. The importance of this goal to all internal actors is sufficient to constrain 
the degree to which they will take risks to jeopardise outcomes. The latter view 
counterpoises the former by assuming that there is an overt cause for shared 
values to not control managerial activity and influence governance. Though this 
tovert cause' remains precluded from analysis in this study, we can assert that 
this cause is itself influence by the size of the Board. Therefore, the major point 
of interest here is whether large or small Boards manifest shared values in their 
decisions and methods of governing the Social Firm. 
If governance pursues the values and interests of key stakeholders, legitimacy 
results. The type of Board with greater stakeholder participation (most likely a 
larger Board) will manifest such a quality. Alternatively, where shared values are 
not important to legitimate governance, we can expect that governance 
legitimacy be judged by other means, namely auditing and performance towards 
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set objectives. These outcomes may not reflect shared values when they relate to 
level of surplus realised, organisation growth, and so on. These outcomes are not 
in synchronisation with the shared values of key stakeholders. However, they do 
legitimise governance because they explain how the Board has performed 
successfully over a given period. 
7.24 PROPOSITION 22: LEGITIMACY IS ACQUIRED BY 
MAXIMISING SOCIAL BENEFIT 
A central theme of this thesis has been to determine the best way for a Social 
Firm to maximise social benefit. So integral is this goal to social enterprises in 
general, it was asserted that legitimacy for the existence of a social enterprise 
depends on its success in delivering social benefit. An emergent issue that 
complicates the pursuit of social benefit is the prediction that managers and 
directors are shifting away from a social benefit focus towards managing the 
business enterprise itself (Dart, 2004, Mason et al., 2007, Young, 2002). The 
study investigated this further, and found key differences according to the type 
and number of staff employed at Social Firms in the sample. 
Firstly, consideration is given to the nature of employment of staff in Social 
Firms. The mix of staff employed in Social Firms is divided between either 
salaried staff or a mix of salaried and volunteers. A possible cause of the 
difference between the groups could be the presence (or absence) of a 
volunteerism 'ethos' amongst the staff. Where volunteers constitute a proportion 
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of the workforce, we can assert that these groups are more likely to be committed 
to the Social Firm due to sharing core values. Hence, these organisations will be 
driven to legitimise their activities by acquiring social benefit. Alternatively, 
those Social Firms that employ salaried staff alone may lack this commitment to 
the organisation's social mission. Rather than giving their time and effort for the 
'greater good', staff are motivated by paid employment and financial rewarded 
for better performance. Therefore, legitimacy is not acquired by achieving social 
benerit, it is realised through better business performance. This outcome 
elucidates a division between Social Firms that focus on social benefit and 
stability, against entrepreneurship and growth. 
Secondly, organisation size, as determined by the number of staff employed, has 
also been found to be significant for this proposition. Social Firms that have been 
more successful and have achieved growth are more likely to require increased 
human resources to manage that growth. Therefore, with a much keener focus on 
non-social performance, these organisations are less likely to feel constrained by 
the need to justify all activities on the grounds of also providing social benefit. 
This provides a problem for the Board in communicating and diffusing the social 
values to a sprawling network of staff, who may be motivated by concerns other 
than maximising social benefit. This is perhaps why social enterprises such as 
DCC have proven so successful, not least because the Board is heavily 
represented (in executive positions) by key stakeholders. Therefore, one possible 
avenue of redress for these scenarios is to identify how key stakeholders can 
(visibly) influence the diffusion and maintenance of social values throughout the 
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organisation. It is important that the Social Firm remains a valid enterprise as 
well as a thriving social organisation. 
Social Firms with fewer staff employed may have closer ties with traditional 
social values, and value social benefit as the main achievement that can attain 
legitimacy. Maintaining this as a key determinant of legitimacy might be easier 
to manage in smaller organisations. Yet these Social Firms run the risk of over- 
compensating towards social benefit, without demanding better non-social 
performance. Without this latter requirement, many social enterprises fail to 
make the transition from grant funding to self-sufficiency. Therefore, it is 
important for Boards in these organisations to have a balance of skills and 
representation to re-focus the strategy on sustainability. 
7.25 PROPOSITION 23: TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
EQUATE TO SUSTAINABILITY 
This proposition extends a supposed syllogistic relationship between 
transparency and accountability, leading to a sustainable outcome from Social 
Firm governance. This outcome is instructive as it confirms the findings from the 
regression model, above (7.2). The stepwise regression model showed that there 
was no causal association between transparency, accountability and 
sustainability. This outcome usefully confirms the absence of an association 
between these variables. 
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7.26 PROPOSITION 24: BOARD PROCESSES AND DECISIONS ARE 
BASED ON INSTITUTIONAL NORMS 
The final proposition that was tested in the study related to the influence of 
institutional norms on Board decisions. The influence of the institutional 
environment on organisations has been reiterated throughout this thesis. Many 
previous studies have focussed on its influence upon corporate governance 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999, Judge and Zeithaml, 1992, Ocasio, 1999, Oliver, 
1991, Oliver, 1997). This study found that the budget responsibility of 
respondents was significant for further analysis. This could indicate that those 
individuals acquainted with a rigorous examination of their financial decisions 
perceive the Board as driven by formal, rather than informal systems of 
accountability. In turn, this shows that non-budget holders perceive Board 
activities as firmly rooted in the shared understanding of the Social Firm's 
institutional environment. If Board performance is improved by establishing 
formal procedures of accountability, then the benefits are clear. This would fit 
with an institutional environment that aims to promote ethical behaviour by its 
members. 
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7.27 A CONCEPTUAL'MODEVOF SOCIAL FIRM GOVERNANCE 
The final stage of analysis considers the broader implications of the study. In 
particular, this includes conceptualising the governance structure / arrangements 
of the Social Firm. Because of the analysis provided in the Chapter, several 
considerations influence the design of governance arrangements for a Social 
Firm. The diagram of the model is shown below. It should be noted that the 
concentric circle lines are not intended to represent actual boundaries, just 
notional divisions of responsibility. It is important that all members understand 
the value of these systems, particularly to understand how it represents 
legitimacy-seeking activity. Implicitly these systems symbolise that the Board 
needs them to account for all decisions and activities made by key individuals in 
the organisation. 
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Figure 7.1 A Conceptual Model of Social Firm Governance 
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7.27.1 INTERNAL ORGANISATION 
There are three main groups identified in the model that reside 'internally' to the 
organisation: managers, Board of directors and a stakeholder committee 
(presently this is represented by a Board of trustees). The co-existence of Boards 
of directors and trustees is not common in Social Firms used in the study: usually 
the latter is commonplace. Using the existing literature and surveying the 
findings from this investigation, the presence of a Board of directors is 
instrumental to resolving some of the issues uncovered herein. 
7.27.2 MANAGERS / PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES 
Managers (or key staff) form a central part of the Social Firm governance model. 
They are positioned at its core because they commonly represent the primary 
beneficiaries of the Social Firm's operation. This group is also instrumental in 
achieving the business goals of the Social Firm. Therefore, they are at the core of 
the model because of their instrumentality and the power they hold over 
providing legitimacy to the Board and the organisation. It is logical that 
governance of the organisation must be in the interests of this group. All the 
actions taken by the Board should positively affect this group at the centre of the 
model. Furthermore, this group should also be involved in governing the 
organisation. This would involve nominating a member (or members) of the staff 
to serve on the Board, preferably two: one from the primary stakeholder group 
and one not. This 'opens up' the Board to participation by non-Board staff, 
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allowing them to contribute to the strategic direction of the organisation. This 
inclusion would also enhance transparency and accountability, though ensuring 
this is within the remit of the stakeholder committee. This group must be 
involved and aware of the activities of the Board of directors and stakeholder 
committee, to be able to legitimise them and the organisation. 
This group provides inputs in terms of human resources, skills and aptitude in 
operational terms. They also provide useful information to members of both the 
Board of directors and stakeholder committee to assist their decision-making 
process. The outputs produced could include better product / service delivery, 
skills development and value production. The more successful this group is at 
achieving this legitimacy acquisition can become self-perpetuating. This is 
because the primary beneficiaries receive social benefit as a result of better 
performance. The Board of directors and stakeholder committee shape the 
internal conditions that determine how well they can perform. Their rationale, 
inputs and outputs are discussed below. 
7.27.3 BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
The conception of the Board of directors in this study is as an instrumental, 
functional group of business experts. This differentiates from the role of a Board 
of trustees, a body that is expected to fulfil two roles: oversight and strategic 
impetus. This is ineffective because there is no separation of powers. In this 
model, the Board of directors, serving the key stakeholders, are unburdened from 
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the task of holding themselves and the entire organisation accountable. This role 
is taken partly by the next group in the model (below). Rather, they can utilise 
their time and expertise in driving the Social Firm forward and delivering on 
multiple performance goals. This is very important, because it enables the Board 
to improve their performance and enhance its ability to promote legitimacy- 
seeking activity. The Board is also smaller in number, avoiding the problem of 
larger Board size indicated in this study and in the prevailing literature 
(Eisenberg et al., 1998, Yermack, 1996). 
directors with the requisite skills and experience are clearly essential here: 
though ideally directors would be individuals with a clear understanding of, and 
empathy for the organisation (shared meanings). This opens up opportunities for 
current managers and other staff with experience of the organisation, who may 
require some training to fulfil the role of functional director. However, it is more 
important that directors havd the skills to be able to contribute, rather than simply 
being drawn from the pool of primary stakeholders. The Board of directors 
would accommodate a Chief Executive, who may also be drawn from outside the 
organisation. The Chairman (if required) would serve on the stakeholder 
committee, to augment the power base between the two, co-existing Boards. 
The Board of directors provide inputs to the organisation through their expertise, 
and ability to improve the business performance of the Social Firm. Through this, 
they enable greater social benefit. This is achieved via improving access to 
employment for their primary stakeholders. In return, they may receive some 
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remunerative benefit, as appears possible from this study (7.20). Of course, this 
depends on the acceptability of this to the Social Firm: it cannot be dismissed as 
inappropriate in all situations on the basis that social enterprise should not 
financially reward staff for success. 
7.27.4 STAKEHOLDER COMMITTEE 
The stakeholder committee is a body that co-exists but is independent from the 
Board of directors. This group is similar to a Board of trustees in that it is 
representative and inclusive of various groups' interests. However, it differs from 
the existing Boards of trustees because it works with a separate Board of 
directors to ensure accountability (i. e. managing the social audit), and 
representing stakeholder input into decisions made by the Board of directors. 
Currently, Boards of trustees are required to provide a range of inputs, that they 
are ill-disposed to perform effectively. Re-positioning this Board as an executive 
committee would work because it defines the exact boundaries of the 
committee's responsibilities. In addition, it would show where the latter differs 
from the Board of directors. 
The constitution of the committee must be representative: thus, it should 
comprise staff, primary stakeholders, and other parties external to the 
organisation, including funding bodies, local government agencies (as 
appropriate). This committee should also be given the opportunity to consult on 
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key business decisions by the Board of directors. This should represent the range 
of interests in the Social Firm, cutting down on larger Boards of trustees by 
splitting executive function from the necessary oversight function. They should 
also encourage greater transparency and accountability by bridging a 
communication gap between the Board of directors and staff. In addition, since 
staff generally comprises the primary stakeholder group, this can enhance 
legitimacy-seeking behaviour. 
The committee, in addition to consulting with the Board of directors on key 
decisions, add-value through: managing the social audit, enhancing inclusion 
throughout the organisation, improving transparency via better links with 
stakeholders and accountability though better oversight of directors and staff. 
Their presence would fit with the norms of the institutional environment, since 
its purpose aligns with the social and ethical orientation of Social Firms. Yet it 
also suits the business element of Social Firms because it reassigns an existing 
constraint of assuring oversight from the Board of directors. In so doing, it frees 
the Board to focus the organisations operational capabilities more effectively. 
The committee has the sole task of ensuring that the methods the Board adopts to 
achieve this are transparent, accountable and concordant with institutional norms. 
Hence, the committee aid the Board of directors in acquiring legitimacy from 
primary beneficiaries. 
There are some caveats to this proposed committee. Firstly, committee members 
must have an agreed brief and remit of responsibility. This determines where the 
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responsibilities of the group begin and end, drawing a faint dividing line between 
the committee and the Board of directors. Secondly, the group must be able to 
meet on a convenient and relatively frequent basis. If it does not convene on a 
sufficiently frequent or convenient basis, then there is an overt problem in the 
group's constitution. This could make the committee benign, unable to influence 
the governance of the Social Firm. Members, if required, should be able to 
acquire training and skills-acquisition to fulfil their roles. This ensures that staff 
and other members without the requisite skills can add-value to the roles they 
perform. Furthermore, the issue of a minimum commitment / tenure for members 
needs to be determined. For the committee to be effective over time, there must 
be stability within the group to build trust and legitimise its existence to other 
stakeholder groups. Finally, the committee has to be responsive to the dynamic 
operational environment of the organisation. This aspect of the group is one that 
would have to be managed at a local level and is difficult to mitigate for at the 
conceptual level. This is because of the unique contexts applicable to every 
Social Firm, including the set of skills available to each committee and the mix 
of different people and their power relationships within the organisation. Yet, it 
is clear that to remain responsive to change, the committee (and the Board of 
directors) would be adversely affected by dominant, key individuals (for example 
the Chief Executive or Chairman). Therefore, it is vital that there are mitigating 
conditions in place to reconcile such issues when the governance and 
management of the Social Firm is inimical to progress. 
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7.27.5 EXTERNAL ORGANISATION 
This section of the analysis examines the expected roles and influence of groups 
$external' to the core organisation. These have been divided into five key groups: 
trade / support groups, external verification, funding bodies, government and the 
local community. 
7.27.6 TRADE / SUPPORT GROUPS 
Trade organisations have influence over particular social enterprise types, or try 
to support the sector generally. The nature of this support is typically non- 
financial, thus differentiating these groups further from funding bodies (7.27.8, 
below). Their primary interest is in ensuring the success of its members and to 
this end represents their interests. From Stage I of this study (Chapter 4), it was 
evident that all of the interviewees had their members' interests at the forefront 
of their responses, whether these were positive or negative. They have become a 
stakeholder group as a result. They provide inputs to the Social Firm through 
support, training, performance tools development, networking opportunities and 
championing their cause on a local and national scale. The outputs they receive 
are the creation of similar organisations, if the sector continues to grow, and 
legitimacy for their existence if they play a part in creating a successful 
environment for Social Firms. 
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7.27.7 EXTERNAL VERIFICATION: 
This group represents those organisations that are involved in external 
verification of financial and social audits (such as the New Economics 
Foundation). They are important because they form a key part of the process of 
ensuring accountability. Therefore, in this conceptual model, they assist the 
stakeholder committee in providing an accurate assessment of the accountability 
of instrumental groups within the Social Firm. These groups also set the standard 
for social auditing and accounting, with many different programmes having been 
developed (including SROI, Local Multiplier 3, 'Prove It', 'Looking Back to 
Move Forward'). Therefore, to utilise these approaches adds to the credibility of 
the Social Firm's governance process by using (and meeting) an 'industry 
standard'. This can facilitate accountability throughout the Social Firm; hence, it 
is crucial that the stakeholder committee has the necessary resources to engage in 
these activities. The study found that very few Social Firms partake in social 
auditing, which will need to change if the ultimate goal is to ensure better 
accountability at Board level. 
7.27.8 FUNDING BODIES 
These organisations play a crucial role in facilitating start-up social enterprises, 
and offer a fixed-term level of financial support in the short-term. They also have 
a non-financial interest in the organisation. However, they have 'stakes', for 
example, the pursuance of economic and social regeneration. It is important for 
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these organisations to fund viable projects that have defined objectives and can 
evidence delivery of social value. To this end, they exert pressure on social 
enterprise to provide this proof of meeting defined aims. This process is an 
important consideration for Social Firms, if they are indicative of social 
enterprises in the UK, because they must show a willingness to move away from 
funding. 
The problem for funding bodies is that a proportion of these organisations are 
content to move from one source of funding to another, ensuring their existence 
for as long as they can secure funding. This is contrary to the rhetoric of social 
enterprise, to use funding where appropriate but with the goal of becoming a 
viable enterprise in its own right. This ideal is the, albeit slowly growing, 
minority. Therefore, Social Firms must be able to develop a coherent strategy to 
move away from funding, or at least satisfy funders, to enable their future 
legitimacy and sustainability. The conceptual model promotes this by combining 
a range of interests at management level: business-focussed directors and a 
stakeholder committee with authority to contribute to strategic direction. 
7.27.9 GOVERNMENT 
The role of Government agencies is to promote and support their own agenda 
and policy for the social enterprise sector in the UK. Invariably, the decisions 
taken at this level will affect Social Firms, and could influence individual 
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functions such as governance. Government policy intends to shape the sector by 
encouraging greater levels of involvement. However, it is the role of support 
groups to communicate this agenda to the social enterprise sector (the Social 
Enterprise Coalition is recognised as the most influential in this regard). Like all 
organisations, Social Firms will be influenced by macro-level changes in 
industries. These changes can be often catalysed by Government activity, and the 
social enterprise sector is of particular interest to the UK Government for reason 
of inclusion, access to employment and social regeneration of communities (DTI, 
2002, DTI, 2006). Social Firms contribute to achieving these goals, and therefore 
collectively influence the achievement of these broad policy goals. 
Returning to the notion of industry change, Government influence is currently 
pushing the sector towards isomorphism. The UK Government advocates the 
dissemination of best practice by successful social enterprises, as well as 'sector 
champions'. The rationale behind this is that smaller enterprises (or potential 
social entrepreneurs) can apply some of these learned experiences to their own 
organisation, and adapt it to replicate success. The degree to which isomorphism 
occurs, and how, is currently open to debate. However, a steadily growing body 
of scholarship supports and builds on this prediction (Mason et al., 2007, 
Nyssens, 2006, Reid and Griffith, 2006). Therefore, we can see how broader, 
macro-level policy decisions by Governments might influence the shaping of the 
social enterprise sector. Thus confirming the influence the various inputs and 
influence such agencies have on the typical Social Firm. 
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7.27.10 LOCAL COMMUNITY 
Finally, consideration is given to the influence and impact of local communities. 
This group is implicitly a part of the institutional environment, since they support 
the Social Firms (in terms of provided human resources), and receive economic 
benefits on a local scale (through employment and economic activity). This last 
point is interesting, because all social enterprises are viewed as important in 
enabling the regeneration of towns and cities where economic deprivation denies 
many individuals employment opportunities to correct this situation. Therefore, 
there is a reciprocal relationship between Social Firms and local communities, 
which should be mutually beneficial. Therefore, in the broader strategic context 
of Social Firm sustainability, Social Firm governance must account for how their 
activities will benefit the local community in the longer-term. This study 
provided mixed evidence about perceptions of sustainability as a necessary part 
of Social Firm strategy. This contradicts the prevailing view of sustainability for 
these (and other) types of organisations, leading to the tentative conclusion that 
most Social Firms are not in a position to strategise for sustainability. This 
should change, and the stakeholder committee must be sufficiently aware of the 
impact Social Firm activities have on the local community. Therefore, it is vital 
that this committee ensures that the organisation is transparent form the outside, 
looking inside. 
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7.27.11 COMMENTS ON THE MODEL 
A summary of the conceptual model and explanation of its various components is 
detailed here. Discussion of its limitations is provided in a separate section below 
(7.28.6). The model promotes many benefits to the Social Firm. Firstly, it 
delineates between a functional 'Board' and a separate body charged with 
ensuring that the business element provides accountability. The former is better 
placed to deliver business performance and maximise social benefit, by 
employing experts and specialists rather than trustees. This accommodates the 
application of stewardship theory to directors in social enterprises (Low, 2006, 
Reid and Griffith, 2006). The latter provides an oversight role, removing the 
burden from the former Board. This 'committee' also satisfies ethical 
requirements for inclusion of stakeholders at a senior level within the 
organisation. Therefore, overall Board size (an issue in this study) is less of an 
issue by splitting the group into 'stewards' and 'gatekeepers'. 
The model recognises the centrality of managers / staff as primary beneficiaries 
in the Social Firm, having a dual function. All value-adding activities conducted 
by the two management groups are received by the central group. This provides 
them with the required social benefit: the primary reason for the Social Firm's 
existence. In return, the central group confers legitimacy, and assures the 
continued existence of the organisation. This approach differs from the idea of 
managerial hegemony, because managers' most influential role is as primary 
beneficiaries. Authority is still placed above the managerial level, and in this 
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sense, the governance arrangements are 'hierarchical' (although the model does 
not reflect this). 
In an effort to avoid over-complicating the conceptual model, relationships with 
external groups were defined in relatively linear terms: inputs vs. outputs. The 
main thrust of their inclusion in the model was the degree to which these groups 
influence the Social Firm, and the duties to these groups that governance must 
accommodate. Attempts were also made to outline the level at which these 
groups influence the organisation (micro- or macro-). Overall, these groups are 
important in shaping the Social Firm from start-up to sustainable enterprise, and 
they can influence legitimacy as a result. 
7.28 LIMITATIONS 
The findings and analysis of the current and prior Chapters of the study must be 
judged in relation to the limitations that apply to the study. The limitations that 
apply to the methodology were discussed in previous Chapters (4.8; 5.10.1; 
5.10.5). This section deals specifically with the limitations that apply to the 
findings and analysis in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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7.28.1 SAMPLE SIZE 
Firstly, there are issues concerning the relatively small sample size acquired in 
the study. Principally, this applies to the reliability of significant findings. A 
larger sample would have enabled analysis that is more reliable and enhanced the 
possibility more certain predictions. The difficulty in achieving a higher response 
was due to a number of reasons. These included the relatively small population 
of Social Firms available (118 registered Social Firm members), limited access to 
the sample (the best access was via mail), and the discretionary nature of 
involvement (a limiting factor but ethically proper). Despite this, a useable 
sample size was achieved. Yet it is regrettable that more Social Firms could have 
been involved in the study, which appears to have unearthed much of interest to 
the Social Finn sector. 
7.28.2 GENERALISABILITY 
There is a problem o genera isa i ity in t is study, limiting the application of 
findings to other social enterprise types. It is difficult to justify the 
appropriateness of the findings across contexts, when these findings refer to 
specific, dynamic conditions. The conditions that influence governance as well as 
other functional activities inside the organisation are not replicable over time and 
in different contexts. Therefore, findings from the study can only be applied to 
Social Firms alone. Efforts have been made throughout the thesis to refer 
explicitly to Social Firms rather than social enterprises (unless appropriate). 
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In addition, the exploratory nature of the research detracted from the usefulness 
of the study. This is because it did (and arguable could) not offer more precise 
outcomes that related to hypotheses, rather than more general propositions. The 
decision was taken very early on that the exploratory approach was the best 
method of inquiry, because there was (and still is) very little prior research of 
social enterprise governance. Where this research has been done, researchers 
have been clear in asserting similar limiting factors regarding generalising across 
social enterprise types. This is a conundrum for research in this area: determining 
how useful research can be when it is clear that findings cannot be reliably 
generalised. Many social enterprise practitioners continue to debate the same 
issues, such as appropriate definitions that account for the difference within the 
sector. These debates are meant to be constructive, but perhaps result in being 
counter-productive. Hence, researchers tend to be more pragmatic (rather than 
pedantic) over definitions and focus on pursuing a general social enterprise 
research agenda, leaving it to practitioners to adopt new ideas and approaches as 
they see fit. 
7.28.3 CONSTRUCT DEVELOPMENT 
There were some issues surrounding the development and integrity of the 
constructs developed for the dependent and predictor variables. With a disparate 
base of literature to develop the constructs with, some were more reliable than 
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others. Although the overall scale was internally consistent (Cronbach's Alpha: 
0.888), there was still scope for the individual constructs to be developed more 
reliably. More time spent testing the constructs for validity would certainly have 
improved the usefulness of the implications drawn from the data. This is an 
important caveat for such an exploratory study, where many of the constructs 
used were developed from prior (non-empirical) literature. The constructs that 
were developed may prove a useful starting point for further research seeking to 
build on some of the central ideas adopted in this study. 
7.28.4 MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENT DEVELOPMENT 
The development of the Likert, statements used to test the general propositions 
should also be scrutinised here. Upon reflection, some of these statements were 
too ambiguous and did not succinctly communicate their subject. Again, this 
could have been corrected before the first deployment of questionnaires during 
the piloting phase. This aspect of the study was not as well developed as it should 
have been, and this is due to poor planning at this stage. This could have been 
avoided for the most part, by a more thorough piloting stage for the 
questionnaire. Reflection on this stage exposes it as a weak point in the 
instrument development process. Given the generally high internal consistency of 
the constructs, it is difficult to ascertain the magnitude this limitation had on the 
data collected. 
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7.28.5 METHODOLOGICAL CONFLICT / CHOICE OF METHODS 
The choice of mixed methodology and of postpositivism also caused problems. 
Though it is perhaps well suited for exploratory research (covering a number of 
data considerations), it would have been better to adopt a more novel 
methodological stance. The relativist concessions of postpositivism, leave the 
enquirer betwixt and between. Lacking the epistemological and ontological 
absolutism of other approaches (positivism and phenomenology) forces the 
enquirer to justify the approach on a number of levels. 
In relation to the methods used, a more apt approach would have been Board 
shadowing: with the complicity of a particular (or a few) Social Firms, the 
enquirer is able to observe Board level activities and gain much better access to 
the reality of governance in organisations. Alternatively, and perhaps as a result 
of exploratory studies such as this, future research should be grounded more 
closely in the methodological norms associated with mainstream governance 
research. Though the contexts differ, the nature of investigation is similar: 
examining the nature of relationships and processes that manage relationships 
between key stakeholders in organisations. 
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7.28.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE GOVERNANCE MODEL 
Finally, consideration must be given to limitations inherent in the conceptual 
model described above. Firstly, this model is a simplistic representation of how 
governance might be improved by reassigning some roles and responsibilities in 
Social Firm governance. It does not attempt to account for the dynamism of the 
real-time operational environment, though this could be determined through 
further research and development of the key ideas it presents. The development 
of minutiae for each aspect of the model remains vague. This is because the 
particular elements of each role, including frequency of meetings, arrangements 
for skills training and boundaries of responsibility must be determined at the 
local level, as needs determine. 
7.29 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This Chapter has given a full account of the findings outlined in Chapter 6. In so 
doing, it provided analysis of all of the propositions that were developed in the 
thesis. The recurrent significant themes emerging from the study included: job; 
the number of Board members; the presence of the social audit; perceptions of 
Board effectiveness, and the locus of decision-making authority. The culmination 
of this analysis was the conceptualisation of a model of governance in Social 
Firms. In particular, this model focussed on the relations within the Social Firm, 
and how the governance of them enhances legitimacy. 
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Finally, attention was given to the limiting influences on the study, and there 
were some worthy of consideration. Principally, the small size of the sample and 
the validity of the constructs developed were limiting influences. In addition, the 
choice of methodology and methods was criticised, and some alternative options 
worthwhile of future study of Boards in Social Firms. The Chapter concluded 
with an outline of the caveats associated with the conceptual model, the 
particular constraints that might limit its usefulness. The next Chapter evaluates 
the overall impact of the study. in so doing, it contemplates the general 
conclusions that can be drawn from the findings and implications detailed in the 
Chapter. In addition, it considers the opportunities for further research in this 
area, in light of the conclusions drawn. 
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CHAPTER8 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This final Chapter outlines the number of conclusions that have been drawn from 
this study. Firstly, it revisits the research question and objectives for the study 
developed in Chapter 2. The degree to which the findings of the study inform 
these research goals is discussed. It summarises the outcomes of the study 
according to the variables used. A brief conclusion is provided on the conceptual 
model and its possible application in practice. Furthermore, there are several 
areas for research that require deeper examination than could be explored in this 
thesis. These are discussed at length in the penultimate section of the Chapter. 
8.2 CONCLUSIONS 
Mindful of the analysis (and limitations) of this study, there are general 
conclusions that can be drawn about Social Firms, and their governance. The 
research question that framed the investigation stated: 
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Do attitudes to governance influence perceptions of performance in Social 
Firms? 
At this stage of the thesis, we can revisit this question in light of the range of 
findings uncovered. Primarily, we can determine that perceptions of governance 
do influence perceptions of performance in a number of ways. 
There are instances where respondents found that their Boards were considered 
to be ineffective. This signals that key groups within Social Firms are 
disenchanted with the existing Board. This exemplifies some key success factors 
for the Board: their effectiveness is contingent upon how well they deliver in 
certain areas. These include supporting managers, providing strategic direction 
and disclosure, and balancing business with social aims. We can conclude that 
the first task for a Social Firm's Board is to address how well it currently 
performs in relation to these areas. 
The number of Board members serving in Social Firms was a recurrent 
significant category. Therefore, it is essential that the Board conduct a skills audit 
to ensure that it has a good balance of skills, capable of managing the balance of 
business and social benefit. It is vital that the Board does not carry any long- 
serving members who cannot (or will not) contribute in a way that adds-value to 
the process of governance. Therefore, this study proposes splitting the Board into 
two: counterpoising a smaller instrumental Board of directors with a (larger) 
representative stakeholder committee with a consultation role. A skills-audit of 
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the Board's developmental requirements would facilitate this process, and 
provide direction for future added-value Board activities. 
Related to the above point, the locus of decision-making authority was another 
key factor in this study. Certain aspects of good governance, for example 
democracy and transparency, were constrained by the individual(s) with the 
ultimate sanction. As this is an issue, the conceptual model provided a 
stakeholder committee that would be the final arbiter of major decisions affecting 
key aspects of the Social Firms service delivery. 
The research objectives in Chapter 2 were developed to elucidate how the 
research question would be approached. This sub-section examines these 
objectives, and assesses the general outcomes of the study. 
8.2.1 ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEGITIMACY IN SOCIAL FIRM 
GOVERNANCE 
This section considers two of the research objectives, which are: 
The influence of accountability on the legitimacy of social enterprise 
govemance. 
0 The significance of any relationship(s) between transparency, 
accountability, sustainability and legitimacy. 
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The study tested for the presence of any association between the dependent and 
predictor variables. Analysis found that one significant association exists 
between two of the variables: accountability (dependent) and legitimacy 
(predictor). This association is concordant with the salient corporate governance 
literature, which places accountability as one of the main features of good 
governance in a range of organisations. Therefore, we have empirical evidence 
here that suggests this association is also important in Social Firms. This link 
might have been assumed previously, though no primary research exists to 
confirm this assumption. 
The more focussed a Board (or similar group) is on achieving accountability, the 
more likely that its goals align with those of the organisation's primary 
beneficiaries. In the Social Firm, primary beneficiaries are integrated into the 
organisation, playing a key part in the economic viability of the organisation. 
Therefore, they are ideally placed to pressurise Boards to enhance their 
accountability profile to provide evidence of their competence and the alignment 
of interests. This benefits the organisation, since greater accountability should 
result in legitimacy and the continued existence of the Social Firm. This is 
because legitimacy represents a confirmation that the Board's activities are 
within the regulative and constitutive rules of the institutional environment. 
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8.2.2 THE DEVELOPAIENT OF THE CONSTRUCTS 
Aside from relationships between the dependent and predictor variables, the 
investigation also established elements of each defined construct used. These are 
addressed in turn below. 
8.2.2.1 TRANSPARENCY 
Transparency is a salient and enduring feature of corporate governance. In this 
study, perceptions of transparency were tested against a number of propositions 
(P4, P5, P6, P7, P8 and PIO). The study found that all save one of the six 
propositions were found to be significant. For Social Firms in this study, a 
transparency construct emerges. Normatively, transparency indicates better 
governance performance, which aligns with the prevalent view of transparency in 
the mainstream corporate governance literature. Three facets of transparency are 
trust, democracy and disclosure, and Board effectiveness is judged on its 
presence (or lack thereof). The importance of disclosure differs according to a 
number of different factors, highlighting disparities between Board and non- 
Board members and the age of the Social Firm. This emergent transparency 
construct would also promote stakeholder inclusion at Board level, though Board 
members and non-Board members have different perspectives of this. 
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No significant association exists between transparency and the other variables 
used in the study. However, we can conclude that it offers some interesting 
opportunities to challenge to the view that transparency is a taken-for-granted 
aspect of good governance. Reality diverges from the theoretical terrain because 
there are clear differences in perceptions of transparency, and what activities 
constitute it. Furthermore, transparency is less important to achieving legitimate 
governance than accounta i ity. 
8.2.2.2 ACCOUNTABILITY 
As mentioned previously, accountability shows a significant association with 
legitimacy. Yet, as a construct, a number of significant findings also emerge that 
aid understanding of accountability in Social Firm governance, aside of 
relationships with other variables. There were several propositions related to 
accountability (P3, P9, Pll, P12, P13, P17, P18, P20, and P24). Of these 
propositions, only two were not significant. Therefore, regarding accountability 
and the governance of Social Firms, a construct emerges. 
As accountability is an indicator of better governance, Social Firm Boards should 
ensure that they are accountable for performance. This enables the Social Firm to 
acquire and perpetuate legitimacy. The standards of ethical practice play a part in 
achieving accountability, and this is the responsibility of the Board. One of the 
research objectives referred to managers' ethical performance as controlled by the 
339 
over-riding importance of the social mission. This aspect of the accountability 
construct shows that ethical behaviour is not assured in this way, instead the 
Board has the responsibility for setting and maintaining standards. The typical 
dichotomy of social enterprise, between business and social benefit, is present 
and Boards should be accountable for competitive performance. A feature of 
Social Firm governance that may enhance accountability is Board member 
tenure: shorter tenure can play a role improving their performance. 
8.2.2.3 SUSTAINABILITY 
The propositions tested for sustainability were P2, P14, P15, P16, P19 and P23. 
The study found the three of the six propositions were valid. Sustainability 
showed no association with legitimacy, however we can conclude that 
sustainability in Social Firms has at least three aspects. To enable sustainability, 
Boards should support managers to deliver on social objectives. In addition, they 
should also provide strategic direction to enable business sustainability. Clearly, 
if the Board can embed governance processes that enhance accountability on 
business and social fronts, the long-term impact would be sustainability. 
There is a divergence of view whether the Board can possess the skills required 
to govern the social enterprise effectively. In a unitary Board structure, its scope 
of responsibility will necessitate a larger recruitment of and representation 
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amongst its members. After all, social enterprises have a variety of conflicting 
demands to satisfy. Primary stakeholder set the conditions upon which these 
demands are met, and the role of the Board is to manage the conditions 
appropriately. They are judged to be accountable in the short- and medium-term; 
long-term accountability is synonymous with sustainability. This study found 
that Board size is an important issue facing Social Firms. The sustainability of 
larger Boards can only be assured if the skills-set matches the requirements of 
primary stakeholders and market demands. It is not certain that these Boards are 
effective in this regard; there is no evidence in this study linking sustainability 
with legitimacy. Yet, it is possible to conclude that sustainability is still an 
important long-term objective. This long-term strategy can only be achieved if 
governance enables all those responsible for its achievement to operate on two, 
often conflicting, fronts. 
8.2.2.4 LEGITIMACY 
Finally, the propositions that were developed to explore perceptions of 
legitimacy comprised PI, P21, P22 and P24. Two of the four propositions were 
valid following analysis of the findings. Legitimate governance in Social Firms is 
contingent upon the Board successfully balancing social aims with business- 
focus. This is a key feature of all social enterprises, and it is unsurprising that it 
remains so. Furthermore, the study found that legitimacy is acquired by 
maximising social benefit. Therefore, governance in Social Firms must promote 
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the most effective ways of providing social benefit, as a means to acquiring 
legitimacy. This is consistent with the findings from the accountability 
propositions, and there is an association between the two variables. The most 
important outcome of Social Firm governance is legitimacy, and the most 
effective way of achieving this is via ensuring accountability. The present 
arrangements in place may jeopardise the Board evidencing its performance, 
consequently its accountability. The lack of social auditing procedures may 
expedite these problems. Therefore, we must examine the link between social 
auditing and legitimacy in greater depth, to ensure that the process is a rational 
and achievable option for Social Firms. 
8.2.3 A MODEL OF GOVERNANCE 
The final task involved in this study was the consideration and development of a 
conceptual model that represents a holistic view of the formal and informal 
governance arrangements in Social Firms. One of the major outcomes from the 
analysis was that the Board of trustees is expected (and is ill equipped to) 
perform two general functions. The first is to oversee that the Social Firm is run 
in the interests of stakeholders. The second is to offer support to managers in 
their jobs, providing a source of business-specific knowledge and expertise. 
Hence, an alternative approach was developed that sought to resolve the issue of 
over-burdening any particular group involved in governance. It also attempted to 
accommodate current theoretical perspectives of social enterprise governance. To 
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this end, managers and directors are 'stewards' of the organisation, whilst 
committee members provide the necessary oversight top ensure legitimacy. 
The resulting model centred on the legitimising authority of the managers / staff 
member (where these individuals are also primary beneficiaries). This group is 
served and strategically guided by a small Board of directors, who possesses 
particular business skills / experience. This enables them to embed an 
instrumental and beneficial approach to enterprise activities undertaken at the 
Social Firm. The social interests of the central group are protected by the 
stakeholder committee. This group has a similar function to a Board of trustees, 
though the term 'committee' is used to convey its consultative involvement with 
the Board. This independent committee is representative of all the stakeholder 
interests and claims on the organisation. In this way, it is inclusive and improves 
communication between all parties. They protect the interest of primary 
stakeholders through communication with the Board of directors, and have the 
opportunity to work with them in key business strategy decisions. 
8.3 SUGGESTED AREAS OF FURTHER WORK 
The growing social enterprise sector means more opportunities to engage in 
research. Practitioners, academics and policy makers are pursuing their own 
agendas in social enterprise research. The Social Firm is one of many types of 
social enterprise that are worthy of further investigation. Of course, this 
investigation is an exploratory governance study, and there are many different, 
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interesting strands already developing, such as the role of social capital, 
sustainability and business strategy. Because of this study, there are a number of 
avenues for further research of the governance of social enterprises. These have 
Iý 
been divided into sub-sections below, and Appendix 10 shows the viability that 
each proposition presents for further research depending on the number of 
significant associations. 
8.3.1 THE BOARD IN SOCIAL ENTERPRISES 
This study produced some interesting findings relating to perceptions of Boards, 
their assets and their liabilities. It became clear though, that much more detail on 
the Board itself and how it conducts its affairs would be enlightening to verify / 
falsify these perceptions. More empirical research is advocated to build upon the 
exploratory findings from this research. Social enterprises are unique 
organisations, embodying the management of two contrasting organisational 
functions. If we can understand more of why and how governance of these 
organisations satisfy both business and social objectives, it may be possible to 
transfer this knowledge across different sectors. This is because one of the 
central criticisms of stakeholder-orientated theories of governance is the 
difficulty they have in reconciling stakeholder claims against the primacy of 
shareholders. Social enterprises might be able to show how the management of a 
set of priorities can be achieved effectively. Conversely, there is much that social 
enterprises can acquire from other sectors also, in particular the professional 
344 
management of enterprises. It has been indicated that such acquisition from for- 
profit sectors is an eventuality, rather than a possibility. Therefore, there are 
opportunities for long-term observation studies of social enterprises to chart any 
changes, and determine the impact these changes have on performance. 
8.3.2 ROLE OF LEGITIMACY IN GOVERNANCE 
Some very interesting previous studies have investigated the role and influence 
of the institutional environment, and legitimacy, upon governance in a variety of 
organisations (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992, Luoma and Goodstein, 1999, Ocasio, 
1999). This topic remains relevant to examination of governance, and the 
influence of the institutional environment upon it. Constitutive rules and the 
changing nature of the regulatory environment, offer future opportunities to track 
their influence on how social enterprises operate. This is in contrast to 
organisations in other sectors: useful insights could be drawn from examination 
of informal pressures on governance arrangements. This research would build 
upon the extant literature in both the institutional theory of organisations and 
corporate governance. Legitimacy is an intangible and elusive quality acquired 
by organisations, and further research on its role in governance may illuminate 
the qualities on Boards that can enhance or detract from legitimate organisations. 
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8.3.3 LONG-TERM STUDIES OF THE CIC FORM OF GOVERNANCE 
The CIC is a relatively new legal form for social enterprises, and contains some 
new 'features' that were previously absent from other legal forms commonly 
adopted. There has been a slow but steady uptake of the CIC legal form by start- 
up social enterprises, and it remains unclear whether this legal form will persist 
in the long-term as a viable alternative for social enterprises to adopt. Many 
existing social enterprises remain content with their adopted legal forms 
(predominantly CLG and IPS), so the focus for the CIC is on start-up social 
enterprises. Further investigation of its influence on governance of social 
enterprises would be particularly useful. 
8.3.4 THE SIZE OF BOARD 
The number of Board members was a recurrent source of significant difference in 
this study. Large and small Boards both have their benefits, though 'optimality' 
would show how Board roles are defined and where value creation occurs 
through their activities. Small organisations with a growth strategy cannot 
support large Boards (of whichever sort) or tolerate inadequate input to support 
managers. Further research should examine the optimal mix of directors and 
6 stakeholder' committee members, and the value these groups add to governance 
and overall performance. This would prove to be beneficial to practitioners and 
academics in determining the appropriate conditions and constituents for social 
enterprise Boards. 
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8.3.5 THE ROLE OF TRUSTEES 
The dominance of the Board of trustees as the most appropriate governance body 
needs further examination. This study found that it is not always perceived as 
effective by key stakeholders, and a reassessment of its suitability should be 
pursued. At present, trustees are charged with the responsibility to safeguard the 
organisation, and this is done in a voluntary capacity. This exemplifies the 
difficulty of the position and the arrangements generally. For social enterprises to 
demonstrate their effectiveness in governing conflicting goals, then the subject of 
Board skills, training and support needs to be considered seriously across the 
sector. Evidently, trade organisations within the social enterprise sectors are 
pushing this issue to their members: many have well developed programmes in 
place to train their members (for example, Cooperatives UK and the Cooperative 
College). Without a proper effort by social enterprises to ensure Boards are 
capably instrumental in the organisation, they are at a competitive disadvantage 
in their chosen markets. The stakeholder committee advocated in this study 
supports the sentiment of trusteeship. However, it demands that this group works 
to represent (and protect) interests and integrates with an executive group (Board 
of directors) to produce a holistic approach to govemance. 
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8.3.6 THE INCLUSION OF STAKEHOLDERS AT BOARD LEVEL 
Though normatively common for nonprofits and social enterprises, more 
evidence is required to show the usefulness of stakeholders at Board level. More 
specifically, we need to understand how the management of stakeholders at this 
level can be achieved effectivelY. This is important because it has cross-sectoral 
implications, during a time when there is greater external pressure for corporate 
responsibility through transparency and accountability. If stakeholder inclusion 
at Board level can enhance transparency and accountability, then organisations 
enhance their claims for legitimacy. Of course, the corporate prerogative is 
proving how this inclusion adds value to their primary beneficiaries. Social 
enterprises could provide the evidence required, and continued research in this 
area would be very valuable to managers in a range of organisations. This study 
showed its importance but varied uptake by Social Firms. If further evidence can 
accumulate to show how stakeholder inclusion works, it extends the debates 
between corporate governance theories. It also further establishes social 
enterprises as a distinct and valuable economic and ethical organisation that can 
compete effectively with mainstream businesses. 
8.3.7 THE ACCOUNTABILITY-LEGITIMACY RELATIONSHIP 
This thesis detailed how accountability and legitimacy are associated through 
perceptions of governance in Social Firms. This reaffirms a relationship that has 
been already detailed in prior research in other sectors (Kearns, 1994; Roberts, 
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2001; Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004; Westphal and Zajac, 1998). A 
useful further investigation could examine this link in some detail, determining 
which functions of governance in social enterprises enhance accountability more 
than others. Long-term study of its effects would provide insight into the long- 
term effects on accountability, and the influence of this on performance over 
time. In addition it would be useful to explore how legitimacy seeking behaviour 
by Boards influences business and social performance. This would provide 
empirical support to clarify the importance of legitimacy on continued existence. 
Such efforts would be valuable additions to the bodies of knowledge in both 
corporate governance and institutional theory. 
8.3.8 THE SOCIAL AUDIT AND GOVERNANCE 
Further research attention should be given to the effectiveness and pervasiveness 
of holistic measures of governance performance. This study showed that very 
few Social Firms in the sample conduct a social audit, or any of its variants. This 
is despite the plentiful academic and practitioner resources encouraging this type 
of audit as a sign of good practice (Pearce, 2003). This apparent lack of uptake 
would prove to be a barrier to accountability, since stakeholders do not have 
access to evidence of how Boards perform on a variety of criteria. In the absence 
of this, Social Firms run the risk of jeopardising their continued legitimacy. We 
need to understand why this function is not being utilised by Social Firms, 
because it would indicate why other social enterprises may not use it either. 
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Furthermore, we should seek to find how barriers to the social audit process can 
be overcome for small organisations with limited resources. In addition, 
consideration should be given to the role of funding bodies and procurement 
partners. Those groups with whom the Social Firm deals may exert pressure to 
deliver on agreed aims and contracts for public sector partnerships. 
8.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This Chapter has detailed the fundamental conclusions that can be drawn from 
this thesis. Primarily these highlight the importance of accountability and 
legitimacy in governance, the importance of Board size and type, and the 
developments to the dependent and predictor variables (and constructs) used in 
the study. 
A model of governance, that attempts to conceptualise the nature of governance 
relations in Social Firms, provides a useful starting point for further research. 
There is a great deal of scope for further research, and there a particular areas 
that may provide researchers with interests avenues to pursue. These include 
further examination of the accountability-legitimacy association, the role of the 
social audit and its usefulness, the relevance of the Board of trustees and 
examination of the CIC legal form. There remain many other avenues of 
potential research that to document here would prove exhaustive. Needless to 
say, the governance of Social Firms and social enterprise generally, maintains an 
allure for governance researchers. This is because these organisations grapple 
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with the challenges of managing stakeholders, and further academic development 
can explain and assist them in doing so. In addition, social enterprises represent 
an ideal for many entrepreneurs who wish to give something back to 
communities and aid the cause of regeneration in many declining and 
underdeveloped cities and towns in the UK. 
A number of issues have been raised in this thesis regarding the integrity of 
Social Firm governance. However, it is evident that social enterprises are of 
significant value to social and environmental regeneration and that they merit 
continued support from various sources to continue their invaluable, and 
important, work. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 
INTERVIEW NOTES 
INTERVIEW WITH SOCIAL FIRMS UK 
X1 
BACKGROUND 
Social Firms UK is the national body representing the interests of social firms in 
the United Kingdom. The organisation represents the interests of registered 
Social Firms. These organisations offer disabled people previously excluded 
from the workforce the opportunity to get back into employment. The interview 
took place on 6 th December 2005 at 10: 30. Due to logistical constraints, 
interview was conducted by telephone. The interview was conducted by the 
researcher, with Kathy Baker, Quality Support Manager (hereafter KB). 
SUMMARY 
Social Firms are a type of social enterprise, which provide employment 
opportunities to disabled people. They are classified as a social enterprise 
because they trade and at least 50% of their income is raised through trading 
revenue. Social Firms, like other social enterprises, are values-driven businesses 
and this is a fundamental element of how they operate. They are considered to be 
the 'ideal type' of social enterprise, because they have a balanced commitment to 
both the social mission and the entrepreneurial approach to achieve it. Some 
types of social enterprise focus more on the business approach and less on the 
achievement of social aims (for example, marketing co-operatives). Other 
organisations like development trusts do not engage in 'trade' as such, and social 
firms embody both of these elements in the appropriate balance. 
Social Firms UK support their members in many ways, particularly in the 
development of resources. For example, the production of performance 
measurement and other support tools. 
x1i 
KB was certain of the need for further research in social enterprise governance, 
and encouraged more study in the Social Firms. Though there had been some 
efforts by the UK government to address a range of issues within the social 
enterprise sector, these were quite broad in nature. The introduction of tile new 
legal form (the Community Interest Company) is a sign of progress to assist tile 
sector. However, Social Firms can adopt whichever legal form suits their needs 
best. The CIC legal form was viewed as useful, complimentary option for Social 
Firms. 
The Government has a role to play in championing the cause of social 
enterprise in general. However, for each type of social enterprise, tile role of 
trade bodies or similar organisations is key in pushing a collaborative agenda for 
the sector. 
Acknowledged that governance is a key area of future research, particularly tile 
diversity of board membership and the range of skills that board members can 
provide. Social Firms are encouraged to adopt an inclusive approach to Board 
recruitment. This should ensure an open and democratic governance process. Tile 
degree to which this is enacted is open to question. Also, there needs to be a 
more coherent process for ensuring accountability at Board level. Social Firms 
UK develops training tools for Social Firm managers and Directors to determine 
the tasks involved in governing and measuring performance. For example, they 
have developed the Performance Dashboard which is a user-fricndly approach to 
measuring Social Return on Investment (SROI). 
x1ii 
Furthermore, the relationship between managers and board members is 
one possible avenue of governance research. Managers often feel undermined by 
Directors who are 'out of touch' with the demands of running a growing Social 
Firm. Furthermore, they feel 'held back' by unresponsive strategies and poor 
communication between Directors and managers. This relationship is key in 
governance and some Social Firms UK members feel that their performance is 
stymied by unresponsive Directors. 
KB indicated that Social Firms are an under-researched social enterprise, 
and that members are keen to become involved in research projects. In addition, 
KB offered her support in access members for the collection of data. 
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APPENDIX 2 
INTERVIEW WITH COOPERATIVESUK 
x1vi 
BACKGROUND 
CooperativesUK are the trade organisations representing the interests of cooperatives 
in the UK. CooperativesUK have recently produced a Code of Corporate Governance. 
This document is a result of their efforts to recognise the importance of good 
corporate governance. This document is a summary of the themes raised during the 
semi-structured interview. This interview is one of a series that were conducted as an 
exploratory qualitative phase of the research. Ethical procedures relating to 
confidentiality and the right to withdraw from the interview were stated at the 
commencement of the interview. 
The interview took place on the 6'h October 2005 at CooperativesUK head office, 
Balloon Street, Manchester, UK. Present at the interview were the researcher, Dr. 
John Butler (Board Secretary [Strategic Management]) and Siobhan McCloughlin 
(Research Officer, who had produced the Code of Corporate Governance). 
SUMMAR 
CooperativesUK recognised the importance of governance, where they identified that 
failing cooperatives were affected by governance issues. This led to the development 
of the Corporate Governance Code of Best Practice. The key element of the Code is 
that members 'sign-up' to the Code and report on their progress each year. 
CooperativesUK have worked with its members in ensuring that they send this annual 
review of their governance performance. This process is self-administered by the 
Board of each member cooperative. 
At the time of interview, the current progress of the recently launched Code 
was being collated. One outcome of the process was ensuring that the self- 
x1vii 
administered check-list was completed properly, and on-time. A pressing iSSLIC is 
ensuring compliance with the reporting process. The role of CooperativcsUK is to 
support members in their work and promote best practice. However, it is not within its 
role to enforce any particular Code. The organisation is pursuing corporate 
governance as a key aspect for improving the performance of failing societies. 
Key aspects of governance failure were detailed during the interview. These elements 
provided the impetus for developing the structure of the Code of Corporate 
Governance. The first area of concern was the length of tenure of Directors serving of 
cooperative Boards. Many cooperatives have long-serving Directors. It is typical that 
Directors will be re-elected with little opposition. This causes problems where 
cooperatives 'stagnate', or if change is required and resistance at Board level is found. 
The Code intends to make the election of Directors more transparent. Also, it attempts 
to promote stakeholder inclusion at Board level. The task of recruiting new Directors 
with the required skills and strategic acumen is proving to be a difficult task. 
Stakeholder involvement at such a level is seen as key in establishing 
accountability. If it is difficult to engage stakeholders in the process of accountability, 
it is down to managers and existing Directors to force a change in governance 
practice. This is difficult where the task Of governing the cooperative is executed by 
long-serving Directors who are presented with little incentive to change. 
CooperativesUK offers training courses for Directors and the cooperative 
members at the Cooperative College. These courses intend to offer assistance in the 
process of meeting the aims of the Code of Corporate Governance. Also, it seeks to 
reinforce the benefits to cooperatives of establishing transparent and accountable 
governance. 
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APPENDIX 3 
INTERVIEW WITH NATIONAL HOUSING FEDERATION 
BACKGROUND 
The National Housing Federation (NHF) is the representative body for housing 
associations and housing trusts in the United Kingdom. The interview took place on 
18 th November 2005, at NHF head office, London. Present at the interview were the 
researcher and Stephen Bull (Head of Membership). Ethical considerations were 
outlined by the researcher at the commencement of the interview. 
SUMMARY 
The National Housing Foundation is focused on housing associations and trusts. The 
organisation has worked with members to improve their governance, and found that 
many members are having problems recruiting Board members. In particular, 
recruiting Directors with skills to add to the existing skills set at Board level. The 
NHF takes a hands-off approach to enforcing their code. They wish to encourage 
good practice through collaboration with housing associations. This is a difficult task 
for NHF to manage and are expecting more housing associations to take on the 
responsibility themselves. 
Given the importance of corporate governance to the social enterprise sector, the NHF 
has begun implementation of a Code of Governance for its members. Importantly, the 
NHF does not see itself as an enforcer of this Code. Rather it role is an advisory one 
to guide members. Coercion to normative governance principles is not conducive to a 
'good' change. This is because of the nature of governance in housing associations. 
The key role in their governance is the Board of Directors, and they exhibit 
heterogeneous characteristics. Aspects such as Director tenure, skills and 
iii 
representation at Board level are all important issues. However, to the NHF they are 
seen as barriers to the implementation of a Corporate Governance Code. This reason 
for this is the Directors are often voluntary and serve on a Board of Trustees. Without 
the long-term commitment that most Directors have provided, many housing 
associations would not have been able to succeed. Recognition is required of the 
broader political context, where housing associations are affected by government 
policy related to social housing and immigration. Also, housing associations often 
struggle to attract "new blood" onto Board of Directors, with the enthusiasm, skill and 
experience to bring change at Board level in situations that require it. 
Skills and recruitment are pressing for housing associations. Also, director tenure is a 
key issue that is a difficult problem to resolve. Directors tend to serve for a long time 
on the Boards of housing associations. Their view of housing associations, and of 
social enterprises, represent the 'old' view, rather than as dynamic organisations (the 
'modern' view of social enterprise). 
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APPENDIX 4 
INTERVIEW WITH SOCIAL ENTERPRISE COALITION 
Ivi 
BACKGROUND 
Due to logistical constraints on behalf of the interviewee, the interview took place via 
the telephone on (September 2005). The interview was conducted by the researcher, 
and the interviewee was Jonathan Bland (Chief Executive, Social Enterprise 
Coalition). 
SUMMA 
Governance issues are of importance, and research in social enterprise governance is 
in need of more development. However, issues of social enterprise governance are 
contingent on the legal form adopted by each enterprise. Promoting good governance 
practice is an important role for SEC, though the variety of social enterprises makes 
seeking a consensus on key issues difficult. 
One area that is due to feature prominently for social enterprises is the prioritising of 
stakeholders at board level, an example of which is leisure trusts (such as Greenwich 
Leisure Limited). Commonly, there is a lack of employee involvement in strategic 
decision-making in social enterprises. Greenwich Leisure Limited (GLL) is an 
excellent example of correcting this trend, and is seen as a role model for the sector. 
This is because GLL is a staff-led organisation, and they work towards maximising 
the social benefit of their defined communities. The interviewee suggested that these 
organisations would make an interesting subject for further study. 
As a representative body for all social enterprise, the SEC promotes a 'suite' of 
training for social entrepreneurs. However, there is not a suite of training for directors 
of social enterprises, particularly with a view to improving governance. The SEC 
Ivii 
offers individual sessions on an ad hoc basis, rather than a set programme for 
directors to attend. 
One area that the SEC is actively involved in is legal reform, correcting what they 
perceive is the disadvantageous state of affairs at present for social enterprises. In 
order for social enterprises to compete, they need the legal forms to allow access to 
capital and be more entrepreneurial as a result. JB asserted this as a viable avenue for 
research. 
Iviii 
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APPENDIX 5 
EXAMPLE OF LETTER SENT TO INTERVIEWEES 
Ix 
CJ Mason 
School of Management 
John Foster Building 
98 Mount Pleasant 
Liverpool 
L3 5UZ 
+44 1512313858 
c. mason@livjm. ac. uk 
Social Enterprise Coalition 
54 Haymarket 
London 
SWIY4RP 
I 91h September 2005 
FAO: Mr. Jonathan Bland 
Dear Mr. Bland, 
My name is Chris Mason, and I am an MPhil student at Liverpool John Moores 
University, and for my thesis am researching the governance structures of social 
enterprises. Critical to this research is gathering information from different types of 
social enterprise, toward the establishment of a governance model. 
In the first phase of my data collection, I am interviewing representatives from 
various organisations that represent a given classification of 'social enterprise'. The 
interview seeks to clarify governance structures for each social enterprise type, 
leading on to further detailed analysis in the coming months and the development of a 
questionnaire in the second phase of data collection. 
I would like to request an interview with you, arrangements at your 
convenience, lasting between 30 - 45 minutes. I intend to ask questions related to 
governance structure and typical issues that arise within social enterprises. I am 
Ixi 
prepared to meet my own costs to visit your location in person, though if you would 
prefer an alternative arrangement I am happy to accommodate this. 
I appreciate that your time is precious, and any offer of assistance will be gratefully 
received. Confidentially is assured as part of my research and I enclose a letter from 
Prof. James Kirkbride, Dean of the Faulty of Business and Law and my Director of 
Studies, to verify my claims of studentship and research agenda. 
Yours faithfully, 
CJ Mason 
Ixii 
APPENDIX 6 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Ixiii 
I) 
C 
cI) 
i) 
1) 
cJ. 
C) 
LU 
/ 
Q, lz ! 
I. ) 
ci 
cq 
APPENDIX 7 
TABLE OF PROPOSITIONS 
1xv 
Proposition Related I 
statcmcnt(s) 
PI The Social Firm Board must successfully balance social aims 1,27,38,42 
with business-focus. 
P2 The Board of Directors should have the skills required to 32 
govern the social enterprise effectively. 
P3 Social enterprises are expected to be more ethical than for- 15 
profit organisations. 
P4 Democracy is an integral part of Social Firm governance. 4,7 
P5 Stakeholder inclusion at Board level is a feature of Social 6,8 
Firm governance. 
P6 Transparency indicates better governance performance. 2,3 
P7 Trust is an indicator of Board transparency. 12 
P8 Disclosure is a facet of transparent governance in Social 5,17 
Firms. 
P9 Ethical performance is a responsibility of Social Firm 10,11,19 
Directors. 
1xvi 
OL 
ORES AuldhaM Robarts LRC 
OL 
231 
PIO Independent Directors enhance transparency in Social Firms. 9 
PH Accountability indicates better governance performance 15,20,24 
P12 Boards should ensure that they are accountable for 
performance. 
13,14 
P13 Boards should ensure Social Firms are competitive in their 
chosen markets. 
30,34,35 
P14 Boards should provide strategic direction to enable business 
sustainability 
24,25,31 
P15 Boards should support managers to deliver on social 
objectives 
18,28,29 
P16 Boards should communicate their ethicality as a competitive 
advantage. 
36 
P17 Short tenure improves Director effectiveness. 16,22 
P18 Director remuneration is not linked to their performance. 21 
P19 Sustainability should be a key long-term objective of a 
Social Firm. 
33 
P20 Accountability enhances legitimacy. 20 
P21 Legitimate governance is linked to the influence of shared 
values in Board-level decisions. 
39,41,42, 
44 
1xvii 
P22 Legitimacy is acquired by maximising social benefit. 45 
P23 Transparency and accountability equate to sustainability. 37 
P24 Board processes and decisions are based on institutional 
norms. 
23,40 
1xviii 
APPENDIX 8 
TAKERT STATEMENTS 
lxix 
Number Transparency Statements Linking Theory 
S1 Board clearly understands needs of Low, 2006 
stakeholders. 
S2 Transparent Board decisions indicate Aguilera, 2005; Gray, 
Social Firm run properly. 1992; Paton, 2003; 
Strenger, 2004; Tullberg, 
2005; Turnbull, 1997 
S3 The more transparent our organisation, O'Neill, Saunders and 
the better we will perform. McCarthy, 1989; 
Verschoor, 1998 
S4 Democratic election of Directors is more Pearce, 2003; 
important than business skills. 
S5 Performance results are disseminated to Bushman et al., 2004; 
all staff by the Board. Bushman and Smith, 
2003; Patel, Balic and 
Bwakira, 2002) 
S6 Staff members are represented at Board Huse, 1998; Luoma and 
meetings. Goodstein, 1999 
S7 Board member elections are democratic Owen, Swift, Humphrey 
and externally scrutinised. and Bowerman, 2000; 
Owen, Swift and Hunt, 
2001 
S8 Directors consult range of stakeholders Owen, Swift, Humphrey 
before making important decisions. and Bowerman, 2000; 
Owen, Swift and Hunt, 
2001 
S9 Independent Directors likely to improve Aguilera, 2005; Johnson, 
Board effectiveness. Daily and Ellstrand, 
1996; Roberts et al., 
2005; Short et al., 2005; 
Weir and Laing, 2001 
lxx 
Number Accountability Statements Linking Theory 
Slo Directors meet ethical standards. Davis, 1994 
Sil Directors monitor staff to maintain Davis, 1994 
ethical standards. 
S12 Trust is important in Board Nobbie and Brudney, 
effectiveness. 2003; Zand, 1972; 
Zandstra, 2002 
S13 Directors should monitor job role and Dart, 2004; Baysinger 
performance. and Butler, 1985; Miller, 
2002 
S14 The process of auditing can improve our Westphal and 
performance. Fredrickson, 2001 
S15 Social enterprises should have better Mason, Kirkbride and 
ethical performance than expected of Bryde, 2007; Pearce, 
for-profits. 2003 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 
S16 Frequent review of Directors would 1988; Santora and 
improve control and performance. S arros, 200 1; Cowan, 
Rohe and Baku, 1999; 
Preston and Brown, 2004 
F S17 Paton, 2003; Pearce, 
Important that Board informs 2003; Bushman et al., 
stakeholders about performance. 2004; Bushman and 
Smith, 2003; Patel, Balic 
and Bwakira, 2002 
S18 F Board significantly influences how I do Stead and Stead, 2000 
my job. 
lxxi 
S19 Board promotes professional standards Davis, 1994 
to improve the standard of work. 
Kearns, 1994b; Roberts, 
S20 Ensuring Board accountability is key 2001; Van Kersbergen 
aspect of good governance. and Van Waarden, 2004; 
Westphal and Zajac, 
1998 
S21 Paying Directors a competitive salary Cowan et al., 1999; 
would improve their performance. Hallock, 2000 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 
S22 The Social Firm would need to change 1988; Santora and 
the Board if it was no longer competitive Sarros, 2001; Cowan, 
in its chosen markets. Rohe and Baku, 1999; 
Preston and Brown, 2004 
S23 It is important that the Board follow 
proper procedure and act in the interests Scott, 2001; Zucker, 
of our stakeholders, even if it is not the 1977 
best business decision. 
lxxii 
Number Sustainability Statements Linking Theory 
S24 It is important that the Board offers Aucoin and Heintzman, 
strategic direction to support what 2002; Gray et al., 1996; 
managers do. Moir, 2001; Deakin and 
Hughes, 1997 
S25 Directors have promoted awareness of Westphal and 
business strategy of Social Firm. Fredrickson, 2001 
S26 Board provides strategic direction to Dart, 2004; Low, 2006; 
better serve stakeholders. Westphal and 
Fredrickson, 2001 
S27 Directors maintain balance between Cornforth, 2003a; Dart, 
business and social objectives. 2004; Harrow and 
Palmer, 2003; Low, 2006 
S28 The Board of Directors are supportive. Stead and Stead, 2000 
S29 Board understand how managers add Stead and Stead, 2000 
value. 
S30 Directors should ensure the Social Firm Dart, 2004; Baysinger 
is efficient to compete in chosen and Butler, 1985; Miller, 
markets. 2002 
S31 Board has clear vision of how to sustain Westphal and 
stakeholder benefit. Fredrickson, 2001 
S32 Board has range of skills to sustain Thompson and Doherty, 
social benefit we deliver. 2006 
S33 Sustainability is a key long term Alter, 2004; Dees, 1994; 
objective of this firm. Harding, 2004; Paton, 
2003; Pearce, 2003 
lxxiii 
S34 Important that our Social Firm performs Dart, 2004; Mason, 
well compared to our competitors. Kirkbride and Bryde, 
2007 
S35 My organisation is successful at meeting Dart, 2004, Thompson 
the needs of its customers. and Doherty, 2006; 
Westall, 2001 
S36 Directors communicate distinct ethical Doherty and Tranchell, 
approach as a competitive advantage. 2005; Thompson and 
Doherty, 2006 
S37 Transparency and accountability affect Gray, 1992 
sustainability. 
lxxiv 
Number Legitimacy Statements Linking Theory 
S38 Reconciling business and social Paton, 2003; Westphal 
objectives is important task for the and Fredrickson, 2001 
Board. 
S39 Staying true to our mission is central to Pearce, 2003; Scott, 
future success. 2001; Zucker, 1977 
S40 Board acts in a way that is faithful to our Scott, 2001; Zucker, 
guiding values. 1977 
S41 Social Firm has strong set of values Dart, 2004; Mason, 
allowing us to fulfil obligations to Kirkbride and Bryde, 
stakeholders. 2007; Westall, 2001 
S42 Success is how well we serve our Pearce, 2003; Westall, 
stakeholders, rather than by business 2001 
performance. 
S43 The Board's activities and decision are Pearce, 2003; Reid and 
based on the "way things have been Griffith, 2006; Scott, 
done in the past". 2001; Zucker, 1977 
S44 Empathy with our stakeholders makes it Edmunds and 
more likely that governance will be run Wollenberg, 2001 
in their interests. 
S45 Our work is worthwhile only if we see Pearce, 2003 
real benefit to our stakeholders as a 
result of it. 
lxxv 
APPENDIX 9 
PROPOSITIONS AND RELATED SIGNIFICANT FACTORS 
lxxvi 
Proposition Significant 
factor(s) 
Board 
PI The Social Firm Board must successfully balance membership 
social aims with business-focus. 
Board 
effectiveness 
P2 The Board of Directors should have the skills Source of 
required to govern the social enterprise effectively. income 
P3 Social enterprises are expected to be more ethical Budget 
than for-profit organisations. responsibility 
P4 Democracy is an integral part of Social Firm Decision- 
governance. making 
authority 
Annual 
P5 Stakeholder inclusion at Board level is a feature of turnover 
Social Firm governance. 
Board 
membership 
P6 Transparency indicates better governance Type of staff 
performance. employed 
P7 Trust is an indicator of Board transparency. Budget 
responsibility 
lxxvii 
Board 
effectiveness 
Decision 
making 
P8 Disclosure is a facet of transparent governance in authority 
Social Fin-ns. 
Board 
membership 
Years in 
operation 
P9 Ethical performance is a responsibility of Social Firm Job title 
Directors. 
Number of 
Board 
members 
PIO Independent Directors enhance transparency in Social Not 
Firms. significant 
Social audit 
PH Accountability indicates better governance 
performance Annual 
turnover 
Number of 
Board 
P12 Boards should ensure that they are accountable for members 
performance. 
Decision- 
making 
authority 
lxxviii 
Board 
membership 
Boards should ensure Social Firms are competitive in 
P13 their chosen markets. Number of 
Board 
members 
Board 
effectiveness 
Board 
membership 
P14 Boards should provide strategic direction to enable 
business sustainability Number of 
Board 
members 
Decision 
making 
authority (on 
two counts) 
Board 
P15 Boards should support managers to deliver on social effectiveness 
objectives 
Budget 
responsibility 
P16 Boards should communicate their ethicality as a Not 
competitive advantage. significant 
Budget 
responsibility 
P17 Short tenure improves Director effectiveness. 
Number of 
Board 
members 
lxxix 
P18 Director remuneration is not linked to their Number of 
performance. Board 
members 
pig Sustainability should be a key long-term objective of None shown 
a Social Firm. to be relevant 
Social audit 
P20 Accountability enhances legitimacy. Number of 
Board 
members 
P21 Legitimate governance is linked to the influence of Number of 
shared values in Board-level decisions. Board 
members 
Type of staff 
employed 
P22 Legitimacy is acquired by maximising social benefit. 
Number of 
staff 
P23 Transparency and accountability equate to Not 
sustainability. significant 
P24 Board processes and decisions are based on Budget 
institutional norms. responsibility 
lxxx 
APPENDIX 10 
OUTCOME OF PROPOSITION ANALYSIS - SUPPORTING FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
lxxxi 
Proposition Would it 
support 
further 
research? 
PI The Social Firm Board must successfully balance social Yes 
aims with business-focus. 
P2 The Board of Directors should have the skills required to Limited 
govern the social enterprise effectively. support 
P3 Social enterprises are expected to be more ethical than Limited 
for-profit organisations. support 
P4 Democracy is an integral part of Social Firm governance. Limited 
support 
P5 Stakeholder inclusion at Board level is a feature of Social Yes 
Firm governance. 
P6 Transparency indicates better governance performance. Limited 
support 
P7 Trust is an indicator of Board transparency. Limited 
support 
P8 Disclosure is a facet of transparent governance in Social Yes 
Finns. 
P9 Ethical performance is a responsibility of Social Firm Yes 
Directors. 
plo F Independent Directors enhance transparency in Social No 
Firms. 
pil Accountability indicates better governance performance YCS 
lxxxii 
P12 Boards should ensure that they are accountable for Yes 
performance. 
P13 Boards should ensure Social Firms are competitive in Yes 
their chosen markets. 
P 14 Boards should provide strategic direction to enable Yes 
business sustainability 
P15 Boards should support managers to deliver on social Yes 
objectives 
P16 Boards should communicate their ethicality as a No 
competitive advantage. 
P17 Short tenure improves Director effectiveness. Yes 
Limited 
P18 Director remuneration is not linked to their performance. support 
pig Sustainability should be a key long-term objective of a No 
Social Firm. 
P20 Accountability enhances legitimacy. Yes 
P21 Legitimate governance is linked to the influence of Limited 
shared values in Board-level decisions. support 
P22 Legitimacy is acquired by maximising social benefit. Yes 
P23 Transparency and accountability equate to sustainability. No 
P24 Board processes and decisions are based on institutional Limited 
norms. support 
lxxxiii 
APPENDIX 11 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
lxxxiv 
Hello! My name is Chris Mason, a Ph. D. researcher at Liverpool John Moores University. My research is 
focussed on the governance of Social Firms, and I am trying to collect managerial perspectives of the 
performance of the Social Firm Board of Directors. I would like to ask if you would mind giving me 10 
minutes of your time to complete the attached questionnaire. 
This questionnaire aims to collect your attitudes of how effective the Board of Directors of your 
Social Firm is. The form is split into five sections. Firstly, it asks for some information about the Social Firms 
that you work for and the type of job that you do. Next, there are three sections that require you to indicate 
your level of agreement with a set of statements related to the performance of your Board of Directors. 
Finally, there is a section that asks for a contact email address or telephone number (optional) if you are 
interested in being interviewed by me to further gather your perceptions, or of the research in general. The 
questionnaire and my research in general, are subject to the ethical standards maintained at my University, 
and so your confidentiality is my priority. If you have any questions about me or my research, please 
contact me on c. mason@limu. ac. uk, or my Director of Studies, Prof. James Kirkbride on 
i. kirkbride Q I'mu. ac. uk 
About your role 
(Please type your answer, or click once on the appropriate tick box) 
Your job title 
Time spent in this role: 
Less than a year F-1 
1-5 years 
6- 10 years 
11 or more years 
Are you also a Board member? 
Yes 
No 
If yes, please state in what capacity you sit on the Board and for how long: 
Do you have responsibility for managing a budget? 
Yes R 
No F1 
lxxxv 
About your Social Firm 
Name of Social Firm 
Location 
Nature of business activity 
Years in operation: 
Lessthan 1year 
D 
2-5 years 
Fý 
6-9 years 
10 years or longer 
Type of staff employed: 
Salaried 
F1 
Volunteers 
0 
El 
0 
El 
F-1 
0 
Annual turnover: 
Less than 50k 
51 k to 1 00k 
1 00k or more El 
Main source of income: 
Trading 
Mixture of trading and grants 
Number of staff employed: 
Less than 10 
11-50 
51-100 
100 or more 
0 
Fj 
El 
0 
How long do Board members serve on the Board? 
1 year or less F-1 
2-5 years F1 
Longer than 5 years EJ 
Unsure M 
Number of Board members 
Does your Social Firm conduct a social audit? 
Yes F-1 
No Fý 
Unsure M 
If yes, do you contribute to social audit process, and how? 
Who has the ultimate decision-making authority in your organisation? 
Chief Executive 0 
Salaried Board of Directors 
Board of Trustees 
None of the above 
If the final option, please explain how decision are made 
Do you feel that the Board of Directors of your Social Firm is effective? 
Yes 
No 
Unsure 
Please explain your answer 
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Please read each statement on the next two pages and tick one box that 
describes your level of agreement with each one. 
CM 
< 
CO 
V) 
(D 
7ý 
:3 Ca 
U) 
L- 
0) < a) Z .9 0 
P 
U) 
The Board of Directors has a clear understanding of the needs of our EJ I 1: 1 11 1-: 1 El 
stakeholders. I Transparent Board decisions indicate Social Firm run properly. El 1-: 1 El EJ El 
The more transparent our organisation, the better we will perform. R El m EJ m 
Democratic election of Directors is more important than ensuring they have 
business appropriate skills and experience. 
Performance results are disseminated to all staff by the Board. El EJ 1: 1 El El 
Staff members are represented at Board meetings. 
Board member elections are democratic and externally scrutinised. El o m EJ n 
Directors consult range of stakeholders before making important decisions. EJ EJ El 
Independent Directors are likely to improve Board effectiveness. EJ El EJ EJ El 
The Board of Directors meet ethical standards. 11 EJ EJ 
The Board of Directors monitor staff to maintain ethical standards. n n -M 
Trust is important feature of the effective of the Board. 1: 1 EJ EJ 
Directors should monitor job role and performance. En El EJ 
The process of auditing can improve our performance. 
Social enterprises should have better ethical performance than expected of for- El L] o m 
ýrofits. 
1 
Frequent review of Directors would improve control and performance. 11 0 EJ El El 
Important that Board informs stakeholders about performance. El m 0 0 1 01 
The Board of Directors significantly influence how I do my job. 
The Board of Directors promote professional standards to improve the standard El 
of work. 
Ensuring Board accountability is key aspect of good governance. 1: 1 EJ n EJ 0 
Paying Directors a competitive salary would improve their performance. M 
The Social Firm would need to change the Board if it was no longer competitive El n n 1: 1 El 
in its chosen markets. 
It is important that the Board follow proper procedure and act in the interests of EJ EJ El EJ 
Lour stakeholders, even if it is not the best business decision. I I I 
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It is important that the Board offers strategic direction to support what managers 
do. 
L] E-1 E-1 L] 
The Board of Directors has promoted an awareness of the business strategy of 
our Social Firm. 
Board provides strategic direction to better serve stakeholders. 
The Board of Directors maintain balance between business and social 
objectives. 
El 1-: 1 El 0 F-1 
The Board of Directors are supportive. ED E7 0- El r-1 
The Board of Directors understands how manager adds value. El El F-1 EJ 
Directors should ensure the Social Firm is efficient to compete in chosen 
markets. 
1: 1 El El 
The Board of Directors has clear vision of how to sustain stakeholder benefit. 0 EJ El 
The 3oard of Directors has range of skills to sustain social benefit we deliver. F] 11 El EJ 
Achieving sustainability is a key long term objective of this firm. El M M 11 EJ 
Important that our Social Firm performs well compared to our competitors. 1-: 1 El El 
My organisation is successful at meeting the needs of its customers. 0 
The 3oard of Directors communicate distinct ethical approach as a competitive 
advantage. 
EJ EJ 1: 1 El 
Transparency and accountability affect sustainability. 0 El El EJ M 
Reconciling business and social objectives is important task for the Board. EJ EY El El 
Staying true to our mission is central to the future success of the Social Firm. 11 EJ EJ M El 
The Board of Directors acts in a way that is faithful to our guiding values. 11 EY = 1: 1 EJ 
Social Firm has strong set of values allowing us to fulfil obligations to 
stakeholders. 
EJ ET = 70- 
'Success' is how well we serve our stakeholders, rather than by business 
performance. 
El 1: 1 = 0 M 
The Board's activities and decision are based on the "way things have been 
done in the past". 
1-: 1 El El El El 
Empathy with our stakeholders makes it more likely that governance will be run 
in their interests. 
EJ a- [: ] 
6-ur tork is worthwhile only if we see real benefit to our stakeholders as a result 
of it. 
El El 
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Thank you for completing this questionnaire! As part of the research, I wish to arrange 
interviews with survey respondents to improve the depth of the data you have provided. If 
you would be willing to participate in these interviews, please fill in your contact details 
below. If you do not wish to take part, but would like to be kept informed as to the outcomes 
of this research, I will be more than happy to keep you updated as it progresses. 
Please contact me for an interview Ej Please keep me informed about the research 
n 
The best time of day to contact me is 
Name 
Organisation 
Contact telephone number 
Contact email address 
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